H04L2209/26

Secure communications amongst connected dice

A plurality of dice having at least a first die and a second die. The first die can generate a measure of the first die using a cryptographic algorithm, a public key and a private key, and a digital signature according to the measure and the private key. The digital signature can include a digest encrypted by the private key. The digest can include the measure. The first die can communicate the measure, the digital signature, and the public key to the second die. The second die can store a validation code representative of a measure of the first die and validate the digital signature using the public key as well validate the measure by comparing the measure to the validation code.

LAWFUL INTERCEPTION SECURITY
20190373023 · 2019-12-05 ·

A first lawful interception (LI) function transmits, to a second LI function in a virtualized network function, VNF, a request for random number generator, RNG, data, characterizing a random number generator in the second LI function. The RNG data is tested, resulting in a randomness test result that is indicative of randomness of numbers generated by the RNG in the second LI function. If the randomness is below a first threshold, mitigation takes place of any undesired effect associated with the randomness being less than the threshold value. A corresponding method is performed by the second LI function, receiving the request for RNG data, obtaining and transmitting the RNG data to the first LI function. Verification can thereby be made whether a LI function in a VNF has a proper level of entropy source for use by its cryptographic operations and, if not, perform mitigation.

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR TESTING OF SYSTEMS
20190367081 · 2019-12-05 ·

A system and method include receiving, by an interface device, test information including a test message from testing equipment. The interface device is configured to interface between the testing equipment and a test specimen. The method also includes converting, by the interface device, the test information into at least one proprietary message. The proprietary message is proprietary to an original-equipment-manufacturer or integrator of the test specimen. The method also includes transmitting the at least one proprietary message to the test specimen. The test specimen is tested based on the at least one proprietary message.

REGULATING COMMUNICATION COMPRISING ACCESS TO PROTECTED DATA
20190342076 · 2019-11-07 ·

Executable code, placed into a plurality of computing resources forming a distributed ledger, (e.g., smart contracts) are provided to enable communicating between parties without requiring trust or an intermediary, such as a broker or escrow service. Data may be deposited in a secure data storage for access by a party who satisfies the condition of the smart contract. A resource holding the deposited data then activates a link upon receiving an access token, as produced as a result of satisfying the smart contract. The distributed ledger is then updated to enable other parties to see a description of the data and the terms.

RFC-DIRECTED DIFFERENTIAL TESTING METHOD OF CERTIFICATE VALIDATION IN SSL/TLS IMPLEMENTATIONS
20190306193 · 2019-10-03 · ·

The present invention relates to the technical field of computer software analysis and discloses an RFC-directed differential testing method of certificate validations in a SSL/TLS implementations which includes: extracting rules from RFC and updating the rules, classifying the rules, further classifying consumer rules and shared rules into breakable rules and unbreakable rules, expressing the rules as variables, and generating a symbolic program; generating low-level test cases by applying the dynamic symbolic execution technique to the symbolic program; assembling high-level test cases i.e. digital certificates according to the low-level test cases; and employing the assembled digital certificates to the differential testing of the certificate validation in SSL/TLS implementations.

AUDITING SMART CONTRACTS CONFIGURED TO MANAGE AND DOCUMENT SOFTWARE AUDITS
20190303541 · 2019-10-03 ·

Provided is a process that includes: calling an audit smart contract with a request to indicate whether an audit requirement has been satisfied for a software asset, wherein: the audit smart contract is configured to access a trust record published in a blockchain to determine whether the audit requirement has been satisfied, the trust record is caused to be published to the blockchain by an auditing entity that performed the audit, the trust record contains a cryptographically signed indication of an identity of an auditing entity that performed the audit, a result of the audit that specifies whether the audit was passed by the software asset, and a hash digest of the software asset upon which the audit was performed, wherein the audit smart contract is configured to determine whether the trust record establishes that the audit requirement has been satisfied.

Methods and Apparatus for Characterizing Memory Devices
20240160270 · 2024-05-16 ·

Methods and apparatus for using characterized devices such as memories. In one embodiment, characterized memories are associated with a range of performances over a range of operational parameters. The characterized memories can be used in conjunction with a solution density function to optimize memory searching. In one exemplary embodiment, a cryptocurrency miner can utilize characterized memories to generate memory hard proof-of-work (POW). The results may be further validated against general compute memories; such that only valid solutions are broadcasted to the mining community. In one embodiment, the validation mechanism is implemented for a plurality of searching apparatus in parallel to provide a more distributed and efficient approach. Various other applications for characterized memories are also described in greater detail herein (e.g., blockchain, social media, machine learning, probabilistic applications and other error-tolerant applications).

Trustless physical cryptocurrency

A physical cryptocurrency may comprise a physical medium and an attached processor. The processor may generate a public-private key pair, or the public-private key pair may be generated in a secure and auditable manner external to the processor and stored on the processor. The private key may enable execution of a smart contract on a blockchain to transfer an asset from a starting address to a destination address on the blockchain.

Software PUF based on RISC-V processor for IoT security

Disclosed is a software PUF based on an RISC-V processor for IoT security. A 32-bit RISC-V processor is used to generate abnormal information results in an abnormal operating state under a low voltage, and the abnormal information results are used to represent the features of the 32-bit RISC-V processor; 5-bit binary data obtained by comparing the abnormal information results with normal information results has high randomness and uniqueness and it is extremely difficult to directly extract internal abnormal information result from a hardware circuit of the 32-bit RISC-V processor, so modeling attacks based on the 5-bit binary data calculated according to the abnormal information results of the 32-bit RISC-V processor are almost impossible; in addition, when the 32-bit RISC-V processor is in an abnormal operating state, the operating frequency of the 32-bit RISC-V processor is dynamically adjusted through a frequency compensation method.

Method to utilize mismatch size to produce additional stable bit in tilting PUF
11985260 · 2024-05-14 ·

A method for creating a physical unclonable function (PUF) bit for use with transistor circuitry includes performing a tilt test on a PUF cell of a transistor circuitry, comprising tilting the PUF cell at least once, and comparing a mismatch of a response of the PUF cell to a tilt threshold. A magnitude of the mismatch is determined. A mismatch magnitude below the tilt threshold is considered a first logic value and a mismatch magnitude above the tilt threshold is considered a second logic value. The mismatch magnitude of the PUF cell is random. The absolute value of the mismatch magnitude is used as an entropy source to produce at least one PUF bit called a mirror PUF bit.