A mobile wallet for storing a digital asset, the mobile wallet may include a communication unit; a programmable logic device (PLD), a main controller, a secure element, and an anti-tamper unit that comprises one or more anti-tamper sensors. The secure element may be configured to store the digital asset. The communication unit may be configured to receive ingress traffic from outside the mobile wallet and to output egress traffic not blocked by the PLD. The PLD may be configured to monitor ingress traffic and egress traffic, and to determine whether to pass or block ingress messages of the ingress traffic and egress messages of the egress traffic. At least one of the main controller and the anti-tamper unit may be configured to detect a tamper attempt based on outputs of the one or more anti-tamper sensors. The main controller may be configured to assist in responding to a detected tamper attempt.

A security chip includes: a first dielectric layer; a second dielectric layer disposed on the first dielectric layer, where the first dielectric layer is an optically denser medium relative to the second dielectric layer, and a roughness of an upper surface of the first dielectric layer is greater than or equal to a preset threshold, so that light entering the second dielectric layer from the first dielectric layer is able to be totally reflected and/or scattered; and a semiconductor chip disposed on the second dielectric layer. Based on the above technical solution, light incident from a lower surface of the first dielectric layer is able to be totally reflected or scattered by the upper surface of the first dielectric layer, so that most of light cannot reach a logic or storage area on the front of the security chip, thereby achieving the purpose of resisting a laser attack.

Constructing a secure enclosure (hard wallet) as a randomized assembly of material constituents with a large variety of electrical conductivity attributes, thereby achieving a unique set of physically measured properties of the enclosure, so that a party can be convinced of the authenticity of the enclosure by comparing the results of real time measurements with measurements pre-recorded in a public ledger, and then extending this trust of the enclosure into trust towards digital money paid by said enclosure.

Constructing a secure enclosure (hard wallet) as a randomized assembly of material constituents with a large variety of electrical conductivity attributes, thereby achieving a unique set of physically measured properties of the enclosure, so that a party can be convinced of the authenticity of the enclosure by comparing the results of real time measurements with measurements pre-recorded in a public ledger, and then extending this trust of the enclosure into trust towards digital money paid by said enclosure.

Apparatus and methods for securing a communication link. The apparatus may include a microprocessor. The apparatus may include a memory cell. The apparatus may include a photovoltaic circuit. The apparatus may include a radio frequency transceiver circuit. The apparatus may include an organic light emitting diode display circuit. The microprocessor may be embedded in an information card. The memory cell may be embedded in the information card. The photovoltaic circuit may be embedded in the information card. The radio frequency transceiver may be embedded in the information card. The organic light emitting diode display may be embedded in the information card. The display circuit may include an array of separately excitable diode fields. The display circuit may include a display controller that is in electronic communication with each of the fields.

An example method may include transmitting a noise signal through a reader connection of a magnetic reader element. The control component and the magnetic reader element may be associated with a card reader device of a transaction device, and the magnetic reader element may be configured to read a magnetic strip of a transaction card. The method may include receiving, from the magnetic reader element, a reader connection signal from the reader connection. The reader connection signal may include the noise signal. The method may include extracting, from the reader connection signal, a card information signal associated with the transaction card from the magnetic strip. The card information signal may be extracted based on the noise signal. The method may include performing an action associated with the card information signal.

When Integrated Circuit Cards (ICC's) such as chip cards are configured to initiate electronic transactions, such as financial transactions, lapses in security can have severe consequences. Although global standardization means a high degree of interoperability, it also means that ICC's may be manufactured anywhere in the world. A frequent problem is that ICC's with older generation IC's remain in circulation, and/or some manufacturers of ICC's may use older technologies in new cards. Both of these policies may increase the security risks. In addition, ICC's can be cloned, and may be difficult to distinguish from genuine ICC's. By providing a card reader with a signal generator for providing a circuit test signal, and a signal detector, for detecting a circuit response signal, the response signal may be compared with an expected response signal to determine a degree of electrical correspondence and whether the ICC passes or fails the hardware integrity control.

In some examples, a system and method for generating a payment instrument are described. The method includes receiving a unique signature that a recipient intends to associate with the payment instrument; verifying that the received feature meets an acceptability criterion; generating a representation of the received signature, wherein the representation is in a form capable of being physically associated with the payment instrument, and wherein association is established by embedding or exposing the representation on the payment instrument; and causing physical generation of the payment instrument having associated therewith the representation of the signature.

One or more embodiments include obtaining information from a physical payment card. Based on the information from the physical payment card, an output is obtained that includes a valid account number corresponding to the physical payment card. The valid account number is displayed to the cardholder. The physical payment card does not contain a visual indication of the valid account number and thus cannot be used by a malicious entity. One or more embodiments may include a physical payment card. The physical payment card includes a fake account number that cannot be used for executing a transaction based on funds associated with the physical payment card. They physical payment card may also include a key that can be mapped to a valid account number that can be used for executing a transaction based on funds associated with the physical payment card.

In some examples, a system and method for generating a payment instrument are described. The method includes receiving a unique signature that a recipient intends to associate with the payment instrument; verifying that the received feature meets an acceptability criterion; generating a representation of the received signature, wherein the representation is in a form capable of being physically associated with the payment instrument, and wherein association is established by embedding or exposing the representation on the payment instrument; and causing physical generation of the payment instrument having associated therewith the representation of the signature.