An electronic device that implements each module of a plurality of modules to jointly perform a secure multiparty cryptographic process to generate authorisation data based on input data, the authorisation data being suitable for use in authorising the electronic device, wherein each module uses secure data that is not shared outside that module to generate intermediate data for use in the secure multiparty cryptographic process to generate authentication data.

A system may include a plurality of matching block cipher devices, and a hardware state machine communicatively coupled to each of the plurality of matching block cipher devices. Each of the plurality of matching block cipher devices can be independently invoked by the hardware state machine such that the hardware state machine causes two or more of the plurality of matching block cipher devices to selectively perform a block-cipher-based symmetric cryptographic operation in a redundant mode or a parallel mode. The block-cipher-based symmetric cryptographic operation may be associated with securing a communication channel of an automotive system.

A power is computed at high speed with a small number of communication rounds. A secret computation system that includes three or more secret computation apparatuses computes a share [a.sup.] of the -th power of data a from a share [a] of data a while data a is concealed. The share [a] of data a and an exponent are input to an input unit (step S11). A local operation unit computes the p.sup.u-th power of a share [a.sup.t] of the t-th power of data a without communication with the other secret computation apparatuses (step S12). A secret computation unit uses secret computation that requires communication with the other secret computation apparatuses to compute a multiplication in which at least one of the multiplicands is [a.sup.(t*p{circumflex over ()}u)], the computation result of the local operation unit, to obtain the share [a.sup.] (step S13). An output unit outputs the share [a.sup.] (step S14).

A method for anonymous authentication and key establishment based on passwords (APAKE), includes instantiating, by the server, an OPRF scheme and a symmetric encryption scheme; engaging in, by the client and the server, an OPRFEvaluate protocol so that the client learns a decryption key associated with its password while the server learns nothing; securely transferring, by the server, a nonce and a symmetric encryption key to the client if the client holds a valid password; sending, by the client, its nonce encrypted under the symmetric encryption key; using, by the server, the symmetric encryption key to decipher ciphertext received by virtue of the sending, by the client, its nonce encrypted under the symmetric encryption key and to recover the client's nonce; and computing, by the server and the client, a compute key based on the client's nonce and the server's nonce.

Techniques for storing encrypted data using a storage service system are described herein. A computer system of a computation layer of the storage service system receives an encrypted key manifest, which is then decrypted using a cryptoprocessor of the computer system of the computation layer to produce a partition key. The partition key is then provided to a file system abstraction layer so that, as data is provided to the computation layer for storage, the file system abstraction layer can use the partition key to encrypt data and store the encrypted data in the storage layer.

This application describes systems and methods for using a physical unclonable function (PUF) to authenticate a device, which may include circuitry for generating PUF values that may uniquely identify the device. According to one aspect, the device may provide enrollment PUF values to an authentication device. The device may later be authenticated if PUF values generated by the device are within a threshold distance of the enrollment PUF values. Since the PUF values are compared using a distance, it may not necessary to apply an error correcting code to the PUF values. The enrollment values and/or the calculated distance may be adjusted to compensate for time variations in the PUF values due to circuit aging. Systems and methods are also described herein for authenticating the device without revealing new PUF values to any second party, for example using a cryptographic technique known as a garbled circuit.

This application relates to a client-server architecture that enables user accounts registered with a service to be discoverable to other users of the service. A discovery protocol includes accessing personal information data stored in an address book of a client device, obfuscating the personal information data, transmitting a request to a service to determine if the obfuscated personal information data matches any potential contacts that have registered as discoverable with the service, and comparing information related to the potential contacts with the contacts included in the address book to determine if the contacts in the address book match any of the potential contacts.

Disclosed is a process for testing a suspect model to determine whether it was derived from a source model. An example method includes receiving, from a model owner node, a source model and a fingerprint associated with the source model, receiving a suspect model at a service node, based on a request to test the suspect model, applying the fingerprint to the suspect model to generate an output and, when the output has an accuracy that is equal to or greater than a threshold, determining that the suspect model is derived from the source model. Imperceptible noise can be used to generate the fingerprint which can cause predictable outputs from the source model and a potential derivative thereof.

Methods and systems are presented for providing a framework for facilitating multi-party computation within a sharding environment. After a blockchain is divided into multiple shard chains, a multi-party computation system obtains attributes associated with a first shard chain. The attributes may represent characteristics of the first shard chain, characteristics of transactions recorded in the first shard chain, and characteristics of the computer nodes configured to manage the first shard chain. Based on the attributes, the multi-party computation system determines a multi-party computation scheme that specifies a minimum threshold number of nodes required to participate in a transaction validation process and at least one required node required to participate in the transaction validation process for the first shard chain. The multi-party computation system configures the computer nodes configured to manage the first shard chain to perform the transaction validation process according to the multi-party computation scheme.

The present invention relates to methods for secure computation and/or communication. Entangled photons (118) are generated such that each participating party receives a series of optical pulses. Each party has private information (110, 112) which are never transmitted through public or private communication channels. Instead, each party converts their respective private information (110, 112) into measurement bases via an encryption process (114, 116) which are then applied to the entangled photons (118). After the measurement process, e.g., quantum frequency conversion (122, 124), reference indices are announced (124, 126) so that computation can be performed (128) without revealing the private information directly or indirectly.