H04L2209/12

HASHING METHODS AND SYSTEMS
20230076393 · 2023-03-09 ·

A hashing method comprises the steps of converting an input message into a binary input matrix with columns and rows; applying a Fourier Transform (FT) to obtain a multiplication; wherein said FT is an optical FT; and applying a summation across the rows.

Automatic message assembly during a cryptographic operation
11626995 · 2023-04-11 · ·

A cryptographic accelerator may include an input buffer to store an additional authenticated data (AAD) portion of a message and a plain text portion of the message. The cryptographic accelerator may include a cryptographic engine to generate cipher text using the plain text portion of the message, generate a message authentication code (MAC) using the AAD portion and either the plain text portion or the cipher text, determine a configuration for creating an assembled message in an output buffer of the cryptographic accelerator, and provide at least the cipher text to the output buffer to create the assembled message in the output buffer according to the configuration. The cryptographic accelerator may include the output buffer to provide the assembled message.

Methods and apparatus for rewarding user on-line course performance via blockchain mining
11468531 · 2022-10-11 · ·

A method for a computer system includes receiving a request from a client system comprising a request for streaming data, providing to the client system the streaming data, receiving from the client system, the user activity data in response to providing the streaming data, determining whether the user activity data exceeds a threshold activity level, instantiating a blockchain mining software instance when the user activity data exceeds the threshold activity level, associating the blockchain mining software instance with a user of the client system, and sending a notice to the client system that the block chain mining software instance is associated with the user.

PHYSICALLY UNCLONABLE FUNCTION (PUF) GENERATION

A PUF generator includes a difference generator circuit with first and second transistors having a first predetermined VT. The difference generator circuit is configured to provide a first output signal for generating a PUF signature based on respective turn on times of the first and second transistors. An amplifier includes a plurality of transistors having a second predetermined VT. The amplifier is configured to receive the first output signal and output the PUF signature.

SECURED STORAGE OF CIPHERING KEYS
20220318439 · 2022-10-06 ·

The present disclosure relates to a method for performing a cryptographic operation, the method including generating a first count value by a monotonic counter of a processing device, transmitting the first count value from the monotonic counter to a memory of the processing device, selecting a first encryption key from the memory based on the first count value, and providing the selected first encryption key to a cryptographic processor.

Hashing values using salts and peppers

In some examples, a management controller includes a communication interface to communicate with a computing device, where the management controller is separate from a processor of the computing device. The management controller includes a management processor to receive, from the computing device, a first hash value that is based on a first hash function applied on an input value and a salt, generate a second hash value based on applying a second hash function on the first hash value and a pepper, and send the second hash value to the computing device.

Method and apparatus for encrypting and decrypting user data
11651707 · 2023-05-16 · ·

The invention introduces an apparatus for encrypting and decrypting user data, including a memory, a bypass-flag writing circuit and a flash interface controller. The bypass-flag writing circuit writes a bypass flag in a remaining bit of space of the memory that is originally allocated for storing an End-to-End Data Path Protection (E2E DPP), where the bypass flag indicates whether user data has been encrypted. The flash interface controller reads the user data, the E2E DPP and the bypass flag from the memory and programs the user data, the E2E DPP and the bypass flag into the flash device.

Circuit for physically unclonable function and a method to generate private key for secure authentication using a physically unclonable function cell

The present disclosure provides a PUF circuit including a first array including at least one physically unclonable function (PUF) cell, a second array including at least one PUF cell, and a controller which selects a first PUF cell from the first array and selects a second PUF cell from the second array and generates unique information represented by the first PUF cell and the second PUF cell based on a first output voltage output by the first PUF cell and a second output voltage output by the second PUF cell.

Handheld wand device and method for scanning the physical signature data of a physical unclonable function along an arbitrary path

Unique physical unclonable function objects are created by molding pre-magnetized or post-magnetized particles into a resin. The particles form a unique physical “fingerprint” based on the random particle size, position, polar rotation, magnetization level, particle density, etc. This invention addresses devices for accurately measuring the physical fingerprint of a PUF, specifically including the X, Y, & Z components of the magnetic field at enough discrete points on the PUF to allow a confident recognition of the identification. A handheld wand is described for measuring the magnetic field along an arbitrary path.

PHYSICALLY UNCLONABLE FUNCTION BASED ON A PHASE CHANGE MATERIAL ARRAY
20230153444 · 2023-05-18 ·

In an approach to a implementing a PUF based on a PCM array, for each PCM device in an array of PCM devices, the PCM device is reset to an initial state. A first conductance of the PCM device is measured. A predetermined number of partial set pulses is applied to the PCM device. A second conductance of the PCM device is measured. Responsive to determining that the second conductance is greater than the first conductance multiplied by a factor, a PUF value of the PCM device is set to logical “1”. Responsive to determining that the second conductance is less than the first conductance multiplied by a factor, a PUF value of the PCM device is set to logical “0”. The PUF value of the PCM device is added to an overall PUF string for the array of PCM devices.