A system for optimal power utilization and supply strategy in a microgrid has a smart meter connected to a micro grid, at least one micro electricity manager connected to the smart meter, at least one wireless switch board connected to the micro electricity manager, and at least one intelligent device connected to said micro electricity manager. The system for optimal power utilization and supply strategy is configured as a cyber-physical system capable of dynamic energy management to minimize mismatch between electricity demand and generation.

A method for verifying the wiring of an electrical energy meter, the meter comprising an upstream phase terminal, a downstream phase terminal and a cut-off member mounted between the upstream phase terminal and the downstream phase terminal, the verification method comprising the steps of: opening the cut-off member; measuring an upstream phase voltage upstream from the cut-off member and a downstream phase voltage downstream from the cut-off member; detecting, particularly according to a measurement of the upstream phase voltage and a measurement of the downstream phase voltage, a possible wiring error; if a wiring error is detected, generating and alert; if no wiring error is detected, closing the cut-off member and putting the meter in a nominal operating mode.

Provided is a system, comprising: an electrical power meter comprising: a network interface; electrical power inputs configured to receive electrical power from a power-distribution system of a vehicle facility configured to host a plurality of vehicles; first and second electrically controlled switches coupled to vehicle power connectors; and a client-side processor configured to communicate with a remote server system; and the remote server system, configured to: cause a user-computing device of a user to display a user interface by which power-delivery is configurable; receive a request to deliver electrical power via a vehicle power connector; and in response, transmitting, to the electrical power meter, a command that causes the client-side processor to adjust the electrically controlled switch.

A smart distribution power grid (SDPG) system has at least one micro-grid, each comprising a set of intelligent entities and a set of external Smart Distribution Nodes, and a communication system enabling communication within the set of intelligent entities, forming an overlay communication network on the microgrid. The communication system is deployed on the micro-grid in a manner minimizing installation cost, communication cost and overall maintenance cost of the SDPG.

Techniques for detecting electrical meter bypass theft are described herein. In one example, a time-series of voltage-changes and current-changes associated with electrical consumption measured at a meter are obtained. The time series may track associated voltage and current changes at short intervals (e.g., 5-minutes). The voltage and current changes may indicate a slight voltage change when an appliance is turned on or off. An analysis (e.g., a regression analysis) may be performed on the voltage-changes against the current-changes. Using the correlation from the analysis, it may be determined if the meter was bypassed.

A computer system analyzes data from smart meters. The computer system can, for example, analyze the data from a smart meter to determine if the smart meter is connected to a different distribution transformer, if the smart meter is at a customer site where power theft is occurring, if the smart meter is located at a customer site having a solar photovoltaic system, if the smart meter is located at a customer site having an electric vehicle, or if the smart meter is located at a grow house.

A security seal identification that may be matched with an identification of a utility measuring meter. This matching may be done, for instance, by a code which is imprinted on the seal and then matched to a meter number in a database, or by a code such as an encryption of the number assigned to the meter. An encryption may be read by an app on a smartphone or checked offline to determine whether the seal belongs to the meter or if it was altered or changed. A mismatch of numbers or symbols may generally indicate a change or manipulation and warrant an investigation.

A utility meter assembly having a base that is secured to a front cover. The assembly includes a dual locking system having a first locking position and a second locking position. In the first locking position, the front cover is removably secured with the base. In the second locking position, the front cover is permanently secured with the base to prevent separation of the two components unless one or both components are destroyed.

A utility meter includes a real-time clock (RTC), a supercapacitor, a power supply, and a set of photodiodes. The RTC keeps time utilized for time stamps applicable to events that occur during alternating current (AC) power outages of the utility meter, and the supercapacitor powers the RTC. The power supply operates in an active mode responsive to an AC line voltage meeting a threshold and, when in the active mode, charges the supercapacitor to power the RTC. The set of photodiodes absorbs energy from ambient light and charges the supercapacitor to power the RTC. Thus, the supercapacitor is configured to be charged based on the power supply and based on the set of photodiodes.

The present disclosure is concerned with measuring the amount of electrical energy consumed even when the electric meter has been tampered with. Electric meters may be fraudulently tampered with by connecting a bypass element, such as a conductive wire or cable, across the terminals of the meter in order to bypass the electric meter. This means that only part of the consumed electrical current passes through the electric meter for measurement, resulting in some of the consumed electrical energy not being measured and therefore not being billed for. However, in the present invention a technique has been developed to enable the electric meter to determine the amount of electrical current that bypasses the meter and therefore measure the amount electrical energy consumed even when the electric meter has been tampered with.