G01S7/021

ELECTRONIC CIRCUIT FOR DETECTING AN ULTRA-WIDEBAND PULSE
20230035736 · 2023-02-02 ·

An electronic circuit for detecting an ultra-wideband pulse, the electronic circuit comprising an analog input terminal configured for connection to an ultra-wideband antenna, a low noise amplifier connected to the analog input terminal and configured to amplify one or more ultra-wideband pulses received via the ultra-wideband antenna, and a comparator connected to the low noise amplifier and configured to generate a wake-up trigger signal for ultra-wideband pulses exceeding a pre-defined pulse amplitude threshold.

Radiant-panel radio stimulation device

A stimulation device notably for testing radio reception devices is provided. It includes a signal generator delivering an amplitude-phase law for beam-forming purposes, transmitted in the form of a composite laser beam which illuminates a matrix of photodiodes of an emission subassembly with active modules separate from the generator, each wavelength of the beam carrying one of the signals defining the amplitude-phase law, intended for an active module. The device comprises means for measuring the orientation of the composite laser beam relative to the matrix of photodiodes of the emission subassembly and the distance traveled by the beam thereto, and correcting the phase law generated by the signal generator so as to neutralize the stray phase-shifts induced by these parameters on the signals transmitted to the emission subassembly.

Technology to support the coexistence of multiple independent lidar sensors

Systems, apparatuses and methods may provide for technology that initiates one or more optical pulses in accordance with a first emission pattern, obtains a second emission pattern in response to one or more of a time-variable trigger or a deviation of one or more received optical reflections from an expected reflection pattern, and initiates one or more optical pulses in accordance with the second emission pattern. Moreover, infrastructure node technology may detect, based on an interference notification from a first sensor platform, a deviation of received optical reflection(s) from an expected reflection pattern, select emission parameter(s) in response to the deviation, and alter a first emission pattern with respect to the selected emission parameter(s) to obtain a second emission pattern.

Emitter Identification through Unobserved Parameters

An apparatus and method identify emitters. The apparatus includes a receiver, a parameter estimator, a database, and a correlator. The receiver receives an electromagnetic signal from an emitter and measures actual values of observed parameters of the electromagnetic signal. The parameter estimator surmises surmised values of unobserved parameters from the actual values of the observed parameters. The actual values of the observed parameters and the surmised values of the unobserved parameters characterize the emitter. The database stores one or more entries for each emitter. Each entry specifies an identifier of an emitter and exemplary values of the observed and unobserved parameters. The correlator matches the actual values of the observed parameters and the surmised values of the unobserved parameters with the exemplary values of one of the entries of the emitter from which the receiver receives the electromagnetic signal. The correlator outputs the identifier from this entry in the database.

Service for real-time spoofing/jamming/meaconing warning

A method is disclosed that includes obtaining one or more pieces of threat information indicative of a data set enabling positioning based on radio signals sent by a respective radio node. The data set is further indicative of one or more parameters based on which said positioning is performed and/or controlled and which is considered to be at least partially unexpected. The method also includes utilizing the one or more pieces of threat information in a positioning. In order to obtain the one or more pieces of threat information, the method includes at least one of: obtaining the one or more pieces of threat information by using an application programming interface; or obtaining the one or more pieces of spoofing information by using a push method. A corresponding apparatus, computer-readable storage medium and system are also disclosed.

Method for detecting conflicts in the II/SI identification code of a mode S radar with nearby radars, and secondary radar implementing such a method
11604269 · 2023-03-14 · ·

A method for detecting conflicts in the II/SI identification code of radars nearby a secondary mode-S radar, includes at least: a first step wherein the radar detects unsolicited unsynchronized replies, i.e. fruits, in a region of extended radar coverage; a second step wherein the radar detects a conflict in II/SI code by analyzing geographic regions of radar coverage common to the radar and to at least one nearby radar, a conflict being detected if the radar: detects, in the region of extended coverage, the presence of fruits that have as source the nearby radar; observes the absence of fruits caused by the nearby radar in that region of radar coverage of the radar which does not overlap with the region of radar coverage of the nearby radar; the region of overlap between the radar coverage of the radar and the radar coverage of the nearby radar forming a region of conflict in II/SI code.

Wireless Communication System and Method
20230125956 · 2023-04-27 ·

A wireless communication system includes a first terminal and a routing device. The routing device is configured to perform channel availability check (CAC) before performing communication on a 5 gigahertz (GHz) channel of a first frequency bandwidth, and broadcast a beacon frame on the 5 GHz channel of the first frequency bandwidth when the routing device does not detect a radar signal. The routing device is configured to operate on the 5 GHz channel of the first frequency bandwidth, and the first frequency bandwidth includes a dynamic frequency selection DFS channel. The first terminal is configured to perform communication on the 5 GHz channel of the first frequency bandwidth when the first terminal is configured to operate on the 5 GHz channel of the first frequency bandwidth and receives the beacon frame on the DFS channel.

High probability of intercept radar detector

Operating a police radar detector to suppress nuisance radar alerts due to received signals that are not police radar signals includes receiving electromagnetic signals; mixing received electromagnetic signals with a local oscillator signal that is swept at a constant sweep rate; and accumulating a virtual image of the signal environment represented by received electromagnetic signals. Analysis of the virtual image is performed for signals suspected of being nuisance signals that could result in nuisance radar alert so that any nuisance signals within the virtual image can be identified and ignored by the alarm portion of the police radar detector.

POWER CONTROL AND BEAM MANAGEMENT FOR COMMUNICATION AND SENSING

Methods and apparatuses for power control and beam management to enable coexistence of radar sensing and wireless communication. A method for a UE includes determining a sensing category or characteristics for a sensing application, and selecting a spatial filter for radar sensing transmission or reception based on determined sensing category or characteristics. The method further includes identifying a radar sensing transmission power and transmitting or receiving radar sensing signals using the spatial filter and the identified radar sensing transmission power. The method further includes reporting one of communication blockage, radar sensing beam information, or CSI adapted to the radar sensing beam information to a base station or neighboring UEs.

SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR REDUCING FALSE RADAR DETECTION

Methods and systems for distinguishing between radar signals and Wi-Fi signals are provided. When a set of electromagnetic signals are received, various tests are performed on the signals to determine if the signals are associated with radar pulses or if the signals are more likely to be associated with stray WI-Fi signals or other non-radar interference. One such test relies on the relatively small variance of frequencies used by radar pulses when compared to the high variation of Wi-Fi signals. Another test relies on the relatively low peak to average power ratio of signals associated with radar pulses when compared to Wi-Fi signals. The tests described herein are an improvement on existing methods for distinguishing radar signals from Wi-Fi signals and result in less switching of Wi-Fi channels due to erroneously detected radar signals.