Patent classifications
H04L2209/08
COUNTERMEASURES FOR SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS ON PROTECTED SIGN AND KEY EXCHANGE OPERATIONS
Embodiments are directed to countermeasures for side-channel attacks on protected sign and key exchange operations. An embodiment of storage mediums includes instructions for commencing a process including an elliptic curve scalar multiplication (ESM) operation including application of a secret scalar value; splitting the secret scalar value into two random scalar values; counting a number of leading ‘0’ bits in the scalar value and skipping the number of leading ‘0’ bits in processing; performing an ESM iteration for each bit of the secret scalar value beginning with a most significant ‘1’ bit of the scalar value including a Point Addition operation and a Point Double operation for each bit on randomized points; performing ESM operation dummy iterations equal to the number of leading ‘0’ bits; and returning an output result for the ESM operation.
Cryptographic device with updatable shared matrix
Some embodiments relate to an electronic network node (110) configured for a cryptographic operation. The network node obtains a shared matrix (A) by selecting integers, polynomials, and/or polynomial-coefficients from a shared pool, the shared pool being shared with the second network node, wherein the selecting is done according to one or more selection functions.
Data protection using universal tagging
A universal tag linked to the content of a data file for protecting the authenticity of the data file and/or the owner/creator of a digital file. The universal tag is linked to the content in the data file via one or more input keys/seeds that are used to generate the universal tag and rely on data associated with the content. Once generated, the universal tag is registered on a distributed ledger of at least on distributed trust computing network, which acts as a source of truth to validate the universal tag and, as such, validate (i) an authenticity of the data file, and/or (ii) the user associated with the data file (e.g., rightful possessor and/or creator of the digital file).
ENABLING CONSTANT PLAINTEXT SPACE IN BOOTSTRAPPING IN FULLY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
Systems and methods for enabling constant plaintext space in bootstrapping in fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) are disclosed. A computer-implemented method for producing an encrypted representation of data includes accessing a set of encoded digits. The method includes applying an inverse linear transformation to the set of encoded digits to obtain a first encoded polynomial. The method includes applying a modulus switching and dot product with bootstrapping key to add an error term to each of the encoded digits in the first polynomial to obtain a second encoded polynomial. The method includes applying a linear transformation to the second encoded polynomial to obtain a first batch encryption. The method includes applying digit extraction to the first batch encryption to obtain a second batch encryption, the second batch encryption corresponding to the set of encoded digits without the error term.
Electromagnetic and Power Noise Injection for Hardware Operation Concealment
A method of operation concealment for a cryptographic system includes randomly selecting which one of at least two cryptographic operation blocks receives a key to apply a valid operation to data and outputs a result that is used for subsequent operations. Noise can be added by operating the other of the at least two cryptographic operation blocks using a modified key. The modified key can be generated by mixing the key with a block-unique-identifier, a device secret, a slowly adjusting output of a counter, or a combination thereof. In some cases, noise can be added to a cryptographic system by transforming input data of the other cryptographic operation block(s) by mixing the input data with the block-unique-identifier, device secret, counter output, or a combination thereof. A cryptographic system with operation concealment can further include a distributed (across a chip) or interweaved arrangement of subblocks of the cryptographic operation blocks.
EXTRA-COMPACT KEY WITH REUSABLE COMMON KEY FOR ENCRYPTION
Techniques for secure public exposure of digital data include extracting first digital data comprising one or more batches, each batch comprising a plurality of no more than a number T of packets, each packet containing a plurality of a number n of bits. A random binary matrix CK consisting of T rows and n columns is generated. For a first batch, a first random n-bit temporary key is generated and positions of the nT elements of matrix CK are randomized to produce matrix CK(RP). For a packet in the first batch, a first packet vector key is generated based on non-overlapping pairs of bit positions for both the temporary key and for a first packet-corresponding row of matrix CK(RP). An encrypted packet is generated for the packet based on the packet and the first packet vector key. The encrypted packet is exposed publicly.
Protecting study participant data for aggregate analysis
Embodiments of the invention include systems and methods for protecting study participant data for aggregate analysis. Aspects include sending a broker encryption key to a plurality of subjects. Aspects also include receiving double-encrypted subject data from the plurality of subjects. Aspects also include decrypting the double-encrypted subject data with a broker decryption key to generate single-encrypted subject data for the plurality of subjects. Aspects also include aggregating the single-encrypted subject data for the plurality of subjects to generate an aggregated single-homomorphically encrypted data set. Aspects also include including a plurality of random factors in the aggregated single-encrypted data set. Aspects also include sending the aggregated single-homomorphically encrypted data set to a researcher.
ELECTROMECHANICAL APPARATUS, SYSTEM, AND METHOD FOR GENERATING TRUE RANDOM NUMBERS
An apparatus generates truly random numbers. The apparatus includes a container that is at least partially filled with a fluid (e.g., water or air). The apparatus also includes objects (e.g., dice) suspended freely in the fluid. The apparatus includes agitators configured to agitate the fluid, and cameras configured to capture images of the objects. When the agitators agitate the fluid, the objects move freely (e.g., move with the created currents) in the fluid in the container. The apparatus also includes a random number generation circuit coupled to the cameras. The random number generation circuit is configured to generate random numbers based on the images captured by the cameras. In some embodiments, the agitators are one or more motor-driven propellers that stir the fluid. Some embodiments use a hydraulic pump to agitate the fluid (e.g., circulating the fluid using both a push action and a pull action).
APPARATUS AND METHOD FOR ENCRYPTING DATA IN A DATA STORAGE SYSTEM
A system and method that utilize an encryption engine endpoint to encrypt data in a data storage system are disclosed. In the system and method, the client controls the encryption keys utilized to encrypt and decrypt data such that the encryption keys are not stored together with the encrypted data. Therefore, once data is encrypted, neither the host of the data storage system, nor the encryption engine endpoint have access to the encryption keys required to decrypt the data, which increases the security of the encrypted data in the event of, for example, the data storage system being accessed by an unauthorized party.
System and method for selective transparency for public ledgers
Described is a system for selective transparency in a public ledger. In operation, a first submission by a first entity is logged to the public ledger. The submission is a data entry with a message M and an identification number (ID). Separately, a linkage by a second entity is recorded. The linkage is an encryption and commitment linking the submission by the first entity to a second submission by the second entity. The linkage can be verified through a series of processes, such as by determining a value of linkage verification information. The value of the linkage verification information and corresponding block number is then transmitted to a third entity. The third entity reads the commitments from block N.sub.i and verifies that the commitments are commitments to the same ID using the linkage verification information.