Provided is an analysis system including a memory acquisition unit that is configured to acquire at least part of data stored in a memory unit in an information communication apparatus including a computing unit and the memory unit; a communication processing unit that is configured to instruct the memory acquisition unit to acquire data stored in the memory unit when determining that key data including an encryption key for cryptographic communication protocol are stored in the memory unit; and a cryptanalysis unit that is configured to extract one or more key data candidates that are candidates of the key data, from the stored in the memory unit, and extract, from one or more of the key data candidates, correct key data that enables to decrypt correctly the encrypted communication data. The communication processing unit is further configured to execute specific processing according to the decrypted communication data.

A data processing device comprises a protection key unit, a dummy key unit, and a control unit. The protection key unit provides a protection key. The dummy key unit provides a dummy key. The dummy key unit has a set of two or more allowed dummy key values associated with it and is configurable by a user or a host device to set the dummy key to any value selected from said set of allowed dummy key values. The control unit is connected to the dummy key unit and to the protection key unit and arranged to set the protection key to the value of the dummy key in response to a tamper detection signal (fatal_sec_vio) indicating a tamper event. The value of the dummy key may notably be different from zero. A method of protecting a data processing device against tampering is also described.

A data processing device comprises a protection key unit, a dummy key unit, and a control unit. The protection key unit provides a protection key. The dummy key unit provides a dummy key. The dummy key unit has a set of two or more allowed dummy key values associated with it and is configurable by a user or a host device to set the dummy key to any value selected from said set of allowed dummy key values. The control unit is connected to the dummy key unit and to the protection key unit and arranged to set the protection key to the value of the dummy key in response to a tamper detection signal (fatal_sec_vio) indicating a tamper event. The value of the dummy key may notably be different from zero. A method of protecting a data processing device against tampering is also described.

A method and a program capable of controlling an error rate of device-specific information are provided. Provided is the method for controlling an error rate of device-specific information, including a step S1 of: inputting each of i (i is an arbitrary natural number) challenges, j times (j is an arbitrary natural number), into a PUF mounted chip; leaving j responses intact (j′=j) or processing j responses into j′ pieces (0<j′<j); and registering them in the database beforehand in association with each piece of the input data, a step S2 of inputting i challenges into the database, a step S3 of: reading j′ responses corresponding to the respective i challenges from the database; concatenating the j′ responses for each piece of the input data; further concatenating the concatenated data by k′ repetitions (0<k′≦k, and k is an arbitrary natural number, but is a natural number of 2 or more if the i and the j are both 1); obtaining the concatenated (j′×k′) responses for each piece of the input data; and further concatenating them also for different input data to obtain concatenated (i×j′×k′) responses and thereby generate reference data, a step S4 of: inputting i challenges, k times, for each challenge into the PUF mounted chip; leaving obtained k responses intact as k′=k or processing the obtained k responses into k′ pieces (0<k′<k); concatenating obtained k′ responses by j′ repetitions for each response; further concatenating them for all of the k′ responses; further concatenating concatenated (j′×k′) responses also for different input data; and obtaining concatenated (i×j′×k′) responses to generate synthesized output data, and a step S5 of deciding whether or not the synthesized output data matches the reference data (specifically, whether a Hamming distance between both data is a threshold value or less), and the method determines whether or not the error rate of the synthesized output data is within a preset range based on the decision result in step S5, and changes at least one of i, j, j′, k, and k′ to repeat steps S1 to S5 until the error rate falls within the preset range if the error rate is determined not to be within the preset range.

A cryptographic system having a plurality of rotors or electronic equivalents using displacement tables. A rotor movement controller, in accordance with a rotor selection value, selectively moves one or more of the rotors or the electronic equivalent of the rotors for each data input value. Contiguous rotor selection values have a triangle or sawtooth shape. A key-driven displacement look-up table randomizes the selection values. The rotor wirings or displacement tables each have N displacement values. The N displacement values are one to N−1 inclusive once and N/2 twice and arranged in a sequence that forms a single loop. Additionally, the N displacement values may be arranged in a sequence that is self-reciprocal so that no change in the rotors or displacement tables is needed whether encrypting or decrypting except for selectively adding a factor of N/2 when indexing the displacement tables or setting the initial position of the rotors.

A cryptographic system having a plurality of rotors or electronic equivalents using displacement tables. A rotor movement controller, in accordance with a rotor selection value, selectively moves one or more of the rotors or the electronic equivalent of the rotors for each data input value. Contiguous rotor selection values have a triangle or sawtooth shape. A key-driven displacement look-up table randomizes the selection values. The rotor wirings or displacement tables each have N displacement values. The N displacement values are one to N−1 inclusive once and N/2 twice and arranged in a sequence that forms a single loop. Additionally, the N displacement values may be arranged in a sequence that is self-reciprocal so that no change in the rotors or displacement tables is needed whether encrypting or decrypting except for selectively adding a factor of N/2 when indexing the displacement tables or setting the initial position of the rotors.

Disclosed are programs, systems, and methods which are capable of using an application program previously used without modification and improving a security counter-measure when a data file is browsed and edited in a user terminal without installing a new security counter-measure program. An information control program has a function of adding a predetermined modification to transmitted/received information, which is transmitted and received between an OS and an application which is capable of generating a data file and saving the data file to an arbitrary information storage area. A save restriction function of restricting saving of the file not encrypted using a predetermined encryption key, a storage destination restriction function of restricting an area other than a predetermined area from being designated as the file storage destination, and a decrypting function of decrypting the file stored in the predetermined area using the predetermined encryption key are provided.

A computer implemented method and system is described which uses blockchain technology as a storage system for data acquired from a digital twin. The blockchain can be used to generate an immutable transaction history of data produced by the digital twin. In the case of an error, failure, incident, or accident, parties of interest can then access and analyse an immutable set of data. The blockchain network can also execute a digital smart contract based on the data received from a digital twin. The invention may be used in conjunction with the Bitcoin blockchain or another blockchain protocol.

A method for operating a surgical instrument, which comprises providing a surgical instrument handle, electrically connecting a controller disposed within the surgical instrument handle to a communication connection of a receiving portion of the surgical instrument, removably securing an interchangeable part at the receiving portion, the interchangeable part having an encryption device electrically connected to the communication connection when the interchangeable part is at the receiving portion, authenticating the interchangeable part upon an exchange between the controller and the encryption device, and after at least a partial use of the interchangeable part, storing within the encryption device a used status of the interchangeable part.

A method for operating a surgical instrument, which comprises providing a surgical instrument handle, electrically connecting a controller disposed within the surgical instrument handle to a communication connection of a receiving portion of the surgical instrument, removably securing an interchangeable part at the receiving portion, the interchangeable part having an encryption device electrically connected to the communication connection when the interchangeable part is at the receiving portion, authenticating the interchangeable part upon an exchange between the controller and the encryption device, and after at least a partial use of the interchangeable part, storing within the encryption device a used status of the interchangeable part.