G06F21/87

Public view monitor with tamper deterrent and security

The present invention provides a device, comprising one or more embedded tamper deterrent and security systems that trigger an alarm if the device is tampered.

TAMPER-PROOF ELECTRONIC PACKAGES FORMED WITH STRESSED GLASS

Tamper-proof electronic packages and fabrication methods are provided which include a glass enclosure enclosing, at least in part, at least one electronic component within a secure volume, and a tamper-respondent detector. The glass enclosure includes stressed glass with a compressively-stressed surface layer, and the tamper-respondent detector monitors, at least in part, the stressed glass to facilitate defining the secure volume. The stressed glass fragments with an attempted intrusion event through the stressed glass, and the tamper-respondent detector detects the fragmenting of the stressed glass. In certain embodiments, the stressed glass may be a machined glass enclosure that has undergone ion-exchange processing, and the compressively-stressed surface layer of the stressed glass may be compressively-stressed to ensure that the stressed glass fragments into glass particles of fragmentation size less than 1000 μm with the intrusion event.

TAMPER-PROOF ELECTRONIC PACKAGES WITH STRESSED GLASS COMPONENT SUBSTRATE(S)

Tamper-proof electronic packages and fabrication methods are provided which include a glass substrate. The glass substrate is stressed glass with a compressively-stressed surface layer. Further, one or more electronic components are secured to the glass substrate within a secure volume of the tamper-proof electronic package. In operation, the glass substrate is configured to fragment with an attempted intrusion event into the electronic package, and the fragmenting of the glass substrate also fragments the electronic component(s) secured to the glass substrate, thereby destroying the electronic component(s). In certain implementations, the glass substrate has undergone ion-exchange processing to provide the stressed glass. Further, the electronic package may include an enclosure, and the glass substrate may be located within the secure volume separate from the enclosure, or alternatively, the enclosure may be a stressed glass enclosure, an inner surface of which is the glass substrate for the electronic component(s).

Method and apparatus for secure recordation of time of attempted breach of IC package
09813242 · 2017-11-07 · ·

An integrated circuit (IC) package includes a storage element and a protection component coupled to the storage element. The protection component includes a breach detection component configured to detect an attempted breach of the IC package. The protection component further includes a time detection component configured to determine a breach timestamp associated with a time of occurrence of the attempted breach and configured to store a representation of the breach timestamp in the storage element. The storage element may be configured to store a sensitive datum, and the time detection component may be configured to store the representation of the breach timestamp by overwriting the sensitive datum in the storage element with the representation of the breach timestamp.

Method and apparatus for secure recordation of time of attempted breach of IC package
09813242 · 2017-11-07 · ·

An integrated circuit (IC) package includes a storage element and a protection component coupled to the storage element. The protection component includes a breach detection component configured to detect an attempted breach of the IC package. The protection component further includes a time detection component configured to determine a breach timestamp associated with a time of occurrence of the attempted breach and configured to store a representation of the breach timestamp in the storage element. The storage element may be configured to store a sensitive datum, and the time detection component may be configured to store the representation of the breach timestamp by overwriting the sensitive datum in the storage element with the representation of the breach timestamp.

System and method for cryptographic key identification

A system includes a MEMS device and a key generating device formed over the substrate. The key generating device is configured to generate a cryptographic key based on a property of the MEMS device and the MEMS device is configured to output a signal indicative of a sensed parameter. The generated cryptographic key is based on the influenced output signal of the MEMS device.

System, method and computer program product for detecting tampering in a product
09798294 · 2017-10-24 · ·

A system for detecting tampering in a product having a tamper-detector seal, including a secure element configured to store a digital signature and a data associated with the digital signature, transmit the digital signature and the data associated with the digital signature in response to a request, detect tampering of the tamper-detector seal, and modify the data associated with the digital signature if tampering is detected. The system further includes a seal validation device configured to receive a public key associated with the product, request the digital signature and the data associated with the digital signature from the secure element, and validate the digital signature utilizing the data associated with the digital signature and the public key associated with the product.

Sharing output device between unsecured processor and secured processor

A point of sale (POS) device includes an output device such as a speaker, a display screen, or a network interface. The POS device also includes a secure enclosure housing a secure processor and tamper detection circuitry for detecting attempts to tamper with the secure enclosure. Use of the output device is shared between the secure processor and a main processor via a switch that is controlled by the secure processor. The secure processor can switch control of the output device from the main processor to itself and can output an output dataset via the output device in a number of scenarios. These scenarios include the secure processor detecting an attempt to tamper with the secure enclosure, the secure processor recognizing that the main processor is behaving suspiciously, or the secure processor wanting to output sensitive information. The output dataset may include visual data, audio data, or network data.

GANG CHARGER, SHROUD, AND DOCK FOR PORTABLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES

An anti-theft device for protecting a portable electronic device from theft or unauthorized removal in a retail environment is provided. The anti-theft device includes a shroud configured to at least partially receive and engage a portable electronic device. The anti-theft device also includes a dock configured to releasably engage the shroud. The dock is configured to engage the shroud in a locked configuration so as to prevent removal of the shroud and the portable electronic device from the dock and to disengage the shroud in an unlocked configuration so as to allow the shroud and the portable electronic device to be removed from the dock.

GANG CHARGER, SHROUD, AND DOCK FOR PORTABLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES

An anti-theft device for protecting a portable electronic device from theft or unauthorized removal in a retail environment is provided. The anti-theft device includes a shroud configured to at least partially receive and engage a portable electronic device. The anti-theft device also includes a dock configured to releasably engage the shroud. The dock is configured to engage the shroud in a locked configuration so as to prevent removal of the shroud and the portable electronic device from the dock and to disengage the shroud in an unlocked configuration so as to allow the shroud and the portable electronic device to be removed from the dock.