G06F2221/2125

SECURE LOW-LATENCY TRAPDOOR PROXY

A proxy system is installed on a computing device that is in the network path between the device and the Internet. The proxy system, residing on the computing device, decrypts and inspects all traffic going in and out of the computing device.

Big Data Distributed Processing and Secure Data Transferring with Resource Allocation and Rebate
20210209235 · 2021-07-08 ·

Aspects of the disclosure relate to resource allocation and rebating during in-flight data masking and on-demand encryption of big data on a network. Computer machine(s), cluster managers, nodes, and/or multilevel platforms can request, receive, and/or authenticate requests for a big data dataset, containing sensitive and non-sensitive data. Profiles can be auto provisioned, and access rights can be assigned. Server configuration and data connection properties can be defined. Secure connection(s) to the data store can be established. Sensitive information can be redacted into a sanitized dataset based on one or more data obfuscation types. RAM requirements and current RAM allocation can be diagnosed. Portion(s) of the current RAM allocation exceeding the RAM requirements can be rebated. The encrypted data can be transmitted, in response to the request, to a source, a target, and/or another computer machine and can be decrypted back into the sanitized dataset.

Big Data Distributed Processing and Secure Data Transferring with Fault Handling
20210208960 · 2021-07-08 ·

Aspects of the disclosure relate to resource allocation and rebating during in-flight data masking and on-demand encryption of big data on a network. Computer machine(s), cluster managers, nodes, and/or multilevel platforms can request, receive, and/or authenticate requests for a big data dataset, containing sensitive and non-sensitive data. Profiles can be auto provisioned, and access rights can be assigned. Server configuration and data connection properties can be defined. Secure connection(s) to the data store can be established. Sensitive information can be redacted into a sanitized dataset based on one or more data obfuscation types. Crashed executor(s) can be detected and caged to prevent further use. Uncompleted task(s) for crashed executor(s) can be reassigned. The encrypted data can be transmitted, in response to the request, to a source, a target, and/or another computer machine and can be decrypted back into the sanitized dataset.

Big Data Distributed Processing and Secure Data Transferring with Obfuscation
20210209202 · 2021-07-08 ·

Aspects of the disclosure relate to in-flight data masking and on-demand encryption of big data on a network. Computer machine(s), cluster managers, nodes, and/or multilevel platforms can request, receive, and/or authenticate requests for a big data dataset, containing sensitive and non-sensitive data, in a data store based on credentials received from a source. Profiles can be auto provisioned, and access rights can be assigned. Server configuration and data connection properties can be defined. A secure connection to the data store can be established. The sensitive information in the big data dataset can be redacted into a sanitized dataset based on one or more data obfuscation types. The encrypted data can be transmitted, in response to the request, to a source, a target, and/or another computer machine and can be decrypted back into the sanitized dataset.

Dynamically generated code process sandboxing using authenticated pointers

A method is provided for safely executing dynamically generated code to avoid the possibility of an attack in unprotected memory space. Upon ascertaining that dynamically generated code is to be executed, a processing circuit and/or operating system kernel restrict the dynamically generated code to use a first memory region within an unprotected memory space, where the first memory region is distinct (e.g., reserved) from other memory regions used by other processes executed by the processing circuit. A first processing stack is maintained for the dynamically generated code within the first memory region. This first processing stack is separate from a general processing stack used by other processes executed by the processing circuit. A stack pointer is switched/pointed to the first processing stack when the dynamically generated code is executed and the stack pointer is switched/pointed to the general processing stack when the dynamically generated code ends.

Systems and methods involving features of hardware virtualization such as separation kernel hypervisors, hypervisors, hypervisor guest context, hypervisor context, rootkit detection/prevention, and/or other features

Systems, methods, computer readable media and articles of manufacture consistent with innovations herein are directed to computer virtualization, computer security and/or data isolation. According to some illustrative implementations, innovations herein may utilize and/or involve a separation kernel hypervisor which may include the use of a guest operating system virtual machine protection domain, a virtualization assistance layer, and/or a rootkit defense mechanism (which may be proximate in temporal and/or spatial locality to malicious code, but isolated from it), inter alia, for detection and/or prevention of malicious code, for example, in a manner/context that is isolated and not able to be corrupted, detected, prevented, bypassed, and/or otherwise affected by the malicious code.

SPECULATION WITH INDIRECT CONTROL FLOW INSTRUCTIONS

There is provided input circuitry to receive input data. Output circuitry outputs a sequence of instructions to be executed by data processing circuitry. Generation circuitry performs a generation process to generate the sequence of instructions using the input data with at least some of the instructions being grouped into functions. The sequence of instructions comprises an indirect control flow instruction comprising a field that indicates where a target of the indirect control flow instruction is stored. The target is an entry point to one of the functions and the generation process causes at least one of the instructions in the sequence of instructions to store a state of control flow speculation after execution of the indirect control flow instruction.

IN-STREAM MALWARE PROTECTION

A protector server located in the Web traffic between an end-user computer and a Web site intercepts requests for Web pages from the Web site. The server inserts protection code into a Web page returned to the user computer which executes within the user browser. The code disables malware executing within the user browser by establishing itself as an event handler, finding likely malware in the stack, and disabling it. The code thwarts host-based malware by establishing itself as an event handler, and encrypting data fields of forms before the form is submitting to the operating system of the user computer. The code detects a Web inject attack by calculating a fingerprint for a form on the Web page and sending that fingerprint to the server. The server compares that fingerprint with one previously calculated for the form and generates an alert if different. The code detects a phishing attack by sending a notification to the server indicating within which domain it is executing. The server generates an alert if the received domain is different from an expected domain. The server provides a Web application firewall.

IN-STREAM MALWARE PROTECTION

A protector server located in the Web traffic between an end-user computer and a Web site intercepts requests for Web pages from the Web site. The server inserts protection code into a Web page returned to the user computer which executes within the user browser. The code disables malware executing within the user browser by establishing itself as an event handler, finding likely malware in the stack, and disabling it. The code thwarts host-based malware by establishing itself as an event handler, and encrypting data fields of forms before the form is submitting to the operating system of the user computer. The code detects a Web inject attack by calculating a fingerprint for a form on the Web page and sending that fingerprint to the server. The server compares that fingerprint with one previously calculated for the form and generates an alert if different. The code detects a phishing attack by sending a notification to the server indicating within which domain it is executing. The server generates an alert if the received domain is different from an expected domain. The server provides a Web application firewall.

Memory fractionation software protection
10891167 · 2021-01-12 · ·

A method of protecting software in a computer system includes defining a memory fractionation configuration for an application software program in the computer system, fractionating at least one page of the application software program into fractions according to the memory fractionation configuration, and running the application in such a manner that, at any particular point in time when the application is running, at least a first one of the fractions is stored in a manner that is not accessible from a user space or a kernel space of the computer system.