Methods and systems for detecting nuclear material concealed within an enclosure are provided. An ionized air density is measured at one or more locations outside of the enclosure. The presence of the concealed nuclear material is detected, for each of the one or more locations, based on a characteristic of the measured ionized air density indicative of concealed nuclear materials.

Neutron multiplicity detector control logic and firmware may control a neutron multiplicity detector such that higher count rates can be achieved by an order of magnitude of more over conventional control logic and firmware. Count rates of over 1,000,000 cps, and even over 1,500,000 cps, have been realized in some implementations.

A device for determining the location of a source of radiation, based on data acquired at a single orientation of the device without iteration or rotations. Embodiments may comprise two side detector panels flanking a shield layer, plus a front detector positioned orthogonally in front of the side detectors. The various detectors thereby have contrasting angular sensitivities, so that a predetermined angular correlation function can determine the sign and magnitude of the source angle according to the detection rates. Rapid detection and localization of nuclear and radiological weapon materials enables greatly improved inspection of cargo containers and personnel. Advanced detectors such as those disclosed herein will be needed in the coming decades to protect against clandestine weapon transport.

A .sup.3Helium gas counter comprising a container, a gas tube within the container, and a mixture of .sup.3Helium and Xenon or a mixture of .sup.3Helium and Krypton. A method of making a .sup.3Helium gas counter comprising providing a container, placing a gas tube within the container, and depositing a mixture of .sup.3Helium and Xenon or a mixture of .sup.3Helium and Krypton into the gas tube.

The detection and assay of fissionable material is carried out on a container known or suspected to have a material with at least one fissionable isotope. The material is irradiated with neutrons from two or more different neutron sources. The fission rates inducted at each irradiation energy are acquired with at least one neutron detector. A multispectral active neutron interrogation analysis (MANIA) is carried out to compare the detected fission rates of the neutron spectra with calculated fission rates where an iterative algorithm is carried out on a system of linear equations to solve for the isotopic composition of one or more isotopes to determine the presence, identity, and quantities of fissionable isotopes in said container.

A system identifying a source of radiation is provided. The system includes a radiation source detector and a radiation source identifier. The radiation source detector receives measurements of radiation; for one or more sources, generates a detection metric indicating whether that source is present in the measurements; and evaluates the detection metrics to detect whether a source is present in the measurements. When the presence of a source in the measurements is detected, the radiation source identifier for one or more sources, generates an identification metric indicating whether that source is present in the measurements; generates a null-hypothesis metric indicating whether no source is present in the measurements; evaluates the one or more identification metrics and the null-hypothesis metric to identify the source, if any, that is present in the measurements.

Systems and methods for detecting clandestine fissile or radioactive material on the basis of emitted radiation and particles (such as neutrons and alpha particles) arising from within the material. Emission by the fissile or radioactive material is detected in conjunction with a conventional x-ray imaging system that includes an external source of illuminating penetrating radiation, at least one detector configured to detect at least the penetrating radiation and to generate a detector signal, and a processor configured as a detector signal discriminator to generate an output indicating whether the detector signal is triggered by an origin other than illuminating penetrating radiation. Active and passive modes of detection are described by some embodiments. Other embodiments are directed toward neutron detection, gamma ray detection with energy resolution, and designs of detectors to enhance the detection of clandestine nuclear material.

The invention is a gamma ray detector that locates a source, both horizontally and vertically. The detector comprises a tubular shield surrounded by scintillator panels. Gammas incident from one side can fully strike the scintillator facing the source, but are blocked from reaching the scintillators on the opposite side of the shield. The scintillator counting rates thus indicate the lateral direction of the source. By iteratively rotating toward the highest-counting scintillator, the detector converges to the source. An additional, central detector can be mounted within the tubular shield. When analyzed with the outer scintillators, the central detector determines the overall angular separation between the source and the detector axis, thereby locating the source in two dimensions automatically. The invention enables rapid detection and precise localization of clandestine nuclear and radiological weapons, despite shielding and clutter obfuscation, while quickly passing clean loads.

The invention relates to an improved method for detecting and possibly identifying and/or characterizing nuclear and/or radiological material in a container, vehicle, or on a person, comprising the steps of: a. providing at least one detector, which is capable of detecting radiation events being interrelated to nuclear or radiological material; b. bringing the at least one detector in the vicinity of the container, vehicle or person to be monitored; c. detecting radiation events being interrelated to the container, vehicle or person to be monitored; d. assigning each detected radiation event an individual time stamp in order to generate a time pattern of the detected radiation events; and e. analyzing the time pattern with respect to time correlation structures in order to identify a presence and/or characteristics of the nuclear or radiological material.

Embodiments are directed to comparison-based methods of conditionally assessing the excess in correlation of an unknown neutron count measurement compared to the correlation present in a data defined as background, and to providing a technical definition of excess correlation intended to properly handle the measured excess correlation. The degree of correlation between an unknown source and background can be used to prevent masking of neutron count data for the source by background radiation.