G01S7/38

Multi-platform location deception system
10277356 · 2019-04-30 · ·

Systems and methods for providing a synthetic track to observation devices are provided. In one embodiment, a method can include determining a location range and a time range for a synthetic track to be created by a plurality of platforms. The method can further include determining an emission location and an emission time for each of the platforms of the plurality of platforms based, at least in part, on the location range and the time range. The method can include sending a set of data to each of the plurality of platforms, each respective set of data indicating the emission location and the emission time at which the respective platform is to generate the emission to create the synthetic track.

Multi-platform location deception system
10277356 · 2019-04-30 · ·

Systems and methods for providing a synthetic track to observation devices are provided. In one embodiment, a method can include determining a location range and a time range for a synthetic track to be created by a plurality of platforms. The method can further include determining an emission location and an emission time for each of the platforms of the plurality of platforms based, at least in part, on the location range and the time range. The method can include sending a set of data to each of the plurality of platforms, each respective set of data indicating the emission location and the emission time at which the respective platform is to generate the emission to create the synthetic track.

Realtime electronic countermeasure assessment

A method of assessing the effectiveness of an electronic countermeasure (ECM) applied against an unknown, ambiguous, or unresponsive radar threat includes monitoring changes in a radar-associated factor while applying the ECM and determining if the ECM is disrupting the hostile radar. The radar-associated factor can be a weapon that is controlled by the radar threat, and assessing the ECM can include determining whether the weapon is misdirected due to applying the ECM. Or the radar-associated factor can be a feature of an RF waveform emitted by the radar threat, and assessing the ECM can include determining if the feature is changed due to applying the ECM. Continuous changes in the feature can indicate unsuccessful attempts to mitigate the ECM. Return of the feature to a pre-threat state can indicate disruption of the radar. The ECM can be selected from a library of countermeasures pre-verified as effective against known threats.

PROGRAMMABLE MULTI-WAVEFORM RF GENERATOR FOR USE AS BATTLEFIELD DECOY
20240237147 · 2024-07-11 ·

The invention relates to a portable electronic signal generator, and in particular a programmable multi-waveform radiofrequency generator for use as battlefield decoy.

PROGRAMMABLE MULTI-WAVEFORM RF GENERATOR FOR USE AS BATTLEFIELD DECOY
20240237147 · 2024-07-11 ·

The invention relates to a portable electronic signal generator, and in particular a programmable multi-waveform radiofrequency generator for use as battlefield decoy.

DETERRENT FOR UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS
20190072644 · 2019-03-07 ·

A system for providing integrated detection and deterrence against an unmanned vehicle including but not limited to aerial technology unmanned systems using a detection element, a tracking element, an identification element and an interdiction or deterrent element. Elements contain sensors that observe real time quantifiable data regarding the object of interest to create an assessment of risk or threat to a protected area of interest. This assessment may be based e.g., on data mining of internal and external data sources. The deterrent element selects from a variable menu of possible deterrent actions. Though designed for autonomous action, a Human in the Loop may override the automated system solutions.

DETERRENT FOR UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS
20190072644 · 2019-03-07 ·

A system for providing integrated detection and deterrence against an unmanned vehicle including but not limited to aerial technology unmanned systems using a detection element, a tracking element, an identification element and an interdiction or deterrent element. Elements contain sensors that observe real time quantifiable data regarding the object of interest to create an assessment of risk or threat to a protected area of interest. This assessment may be based e.g., on data mining of internal and external data sources. The deterrent element selects from a variable menu of possible deterrent actions. Though designed for autonomous action, a Human in the Loop may override the automated system solutions.

PHASE-CONJUGATE ANTENNA SYSTEM

Various embodiments of the present disclosure provide an antenna system including a first set of receive antenna elements and a second set of transmit antenna elements. Each receive antenna element is paired with one of the transmit elements. Paired receive and transmit antenna elements point in the same azimuthal direction, and the receive antenna element feeds its paired transmit antenna element. Each receive antenna element and each transmit antenna element has a phase center, and the phase centers of the receive and transmit antenna elements are all positioned substantially along the same axis. The receive and transmit elements are arranged in a phase-conjugate configuration such that, for each pair of receive and transmit antenna elements, those receive and transmit antenna elements are altitudinally spaced substantially the same distance from a plane through the antenna system.

METHOD FOR JAMMING SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADARS AND ASSOCIATED DEVICE
20190033427 · 2019-01-31 ·

A method for jamming airborne SAR radar implemented by a jamming device includes at least two cooperating units surrounding an area on the ground to be protected, at least two units providing a radar-detection function and at least one unit providing a radar-jamming function, each unit being interlinked by a two-way data link and being synchronized by a common clock, the method comprises a step of identifying the signals received and whether the received signals correspond to SAR signals; a step of characterizing the received SAR signal over a short duration; a step of computing a filter adapted to the signal; a step of carrying out pulse compression of the signal; a step of iteratively periodically characterizing the signal over a long duration; a step of computing the jamming signals to be transmitted; a step of transmitting the jamming signals.

METHOD FOR JAMMING SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADARS AND ASSOCIATED DEVICE
20190033427 · 2019-01-31 ·

A method for jamming airborne SAR radar implemented by a jamming device includes at least two cooperating units surrounding an area on the ground to be protected, at least two units providing a radar-detection function and at least one unit providing a radar-jamming function, each unit being interlinked by a two-way data link and being synchronized by a common clock, the method comprises a step of identifying the signals received and whether the received signals correspond to SAR signals; a step of characterizing the received SAR signal over a short duration; a step of computing a filter adapted to the signal; a step of carrying out pulse compression of the signal; a step of iteratively periodically characterizing the signal over a long duration; a step of computing the jamming signals to be transmitted; a step of transmitting the jamming signals.