An apparatus for verifying an integrity of a device connected to a telecommunication network. The apparatus comprises at least one transceiver configured to broadcast a signal to the device via a non-network channel outside the telecommunication network for causing the device to provide a response to the signal depending on the integrity of the device. Further, the apparatus comprises an attestation server configured to receive the device's response and verify the integrity of the device depending on the device's response.

Whether a connected drive is an unauthorized drive or not can be judged before it becomes possible for the connected drive to access a memory for a storage controller. When a storage device is connected, an information processing apparatus forms a first communication channel via a first interface incapable of accessing a built-in memory even when the communication connection is established; and a second communication channel via a second interface capable of accessing the built-in memory when the communication connection is established. At a specified timing when the communication connection via the second communication channel is not established, a processor executes authenticity verification processing for verifying authenticity of the storage device on the basis of information acquired from the storage device by using the first communication channel and permits establishment of the communication connection via the second communication channel when the authenticity is confirmed by the authenticity verification processing.

This disclosure relates to using trust tokens to verify the integrity of devices and applications from which data is received. In one aspects, a method includes receiving, from a client device, a request for one or more trust tokens. The request includes at least one of one or more device-level fraud detection signals obtained from the client device or data representing code of an application that initiated the request. The request also includes a respective nonce for each of the one or more trust tokens. A determination is made, based on at least one of the one or more device-level fraud signals or the data representing the code of the application, to issue the one or more trust tokens to the client device. Each trust token is generated using the nonce for the trust token. The one or more trust tokens are provided to the client device.

A processor may receive user command generated by a user. A processor may analyze user information for one or more official activities. The one or more official activities are based, at least in part, on a security policy. A processor may identify the user information is associated with the one or more official activities. A processor may prevent, responsive to determining the user command is associated with the one or more official activities, the one or more personal devices from collecting the user command.

End user presence and absence states are determined at an information handling system by analyzing infrared time of flight sensor presence detection information with configuration settings based upon operating conditions at the information handling system. User presence and absence state accuracy is validated and invalidated to analyze and determine optimal configuration settings for each of plural operating conditions, such as the location of the information handling system, ambient light and the availability of plural infrared time of flight sensors, such as the availability of secondary infrared time of flight sensors integrated in peripheral devices.

An electronic device includes a communication unit that communicates with a battery, a storage unit that stores a first identification information of the battery, and a determination unit that determines whether the communication unit is capable of performing a predetermined communication with the battery, in a case where a second identification information of the battery received from the battery is matched with the first identification information stored in the storage unit.

An information handling system includes a provisioning server and a server. The server includes a baseboard management controller (BMC) to determine a first hardware inventory profile for the server. The BMC provides the first hardware inventory profile to the provisioning server. The BMC stores first signed provisioning configuration content that is based on a first ownership certificate for a first owner of the server. The BMC determines a second hardware inventory profile for the server, and provides the second hardware inventory profile to the provisioning server. The BMC stores second signed provisioning configuration content that is based on a second ownership certificate for a second owner of the server. In response to an expiration of the second ownership certificate, the BMC removes the second signed provisioning configuration content, compares a current hardware inventory profile to the first hardware inventory profile, and generates a report to indicate any hardware changes.

Techniques of keyless authentication of computing services in distributed computing systems are disclosed herein. One example technique includes upon receiving a command to instantiate a computing service, transmitting a request to an authentication service for an identity assertion token corresponding to an application execution of which instantiates the computing service. The example technique can also include upon receiving the requested identity assertion token, storing the received identity assertion token in the container and modifying an entry of a configuration file in the container that allows the instantiated computing service to access the stored identity assertion token and authenticate to the authentication service using the identity assertion token.

The authentication and authorization system includes an application execution unit, a user information storage unit, a token acquisition unit configured to acquire, using the user information acquired from the user information storage unit, an access token from an authorization server that authorizes the application to use the external service when a valid access token is presented via the cooperation unit, and a token storage unit configured to store the acquired access token. The token acquisition unit acquires the access token from the authorization server at a predetermined cycle, and stores it in the token storage unit. When the application uses the external service, the application execution unit requests a cooperation unit to make the application cooperate with the external service using the access token acquired from the token storage unit.

In one example, a non-transitory computer readable medium for component verification and revocation includes instructions for a processor to verify that a component in a device is valid using a verification service and consequently enable a premium service. The processor may later use information from the verification service that the component is no longer valid and consequently alter the premium service.