This disclosure describes one or more implementations of systems, non-transitory computer-readable media, and methods that create a secured, versioned, and resilient multi-region caching of digital secrets and application credentials that facilitates scalability of digital secrets without compromising the security of the digital secrets. In particular, in one or more embodiments, the disclosed systems leverage envelope encryption along with management keys of a key management system to cache encrypted data packages that include encrypted digital secrets and encrypted envelope keys at regional storage servers. Furthermore, in some embodiments, the disclosed systems access encrypted digital secrets through regional storage servers by decrypting envelope keys through a key management system and utilizing the envelope keys to extract digital secrets from the encrypted data packages.

Systems and methods for offering and purchasing tokenized securities on a blockchain platform meeting current and future federal, state, and offering and holding entity rules and regulations. Tokenized securities purchased during or after the tokenized securities offering are tradable on a secondary market. The server computer of the tokenized securities provides an automated transfer capability for tokenized securities holders.

A system and method for providing emergency access control for a unified data platform allowing a user to request access to a segregated data set of the unified data platform where the user can automatically be granted the minimum required access permission, therefore providing the user limited access only to the necessary data required for maintenance purposes, and where the access permission is based off authorization information associated with the user for various segregated data sets and associated parameters.

A system and method for providing emergency access control for a unified data platform allowing a user to request access to a segregated data set of the unified data platform where the user can automatically be granted the minimum required access permission, therefore providing the user limited access only to the necessary data required for maintenance purposes, and where the access permission is based off authorization information associated with the user for various segregated data sets and associated parameters.

Techniques for selectively synchronizing network devices to authenticate wireless device to access a network using a key. A system utilizing such techniques can include a unique pre-shared key assignment system and a network device selective synchronization system. A method utilizing such techniques can include unique pre-shared key assignment and selective synchronization management.

Falsification is detected during secret computation that uses a plurality of types of secret sharing. A secret computation apparatus 1 uses shared values [a.sub.0], . . . , [a.sub.M-1] as inputs, and a function value [F([a.sub.0], . . . , [a.sub.M-1])] obtained with a function F for performing secret computation that uses J types of secret sharing as an output, and detects falsification during secret computation. A random number generating section 12 obtains shared values [r.sub.0], . . . , [r.sub.J-1]. A randomizing section 13 multiplies the shared value [a.sub.m] by the shared value [r.sub.j] to calculate a shared value [a.sub.mr.sub.j], and generates a randomized shared value <a.sub.m>:=<[a.sub.m], [a.sub.mr.sub.j]>. A secret computation section 14 obtains the function value [F([a.sub.0], . . . , [a.sub.M-1])] while including, in a checksum C.sub.j, randomized shared values that are computation objects and randomized shared values that are computation results. A synchronizing section 15 keeps idling until all of secret computation that uses secret sharing are completed. A validating section 16 verifies that the shared value [φ.sub.j] obtained by multiplying the sum of shared values [f.sub.0], . . . , [f.sub.μj-1] included in the checksum C.sub.j by the shared value [r.sub.j] is equal to the shared value [ψ.sub.j] obtained by adding shared values [f.sub.0r.sub.j], . . . , [f.sub.μj-1r.sub.j] included in the checksum C.sub.j.

Falsification is detected during secret computation that uses a plurality of types of secret sharing. A secret computation apparatus 1 uses shared values [a.sub.0], . . . , [a.sub.M-1] as inputs, and a function value [F([a.sub.0], . . . , [a.sub.M-1])] obtained with a function F for performing secret computation that uses J types of secret sharing as an output, and detects falsification during secret computation. A random number generating section 12 obtains shared values [r.sub.0], . . . , [r.sub.J-1]. A randomizing section 13 multiplies the shared value [a.sub.m] by the shared value [r.sub.j] to calculate a shared value [a.sub.mr.sub.j], and generates a randomized shared value <a.sub.m>:=<[a.sub.m], [a.sub.mr.sub.j]>. A secret computation section 14 obtains the function value [F([a.sub.0], . . . , [a.sub.M-1])] while including, in a checksum C.sub.j, randomized shared values that are computation objects and randomized shared values that are computation results. A synchronizing section 15 keeps idling until all of secret computation that uses secret sharing are completed. A validating section 16 verifies that the shared value [φ.sub.j] obtained by multiplying the sum of shared values [f.sub.0], . . . , [f.sub.μj-1] included in the checksum C.sub.j by the shared value [r.sub.j] is equal to the shared value [ψ.sub.j] obtained by adding shared values [f.sub.0r.sub.j], . . . , [f.sub.μj-1r.sub.j] included in the checksum C.sub.j.

In a profile data delivery control apparatus, a storage unit stores therein a public key and a private key. A control unit obtains profile data including the identification information of a service provided using a server, and when the profile data satisfies a prescribed validity condition, attaches a signature to the profile data using the private key. The control unit embeds the public key to be used to verify the signature, in a client application that causes a client to perform an authentication process based on the profile data, and delivers the client application with the public key embedded.

Highly secured transactions for mobile or Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices can be conducted using a one-time seed technology (OTST). For example, registration of a user and authentication of a user device is based on a one-time seed (OTS) which is generated by an authentication server and sent to the user device. The user device employs the OTS to generate a one-time password (OTP). After registration and authentication, the OTS is deleted. As such, the OTS and OTP is used only one time. No seed is stored on the user device. As for securing the transactions, it may be signed by a one-time hash (OTH) or a one-time signing key (OTSK). Like the OTS, the OTH or OTSK is deleted from the user device after the transaction. Since the user device does not contain a seed, OTH or OTSK, there is no risk of the user device being hacked by unwanted third parties.

Techniques for securely controlling multiple lighting devices simultaneously with a lighting control device are disclosed. Command messages may be transmitted from the lighting control device to multiple lighting devices over a computer network without routing through a remote cloud service. The messages may be encrypted and may include an incremented sequence number. Lighting devices that receive a command message may compare the incremented sequence number to a previously stored sequence number corresponding to the lighting control device. If the incremented sequence number is greater than the stored sequence number, then a lighting device may determine the message was transmitted by an authorized lighting control device and may implement any command instruction included therein. If the incremented sequence number is equal to or less than the stored sequence number, then the lighting device may determine the command message was transmitted by a malicious source and may ignore the command message.