Out-of-bounds recovery circuits configured to detect an out-of-bounds violation in an electronic device, and cause the electronic device to transition to a predetermined safe state when an out-of-bounds violation is detected. The out-of-bounds recovery circuits include detection logic configured to detect that an out-of-bounds violation has occurred when a processing element of the electronic device has fetched an instruction from an unallowable memory address range for the current operating state of the electronic device; and transition logic configured to cause the electronic device to transition to a predetermined safe state when an out-of-bounds violation has been detected by the detection logic.

Out-of-bounds recovery circuits configured to detect an out-of-bounds violation in an electronic device, and cause the electronic device to transition to a predetermined safe state when an out-of-bounds violation is detected. The out-of-bounds recovery circuits include detection logic configured to detect that an out-of-bounds violation has occurred when a processing element of the electronic device has fetched an instruction from an unallowable memory address range for the current operating state of the electronic device; and transition logic configured to cause the electronic device to transition to a predetermined safe state when an out-of-bounds violation has been detected by the detection logic.

In an example embodiment, a system determines a set of instructions from the available instructions for a computer application. The determined set of instructions provides specific functionality of the computer application. The system may determine the set of instructions by performing functional testing and negative testing on the specific functionality. The system may reorganize and randomize the set of instructions in memory and write the reorganized set of instructions to a smaller memory space. For each available instruction not in the set of instructions, the system changes the respective instruction to inoperative to prevent execution of the respective instruction. The system may change the respective instruction to inoperative by overwriting the instruction with a NOP instruction. The system then captures a memory address of the computer application being accessed at runtime. The system may declare a security attack if the captured memory address matches a memory address for an inoperative instruction.

In an example embodiment, a system determines a set of instructions from the available instructions for a computer application. The determined set of instructions provides specific functionality of the computer application. The system may determine the set of instructions by performing functional testing and negative testing on the specific functionality. The system may reorganize and randomize the set of instructions in memory and write the reorganized set of instructions to a smaller memory space. For each available instruction not in the set of instructions, the system changes the respective instruction to inoperative to prevent execution of the respective instruction. The system may change the respective instruction to inoperative by overwriting the instruction with a NOP instruction. The system then captures a memory address of the computer application being accessed at runtime. The system may declare a security attack if the captured memory address matches a memory address for an inoperative instruction.

Disclosed herein are a dynamic security module server device for transmitting a dynamic security module to a user terminal and receiving a security management event from the user terminal, and a method of operating the dynamic security module server device. The dynamic security module server device includes a communication unit configured to transmit and receive a security management event over a network, and a processor configured to control the communication unit. The processor is configured to create a security session with the security client of a user terminal, and to transmit a dynamic security module to the security client of the user terminal so that part or all of code performing security management in the security client of the user terminal in which the security session has been created has a predetermined valid period.

Disclosed herein are a dynamic security module terminal device for receiving a dynamic security module and transmitting a security management event to a security server, and a method of operating the dynamic security module terminal device. The dynamic security module terminal device includes a communication unit configured to transmit and receive a security management event over a network, and a processor configured to control the communication unit. The processor is configured to create a security session with a security server, and to receive the dynamic security module from the security server so that part or all of code of the dynamic security module performing security management has a predetermined valid period.

Disclosed herein are a dynamic security module terminal device for receiving a dynamic security module and transmitting a security management event to a security server, and a method of operating the dynamic security module terminal device. The dynamic security module terminal device includes a communication unit configured to transmit and receive a security management event over a network, and a processor configured to control the communication unit. The processor is configured to create a security session with a security server, and to receive the dynamic security module from the security server so that part or all of code of the dynamic security module performing security management has a predetermined valid period.

Techniques are described for metadata processing that can be used to encode an arbitrary number of security policies for code running on a processor. Metadata may be added to every word in the system and a metadata processing unit may be used that works in parallel with data flow to enforce an arbitrary set of policies. In one aspect, the metadata may be characterized as unbounded and software programmable to be applicable to a wide range of metadata processing policies. Techniques and policies have a wide range of uses including, for example, safety, security, and synchronization. Additionally, described are aspects and techniques in connection with metadata processing in an embodiment based on the RISC-V architecture.

Techniques are described for metadata processing that can be used to encode an arbitrary number of security policies for code running on a processor. Metadata may be added to every word in the system and a metadata processing unit may be used that works in parallel with data flow to enforce an arbitrary set of policies. In one aspect, the metadata may be characterized as unbounded and software programmable to be applicable to a wide range of metadata processing policies. Techniques and policies have a wide range of uses including, for example, safety, security, and synchronization. Additionally, described are aspects and techniques in connection with metadata processing in an embodiment based on the RISC-V architecture.

An aspect of behavior of an embedded system may be determined by (a) determining a baseline behavior of the embedded system from a sequence of patterns in real-time digital measurements extracted from the embedded system; (b) extracting, while the embedded system is operating, real-time digital measurements from the embedded system; (c) extracting features from the real-time digital measurements extracted from the embedded system while the embedded system was operating; and (d) determining the aspect of the behavior of the embedded system by analyzing the extracted features with respect to features of the baseline behavior determined.