A method comprising bonding a first substrate to a second substrate. The first substrate includes a layer of one or more pairs of reactive material. The method comprising triggering a reaction between the one or more pairs of reactive material and fragmenting the second substrate.

An integrated circuit and a method of securing the integrated circuit during its fabrication. The method includes delimitation of the integrated circuit into a first zone called a standard zone and a second zone called a security zone, and random degradation of an interconnection structure of the security zone thus forming a physical unclonable function modelled by random electrical continuity that can be queried by a challenge-response authentication protocol.

An attack on an integrated circuit using a beam of electrically charged particles is detected by collecting charges due to the attack using at least one electrically conductive body that is electrically coupled to the floating gate of a state transistor. Prior to the attack, the state transistor is configured to confer an initial threshold voltage. The collected charges passed to the floating gate cause a modification of the threshold voltage of the state transistor. Detection of the attack is made by determining that the threshold voltage of the state transistor is different from the initial threshold voltage.

Various methods and structures for fabricating a semiconductor chip structure comprising a chip identification fingerprint layer. A semiconductor chip structure includes a substrate and a chip identification layer disposed on the substrate, the chip identification layer comprising random patterns of electrically conductive material in trenches formed in a semiconductor layer. The chip identification layer is sandwiched between two layers of electrodes that have a crossbar structure. A first crossbar in the crossbar structure is located on a first side of the chip identification layer and includes a first set of electrical contacts in a first grid pattern contacting the first side of the chip identification layer. A second crossbar in the crossbar structure is located on a second side of the chip identification layer and includes a second set of electrical contacts in a second grid pattern contacting the second side of the chip identification layer.

A system includes a stress-engineered substrate comprising at least one tensile stress layer having a residual tensile stress and at least one compressive stress layer having a residual compressive stress. The at least one tensile layer and the at least one compressive layer are coupled such that the at least one tensile stress layer and the at least one compressive stress layer are self-equilibrating. At least one functional device is disposed on the stress-engineered substrate. The stress-engineered substrate is configured to fracture in response to energy applied to the substrate. Fracturing the stress-engineered substrate also fractures the functional device. The system includes at least one decoy device. Fragments of the decoy device are configured to obscure one or more physical characteristics of the functional device and/or one or more functional characteristics of the functional device after the functional device is fractured.

A method and circuit for implementing transient electronic circuits for security applications, and a design structure on which the subject circuit resides are provided. Silver nanowire traces are fabricated forming a protection circuit in a soluble material. A frangible material is provided separating the soluble material from a solvent layer proximately located. During a tampering event the frangible material is ruptured releasing the solvent which contacts and dissolves the soluble material and disperses the silver nanowire traces creating an electrical open in the protection circuit. The electrical open enables enhanced tampering detection.

Systems, apparatus, and methods related to tamper-resistant integrated circuits are described. The tamper-resistant integrated circuits include tamper-resistant features including a tamper-resistant material formulated or configured to exhibit a change in at least one electrical property responsive to exposure to oxygen, electromagnetic radiation, or other environmental conditions. Data located within the integrated circuit may be erased, or at least a portion of the integrated circuit may be destroyed, responsive to a change in the at least one electrical property. In some examples, one or more electrical properties of a tamper-resistant feature may be measured. A change in an electrical property may be an indication that the associated integrated circuit has been tampered with.

A mechanism is provided to secure integrated circuit devices that combines a high degree of security with a low overhead, both in area and cost, thereby making it appropriate for smaller, cheaper integrated circuits. A determination is made whether a device die is on a wafer or if the device die is incorporated into a package. Only if the device die is incorporated in a package can the functional logic of device die be activated, and then only if a challenge-response query is satisfied. In some embodiments, a random number generator is used during wafer testing to form a pair of numbers, along with a die identifier, that is unique for each device die. A final test is then performed in which the device die can be activated if the device die is incorporated in a package, and the die identifierrandom number pair is authenticated.

A device for generating a security key includes a substrate, semiconductor units, contact structures, and defects. The semiconductor units are disposed on the substrate. The contact structures are disposed on and connected with the semiconductor units. The defects are disposed in at least a part of the contact structures randomly. A manufacturing method of a device for generating a security key includes the following steps. First semiconductor units are formed on a substrate. First contact structures are formed on the first semiconductor units. The first contact structures are connected with the first semiconductor units, and defects are formed in at least a part of the first contact structures randomly.

A self-destructing device includes a frangible substrate having at least one pre-weakened area. A heater is thermally coupled to the frangible substrate proximate to or at the pre-weakened area. When activated, the heater generates heat sufficient to initiate self-destruction of the frangible substrate by fractures that propagate from the pre-weakened area and cause the frangible substrate to break into many pieces.