Methods, apparatus and computer program product for protecting a confidential integrated circuit design process. The computer-implemented method includes receiving a design specification dataset from a first untrusted computing device; extracting confidential design specification data from the design specification dataset; encrypting the confidential design specification data to produce encrypted confidential design specification data; generate a first encryption key to be associated with the encrypted confidential design specification data; retrieving a confidential design specification data subset for replacing a design element subset with a security hard macro (SHM) placeholder design element set; generating a security hard macro (SHM) placeholder feature set comprising those security hard macro (SHM) placeholder features representing mappings from the confidential design specification data subset to the SHM placeholder design element set; and transmitting, to the first untrusted computing device, the encrypted confidential design specification data, the first encryption key, and the SHM placeholder feature set.

A secret share value [q] of a quotient q of a/p is obtained through secure computation using a secret share value [a] and a modulus p and [a/d.sub.0]=[(a+qp)/d.sub.0]−[q]p/d.sub.0, . . . , [a/d.sub.n−1 ]=[(a+qp)/d.sub.n−1]−[q]p/d.sub.n−1 are obtained and output through secure computation using secret share values [a] and [q], divisors d.sub.0, . . . , d.sub.n−1, and a modulus p. Here, [μ] is a secret share value of μ, a is a real number, n is an integer equal to or greater than 2, d.sub.0, . . . , d.sub.n−1 are divisors of real numbers, p is a modulus of a positive integer, and q is a quotient of a positive integer.

One-to-many cryptographic systems and methods are disclosed, and a network employing the same, including numerous industry applications. The embodiments of the present invention can generate and regenerate the same symmetric key from a random token. The one-to-many cryptographic systems and methods include a central location and a cryptographic module being in communication with each other. The cryptographic module is configured to encrypt and/or decrypt data received a remote location and output encrypted and/or decrypted data. The cryptographic module includes a key generator configured to use two or more inputs to reproducibly generate the symmetric key and a cryptographic engine configured to use the symmetric key for encrypting and decrypting data. Corresponding methods, and network employing the same, are also provided.

One-to-many cryptographic systems and methods are disclosed, and a network employing the same, including numerous industry applications. The embodiments of the present invention can generate and regenerate the same symmetric key from a random token. The one-to-many cryptographic systems and methods include a central location and a cryptographic module being in communication with each other. The cryptographic module is configured to encrypt and/or decrypt data received a remote location and output encrypted and/or decrypted data. The cryptographic module includes a key generator configured to use two or more inputs to reproducibly generate the symmetric key and a cryptographic engine configured to use the symmetric key for encrypting and decrypting data. Corresponding methods, and network employing the same, are also provided.

An integrated circuit device includes a semiconductor substrate layer and at least one active layer including electronic components and supported by the semiconductor substrate layer. The semiconductor substrate layer and the at least one active layer are sandwiched between two protective layers acting as physical obstacles to prevent the passage of radiations. In addition, the two protective layers are electrically connected to a detection circuit that can monitor an electrical information of the protective layers and detect a physical attack of at least one of the two protective layers, based on the monitored electrical information.

The described techniques facilitate the secure transmission of sensor measurement data to an ECU by implementing an authentication procedure. The authentication procedure includes an integrated circuit (IC) generating authentication tags by encrypting portions of sensor measurement data. These authentication tags are then transmitted together with the sensor measurement data as authenticated sensor measurement data. The ECU may then use the authentication tags to authenticate the sensor measurement data based upon a comparison of the portions of the sensor measurement data sensor measurement data to the authentication tag that is expected to be generated for those portions of sensor measurement data.

The invention relates to an electronic device, and more particularly, to systems, devices and methods of authenticating the electronic device using a challenge-response process that is based on a physically unclonable function (PUF). The electronic device comprises a PUF element, a processor and a communication interface. The PUF element generates an input signal based on at least one PUF that has unique physical features affected by manufacturing variability. A challenge-response database, comprising a plurality of challenges and a plurality of corresponding responses, is set forth by the processor based on the PUF-based input and further provided to a trusted entity. During the trusted transaction, the processor generates a response in response to a challenge sent by the trusted entity based on the PUF-based input, and thereby, the trusted entity authenticates the electronic device by comparing the response with the challenge-response database.

The invention relates to an electronic device, and more particularly, to systems, devices and methods of authenticating the electronic device using a challenge-response process that is based on a physically unclonable function (PUF). The electronic device comprises a PUF element, a processor and a communication interface. The PUF element generates an input signal based on at least one PUF that has unique physical features affected by manufacturing variability. A challenge-response database, comprising a plurality of challenges and a plurality of corresponding responses, is set forth by the processor based on the PUF-based input and further provided to a trusted entity. During the trusted transaction, the processor generates a response in response to a challenge sent by the trusted entity based on the PUF-based input, and thereby, the trusted entity authenticates the electronic device by comparing the response with the challenge-response database.

A data security apparatus includes an analog component. The analog component operates internally with a high degree of entropy. This high degree of entropy resides in the interactions between its internal components in response to an external driving signal. The interactions within the analog component have a level of entropy that is high enough to make digital simulation of the analog component impractical. Because the analog component is impractical to digitally simulate it is referred to as being digitally unclonable. The data security apparatus processes data by encrypting plaintext data into ciphertext and/or decrypting data from ciphertext into plaintext. Part of the conversion between plaintext and ciphertext uses the analog component. Since the analog component is digitally unclonable (that is, impractical to digitally simulate), the part of the conversion process that uses the analog component requires possession of the analog component itself or the possession of another analog component that has the same signature.

A data security apparatus includes an analog component. The analog component operates internally with a high degree of entropy. This high degree of entropy resides in the interactions between its internal components in response to an external driving signal. The interactions within the analog component have a level of entropy that is high enough to make digital simulation of the analog component impractical. Because the analog component is impractical to digitally simulate it is referred to as being digitally unclonable. The data security apparatus processes data by encrypting plaintext data into ciphertext and/or decrypting data from ciphertext into plaintext. Part of the conversion between plaintext and ciphertext uses the analog component. Since the analog component is digitally unclonable (that is, impractical to digitally simulate), the part of the conversion process that uses the analog component requires possession of the analog component itself or the possession of another analog component that has the same signature.