The present invention provides an improved system and method for using cryptography to secure computer-implemented choice mechanisms. In several preferred embodiments, a process is provided for securing participants' submissions while simultaneously providing the capability of validating their submissions. This is referred to as a random permutation. In several other preferred embodiments, a process is provided for securing participants' advance instructions while simultaneously providing the capability of validating their advance instructions. This is referred to as a secure advance instruction. Applications include voting mechanisms, school choice mechanisms, and auction mechanisms.

A server determines an array [[addr]] indicating a storage destination of each piece of data, generates an array of concealed values, and connects the generated array to the array [[addr]] to determine an array [[addr]]. The server generates a sort permutation [[.sub.1]] for the array, applies the sort permutation [[.sub.1]] to the array [[addr]], and converts the array [[addr]] into an array with a sequence composed of first Z elements set to [[i]] followed by .sub.i elements set to [[B]]. The server generates a sort permutation [[.sub.2]] for the converted array [[addr]], generates dummy data, imparts the generated dummy data to the concealed data sequence, applies the sort permutations [[.sub.1]] and [[.sub.2]] to the data array imparted with the dummy data, and generates, as a secret hash table, a data sequence obtained by deleting the last N pieces of data from the sorted data array.

Biometric data such as iris, facial, or fingerprint data may be obtained from a user. A public code may be generated from the biometric data, but does not obtain any of the biometric data or information that can be used to identify the user. The public code includes information that can be used to extract from the biometric data a biometric code that is suitable for bitwise comparison. Neither the underlying biometric data nor information from which the biometric data may be determined is stored as only the public code and the actual biometric feature of the user is required to generate the biometric code.

Systems and methods of generating a security key for an integrated circuit device include generating a plurality of key bits with a physically unclonable function (PUF) device. The PUF can include a random number generator that can create random bits. The random bits may be stored in a nonvolatile memory. The number of random bits stored in the nonvolatile memory allows for a plurality of challenge and response interactions to obtain a plurality of security keys from the PUF.

Example computer-implemented methods and systems for secure random noise generation are disclosed. One example method includes generating, by a first party, n random first bits and n -bit strings. The first party generates, based on the n -bit strings and the n random first bits, n pairs of -bit input messages. The first party performs n 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfers (OTs) of the n pairs of -bit input messages from the first party to a second party. The first party generates, based on the n -bit strings, a first random number. The first party performs, based on the first random number, secure multiparty computation (MPC) that involves the first party and the second party.

Methods, systems, and apparatus, including computer programs encoded on computer storage media, for generating a random noise value for use in providing differential privacy in multiparty computation. One of the method includes receiving, by a first party participating in a multiparty secure computation (MPC) instance, a share of a first n-bit random binary number and a plurality of function table segments; generating a share of a second n-bit random binary number; calculating a first value based on a comparison between the share of the first and second n-bit random binary numbers; reconstructs an overall value of a comparison between the first and second n-bit random binary numbers; and determining a share of the random noise value based on the overall value and the plurality of function table segments.

Example computer-implemented methods and systems for secure random noise generation are disclosed. One example method includes generating, by a first party, n random first bits and n -bit first strings. The first party generates, based on the n -bit first strings and the n random first bits, n pairs of -bit input messages. The first party receives n pairs of -bit second strings. The first party performs n 1-out-of-2 random oblivious transfers (ROTs) of the n pairs of -bit input messages from the first party to a second party. The first party generates, based on the n -bit first strings, a first random number. The first party performs, based on the first random number, secure multiparty computation (MPC) that involves the first party and the second party.

A plurality of data blocks are encrypted in accordance with an encryption scheme that transforms a data block into an encrypted data block by: performing a bit modification operation on the data block using one or more logic blocks generated for the data block to thereby generate a first intermediate state data block; performing a bit remapping operation on the first intermediate state data block using at least one encryption screen to thereby generate a second intermediate state data block; and performing a bit modification operation on the second intermediate state data block using one or more logic blocks generated for the data block to thereby generate the encrypted data block. The encrypted data blocks may then be decrypted in accordance with a decryption scheme that applies at least one decryption screen and the same logic blocks that were used in the encryption scheme.

Embodiments of the invention relate to systems and methods for confidential mutual authentication. A first computer may blind its public key using a blinding factor. The first computer may generate a shared secret using its private key, the blinding factor, and a public key of a second computer. The first computer may encrypt the blinding factor and a certificate including its public key using the shared secret. The first computer may send its blinded public key, the encrypted blinding factor, and the encrypted certificate to the second computer. The second computer may generate the same shared secret using its private key and the blinded public key of the first computer. The second computer may authenticate the first computer by verifying its blinded public key using the blinding factor and the certificate of the first computer. The first computer authenticates the second computer similarly.

An interference signal may be used to add a layer of security to a wireless communication. The interference signal may comprise media content, such as video, audio, text, or other content available to a user device via a media service. The wireless communication may be used to transmit a data signal, which may include sensitive data. The interference signal may be filtered to process the data signal.