In a general aspect, a method for executing a target operation combining a first input data with a second input data, and providing an output data can include generating at least two pairs of input words each comprising a first input word and a second input word and applying to each pair of input words a same derived operation providing an output word including a part of the output data resulting from the application of the target operation to first and second input data parts present in the pair of input words, and a binary one's complement of the output data part.

Methods, systems, and apparatuses for defending against cryptographic attacks using clock period randomization. The methods, systems, and apparatuses are designed to make side channel attacks and fault injection attacks more difficult by using a clock with a variable period during a cryptographic operation. In an example embodiment, a clock period randomizer includes a fixed delay generator and a variable delay generator, wherein a variable delay generated by the variable delay generator is based on a random or pseudorandom value that is changed occasionally or periodically. The methods, systems, and apparatuses are useful in hardware security applications where fault injection and/or side channel attacks are of concern.

The disclosed computer-implemented method for securely authenticating users via facial recognition may include (1) identifying a request from a user to complete an authentication process on the computing device via a facial-recognition system, (2) sending the user a randomized unique identifier to display to a camera on the computing device, (3) simultaneously observing, via the camera on the computing device, both the user and the randomized unique identifier that was sent to the user, and (4) authenticating the observed user in response to determining both that the observed user's facial characteristics match facial characteristics of the user stored in the facial-recognition system and that the observed randomized unique identifier matches the randomized unique identifier sent to the user. Various other methods, systems, and computer-readable media are also disclosed.

A method for at least partially updating encrypted data stored on one or more servers includes dividing the encrypted data into equal sized chunks; encrypting each chunk using an all-or-nothing encryption scheme (AONE) with an encryption key, wherein an additional randomness per chunk is embedded into the AONE; outputting a plurality of ciphertext blocks for each chunk; storing the encrypted chunks on the one or more servers such that an i-th ciphertext block of each encrypted chunk is stored on an i-th server, wherein a result of a predetermined function performed on the randomness for all encrypted chunks is stored with each encrypted chunk; determining one or more chunks to update; reverting the predetermined function by accessing all the encrypted chunks; decrypting the one or more Chunks to update based on the result of, updating the decrypted chunks; re-encrypting the updated decrypted chunks, and storing the re-encrypted chunks.

Systems and methods for protecting secret or secure information involved in generation of ciphered data by circuitry. The circuitry includes data paths and key paths that operate to perform cipher operations to generate a plurality of key shares and a plurality of data shares using a key and data as input. The data and the key may be masked by at least one mask. The plurality of key shares may be generated using the key and a first mask. The plurality of data shares are generated using key shares, the data, and a second mask.

A distributed technique for implementing a cryptographic process performs operations in parallel on both valid and irrelevant data to prevent differentiation of the operations based on an encryption key content. A control entity switches or points valid data to appropriate CPU(s) that are responsible for operations such as squaring or multiplying. Irrelevant data is also switched or pointed to appropriate CPU(s) that execute operations in parallel with the CPU(s) operating on the valid data. The distributed technique contributes to obscuring side channel analysis phenomena from observation, such that cryptographic operations cannot easily be tied to the content of the encryption key.

Cryptographic methods and systems for key exchange, digital signature and zero-knowledge proof. In the digital signature scenario, there is provided a method of signing a digital document, comprising: obtaining a private cryptographic key associated with the signer; obtaining a digital asset from the digital document; selecting a base data element; computing a plurality of signature data elements from (i) the digital asset, (ii) the base data element and (iii) the private cryptographic key; and transmitting the digital document and the plurality of signature data elements to a recipient over a data network. Provenance of the digital document is confirmable by the recipient carrying out a predefined computation involving the digital document, the signature data elements, a plurality of noise variables and a public cryptographic key corresponding to the private cryptographic key associated with the signer. In the zero-knowledge proof scenario, the digital asset plays the role of a challenge data element.

The subject matter described herein includes methods, systems, and computer readable medium for scrambled communication of data to, from, or over a medium. According to one aspect, the subject matter described herein includes a method for communicating data in scrambled form to or over a medium. The method includes receiving analog or digital data to be transmitted to or over a medium. The method further includes modulating samples representing at least signal using the analog or digital data to produce data modulated signal samples. The method further includes scrambling the data modulated signal samples using a predetermined scrambling algorithm. The method further includes transmitting the scrambled data modulated signal samples to or over the medium. The method further includes descrambling samples received from the medium using the inverse of the predetermined scrambling algorithm to obtain the unscrambled modulated signal samples, which can then be demodulated to retrieve original data.

A chip device with a logic circuitry (105) protected by a randomized logic encryption based on a key (K) for preventing a designated usage of the logic circuitry (105) by an unauthorized user comprises: a physically unclonable function, PUF, (110), a storage (120), and a chip enabler (130) with one or more registers (132). The physically unclonable function, PUF, (110) is configured to generate a device-individual response (Re) based on a challenge (Ch). The storage (120) has stored the challenge (Ch) and a data element (C), the data element (C) being an encryption of the key (K) with the response (Re) of the PUF (110) as encryption key. The enabler (130) is configured to enable the logic circuitry (105) for the designated usage only, when the key (K) is transferred to the register(s) (132), the key (K) being a decryption of the data element (C) with the response (Re) as the encryption key.

Systems and methods for processing tokenization requests to facilitate safe storage of tokens. An epoch is identified as a current epoch based on a current system time of a node. A seed value is computed by the node based on a start time of the epoch and a secret. A plurality of ephemeral tokens is generated by a randomization service of the node for a set of sensitive data based on the seed value. Each ephemeral token of the plurality of ephemeral tokens has a usable life defined by the epoch. Each sensitive data instance in the set of sensitive data is associated with a particular ephemeral token of the plurality of ephemeral tokens to create a mapping structure in a main memory of the node. A tokenization service of the node is configured to process tokenization requests using the mapping structure.