H04L2209/12

Synchronization circuit for threshold implementation of S-box

This application relates to a synchronization circuit for synchronizing signals used in a threshold implementation operation process performing in an S-box of an encryption circuit. In one aspect, the synchronization circuit includes an enable signal generator configured to generate an enable signal. The synchronization circuit may also include a synchronization unit included in an encryption circuit and located inside an S-box that performs a threshold implementation operation that calculates by dividing bits of an input signal into bits equal to or greater than the number of bits of the input signal. The synchronization unit may be configured to synchronize signals used in a threshold implementation operation process based on the generated enable signal.

Data security apparatus and method using constant optical signal input to analog component

A data security apparatus includes an analog component. The analog component operates internally with a high degree of entropy. This high degree of entropy resides in the interactions between its internal components in response to an external driving signal. The interactions within the analog component have a level of entropy that is high enough to make digital simulation of the analog component impractical. Because the analog component is impractical to digitally simulate it is referred to as being digitally unclonable. The data security apparatus processes data by encrypting plaintext data into ciphertext and/or decrypting data from ciphertext into plaintext. Part of the conversion between plaintext and ciphertext uses the analog component. Since the analog component is digitally unclonable (that is, impractical to digitally simulate), the part of the conversion process that uses the analog component requires possession of the analog component itself or the possession of another analog component that has the same signature.

Device and method for electronic circuit power

The present invention concerns an electronic circuit power supply device, configured to: flow, through a first conductor connected to a node, a first current that is an image of a second current consumed by the electronic circuit; flow a third current through a second conductor connected to the node, a first branch of a current mirror conducting the third current; flow a fourth constant current through a third conductor connected to the node; consume a fifth current that is an image of the third current; and regulate a potential of the node by acting on a gate potential of a transistor electrically in series with a second branch of the current mirror.

SYSTOLIC PARALLEL GALOIS HASH COMPUTING DEVICE
20230214188 · 2023-07-06 · ·

A computing device (e.g., an FPGA or integrated circuit) processes an incoming packet comprising data to compute a Galois hash. The computing device includes a plurality of circuits, each circuit providing a respective result used to determine the Galois hash, and each circuit including: a first multiplier configured to receive a portion of the data; a first exclusive-OR gate configured to receive an output of the first multiplier as a first input, and to provide the respective result; and a second multiplier configured to receive an output of the first exclusive-OR gate, wherein the first exclusive-OR gate is further configured to receive an output of the second multiplier as a second input. In one embodiment, the computing device further comprises a second exclusive-OR gate configured to output the Galois hash, wherein each respective result is provided as an input to the second exclusive-OR gate.

Using embedded time-varying code generator to provide secure access to embedded content in an on-chip access architecture

A network of storage units has a data path, which is at least a portion of the network. The network also has a dynamic time-varying or cycle-varying code generation unit and a code comparator unit that together make up an unlock signal generation unit; and a gateway storage unit. If the gateway storage unit does not store an unlock signal or the unlock signal generation unit does not generate and transmit an unlock signal, the gateway storage unit does not insert a data path segment in the data path. If the unlock signal generation unit is operated such that it generates an unlock signal, and it transmits that unlock signal to a gateway storage unit, and the gateway storage unit stores the unlock signal value, then the gateway storage unit inserts a data path segment into the data path.

Security device including physical unclonable function cells, operation method of security device, and operation method of physical unclonable function cell device
11695577 · 2023-07-04 · ·

A security device includes a physical unclonable function (PUF) cell array that includes a plurality of PUF cells connected with a first word line, a controller that selects a target PUF cell of the plurality of PUF cells and outputs a control signal based on the target PUF cell, a decoder that applies a first voltage to the first word line in response to the control signal, a bit line selection circuit that outputs a target current across a bit line connected with the target PUF cell and a sum current corresponding to a sum of currents across the remaining bit lines connected with other PUF cells, and a bit determiner that outputs a target bit of the target PUF cell based on the target current and the sum current, and the security device generates a security key based on the target bit for responding to an authentication requests.

METHODS AND APPARATUS TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE OF ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION TASKS
20230004358 · 2023-01-05 ·

Methods, apparatus, systems, and articles of manufacture are disclosed. An example apparatus includes: interface circuitry to receive a first value and a second value; selector circuitry to select a first subset of bits and a second subset of bits from the first value; multiplier circuitry to: multiply the first subset to the second value during a first compute cycle; and multiply the second subset to the second value during a second compute cycle; left shift circuitry to perform a bitwise shift with a product of the first subset and the second value during the second compute cycle; adder circuitry to add a product of the second subset and the second value to a result of the plurality of bitwise shift operations during the second compute cycle; and comparator circuitry to determine the result of the modular multiplication based on a result of the addition during the second compute cycle.

DEVICE FOR GENERATING DIGITAL RANDOM ENCRYPTION KEY
20230006824 · 2023-01-05 ·

A device for generating a digital random encryption key includes an input unit adding a non-volatile active element for overcoming a limit of a passive element when generating an encryption key, applying a random passive filter, and inputting an analog voltage signal to an encryption key generator, an encryption key generator including a non-volatile active element and a passive filter, connected to the input unit through a connection substrate, and generating a random encryption key from an entropy source, and a converter for converting a signal generated by the encryption key generator into a digital signal and outputting the digital signal is provided, thereby improving robustness of security compared to the case of applying the general passive element, allowing regeneration or random generation, and generating an excellent encryption key working excellently for physical reverse engineering violations.

Cryptographic key distribution

An integrated-circuit device comprises a processor, a hardware key-storage system, and a key bus. The hardware key-storage system comprises a non-volatile key storage memory, which includes a key register, for storing a cryptographic key, and an address register, for storing a destination memory address for the cryptographic key. The hardware key-storage system further comprises output logic for sending the cryptographic key over the key bus to the destination memory address, and write-once logic for preventing an address being written to the address register unless the address register is in an erased state.

Secure hardware signature and related methods and applications

This disclosure provides techniques for recovering a root key from measurement of a circuit function. In some embodiments, a checkpointing feature is used to periodically mark measurements of this function and thereby track drift in the value of the root key over the life of a digital device; the checkpointing feature permits rollback of any measurement of the function in a manner that negates incremental drift and permits recovery of the root key for the life of a device (e.g., an IC circuit or product in which the IC is embedded). This disclosure also provides novel PUF designs and applications.