A method and a computer system is provided for executing the method for providing a registration data directory service (RDDS). The method includes obtaining, at a RDDS, a RDDS query comprising a location assertion from a RDDS client from a RDDS client; providing, by the RDDS, a request for personally identifying information (PII) for the RDDS query from a privacy provider, wherein the request comprises the location assertion; obtaining, by the RDDS, the PII for the RDDS query; and providing, by the RDDS, a response to the RDDS query to the RDDS client, wherein the response comprises PII.

A system and method for secure cloud computing. The cloud based processing system comprises a user interface, allowing a user to enter and edit data, a proxy server, and a cloud based processing server. The user interface sends data entered by a user to the proxy server, which sends the encrypted data to the cloud based processing server. The proxy server receives editing commands from the user interface, and sends those commands to the cloud based processing server along with the encrypted data. The cloud based processing server receives the encrypted data and editing commands, applies the editing commands to the encrypted data, and sends the edited encrypted data back to the proxy server.

A system and method for secure cloud computing. The cloud based processing system comprises a user interface, allowing a user to enter and edit data, a proxy server, and a cloud based processing server. The user interface sends data entered by a user to the proxy server, which sends the encrypted data to the cloud based processing server. The proxy server receives editing commands from the user interface, and sends those commands to the cloud based processing server along with the encrypted data. The cloud based processing server receives the encrypted data and editing commands, applies the editing commands to the encrypted data, and sends the edited encrypted data back to the proxy server.

Cryptographic methods and systems for key exchange, digital signature and zero-knowledge proof. In the digital signature scenario, there is provided a method of signing a digital document, comprising: obtaining a private cryptographic key associated with the signer; obtaining a digital asset from the digital document; selecting a base data element; computing a plurality of signature data elements from (i) the digital asset, (ii) the base data element and (iii) the private cryptographic key; and transmitting the digital document and the plurality of signature data elements to a recipient over a data network. Provenance of the digital document is confirmable by the recipient carrying out a predefined computation involving the digital document, the signature data elements, a plurality of noise variables and a public cryptographic key corresponding to the private cryptographic key associated with the signer. In the zero-knowledge proof scenario, the digital asset plays the role of a challenge data element.

An application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) and method are provided for executing a memory-hard algorithm requiring reading generated data. A processor or state machine executes one or more steps of the memory-hard algorithm and requests the generated data. At least one specialized circuit is provided for generating the generated data on demand in response to a request for the generated data from the processor. Specific embodiments are applied to memory-hard cryptographic algorithms, including Ethash and Equihash.

An application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) and method are provided for executing a memory-hard algorithm requiring reading generated data. A processor or state machine executes one or more steps of the memory-hard algorithm and requests the generated data. At least one specialized circuit is provided for generating the generated data on demand in response to a request for the generated data from the processor. Specific embodiments are applied to memory-hard cryptographic algorithms, including Ethash and Equihash.

Systems and methods for managing a compromised autonomous vehicle server are described herein. A processor may obtain an indication of a first server configured to control an autonomous vehicle being compromised. The autonomous vehicle may have previously been provisioned with a first public key. The first public key may be paired with a first private key. A processor may compile command information. The command information may include a command for the autonomous vehicle and a digital certificate of a second server configured to control the autonomous vehicle in the event of the first server being compromised. The digital certificate may include a second public key and may be signed with the first private key. The command may be signed with a second private key associated with the second server. The second private key may be paired with the second public key.

An ABE method with multiple tracing attribute authorities: performing, by a central authority, system initialization to generate a public parameter and disclosing the public parameter; performing, by each of attribute authorities, initialization to generate a key pair, and disclosing a public key in the key pair; performing, by a data owner, symmetric encryption on plaintext data, performing ABE on a symmetric key based on a hidden access structure, and generating an integrity verification value; requesting, by a data user, a decryption key to the attribute authority according to an own attribute; restoring, by the data user in response to decryption, an access structure, generating an outsourcing decryption key, sending the outsourcing decryption key to a cloud storage center for semi-decryption; generating, by the cloud storage center, a semi-decrypted ciphertext, and feeding the semi-decrypted ciphertext back to the data user; fully decrypting the semi-decrypted ciphertext according to a private decryption key.

An ABE method with multiple tracing attribute authorities: performing, by a central authority, system initialization to generate a public parameter and disclosing the public parameter; performing, by each of attribute authorities, initialization to generate a key pair, and disclosing a public key in the key pair; performing, by a data owner, symmetric encryption on plaintext data, performing ABE on a symmetric key based on a hidden access structure, and generating an integrity verification value; requesting, by a data user, a decryption key to the attribute authority according to an own attribute; restoring, by the data user in response to decryption, an access structure, generating an outsourcing decryption key, sending the outsourcing decryption key to a cloud storage center for semi-decryption; generating, by the cloud storage center, a semi-decrypted ciphertext, and feeding the semi-decrypted ciphertext back to the data user; fully decrypting the semi-decrypted ciphertext according to a private decryption key.

In a storage system that includes a plurality of storage devices configured into one or more write groups, quorum-aware secret sharing may include: encrypting a device key for each storage device using a master secret; generating a plurality of shares from the master secret such that a minimum number of storage devices required from each write group for a quorum to boot the storage system is not less than a minimum number of shares required to reconstruct the master secret; and storing the encrypted device key and a separate share of the plurality of shares in each storage device.