Methods, systems, and devices are provided for authenticating API messages using PKI-based authentication techniques. A client system can generate a private/public key pair associated with the client system and sign an API message using the private key of the private/public key pair and a PKI-based cryptographic algorithm, before sending the signed API message to a server system. The server system (e.g., operated by a service provider) can authenticate the incoming signed API message using a proxy authenticator located in less trusted zone (e.g., a perimeter network) of the server system. In particular, the proxy authenticator can be configured to verify the signature of the signed API message using the public key corresponding to the private key and the same cryptographic algorithm. The authenticated API message can then be forwarded to a more trusted zone (e.g., an internal network) of the server system for further processing.

Disclosed is a digital signature service system and method based on a hash function in which a main agent, who requires the generation of a digital signature, does not personally generate the digital signature, and wherein digital signatures may be simultaneously and stably generated for large-scale data such as multiple electronic documents and digital data using a hash function and a hash tree, which are known as a simple and secure method, to guarantee the integrity of the data in a digital signature-based structure based on a server.

An escrow platform is described that can be used to enable access to devices. The escrow platform can be used to sign cryptographic network protocol challenges on behalf of clients so that the secrets used to sign cryptographic network protocol challenges do not have to be exposed to the clients. The escrow platform can store or control access to private keys, and the corresponding public keys can be stored on respective target platforms. A client can attempt to access a target platform and in response the target platform can issue a challenge. The client platform can send the challenge to the escrow platform, which can use the corresponding private key to sign the challenge. The signed challenge can be sent back to the client, which can forward it to the target platform. The target platform can verify the expected private key and grant access.

Described herein are systems, devices, and methods for content delivery on the Internet. In certain non-limiting embodiments, a caching model is provided that can support caching for indefinite time periods, potentially with infinite or relatively long time-to-live values, yet provide prompt updates when the underlying origin content changes. In one approach, an origin server can annotate its responses to content requests with tokens, e.g., placing them in an appended HTTP header or otherwise. The tokens can drive the process of caching, and can be used as handles for later invalidating the responses within caching proxy servers delivering the content. Tokens may be used to represent a variety of kinds of dependencies expressed in the response, including without limitation data, data ranges, or logic that was a basis for the construction of the response.

A third party system generates a public-private key pair, the public key of the key pair being an encryption key, and the private key of the key pair being a decryption key. The third party system publishes the encryption key as a DNS record of a third party system. The third party system receives a request to sign a message on behalf of a domain owner, the message to be sent to a recipient, and accesses an encrypted delegated private key published by the domain owner via a DNS record of the domain owner, the encrypted delegated private key encrypted using the encryption key. The third party system decrypts the encrypted delegated private key using the decryption key, and generates a signature for the message using the delegated private key. The third party system sends the signature and the message to the recipient.

An infrastructure delivery platform provides a RSA proxy service as an enhancement to the TLS/SSL protocol to off-load, from an edge server to an external cryptographic server, the decryption of an encrypted pre-master secret. The technique provides forward secrecy in the event that the edge server is compromised, preferably through the use of a cryptographically strong hash function that is implemented separately at both the edge server and the cryptographic server. To provide the forward secrecy for this particular leg, the edge server selects an ephemeral value, and applies a cryptographic hash the value to compute a server random value, which is then transmitted back to the requesting client. That server random value is later re-generated at the cryptographic server to enable the cryptographic server to compute a master secret. The forward secrecy is enabled by ensuring that the ephemeral value does not travel on the wire.

A computing apparatus outputs .sub.1 and .sub.2 corresponding to a ciphertext x, a capability providing apparatus uses .sub.1 to correctly compute f(.sub.1) with a probability greater than a certain probability and sets the result of the computation as z.sub.1, uses .sub.2 to correctly compute f(.sub.2) with a probability greater than a certain probability and sets the result of the computation as z.sub.2, the computing apparatus generates a computation result u=f(x).sup.bx.sub.1 from z.sub.1, generates a computation result v=f(x).sup.ax.sub.2 from z.sub.2, and outputs u.sup.bv.sup.a if the computation results u and v satisfy a particular relation, where G and H are groups, f(x) is a function for obtaining an element of the group G for xH, X.sub.1 and X.sub.2 are random variables having values in the group G, x.sub.1 is a realization of the random variable X.sub.1, and x.sub.2 is a realization of the random variable X.sub.2.

A computing system, method, and storage medium prevent denial of provision of a network service by a server computer to an authorized client device. The computing system receives network service data that include a credential, then transmits that credential to a cloud-based identity system. The computing system responsively receives data pertaining to either zero or one identities related to the credential. If the data pertain to zero identities, the transaction is immediately terminated, preventing denial of the service. Only when the data pertain to exactly one identity does the computing system transmit the data to the server computer. Moreover, the computing system may terminate the transaction unless the server computer is similarly validated by the cloud-based identity system, thereby preventing access from an unauthorized device. The computing system may hide a network address of the client device from the server computer, and vice versa, and perform other useful supporting functions.

A system, method, and device includes a platform data storage that stores a wrap that secures an executable controller and executable sensors. The wrap is verified, optionally through a downloaded authentication driver. After verifying the wrap, the wrap is opened and a sister of the executable controller is installed into the platform memory to cooperate with the executable controller. Additionally or alternatively, the authentication driver may cooperate with the executable controller. The executable controller allows the platform processor to access data secured in a vault and/or verify the platform to create a connection to an application server.

A system, method and program product for implementing a database security model. A database security model is disclosed that includes: a system for maintaining private data in an encrypted storage area; an ENCR system for implementing a plurality of ENCR routines, wherein each of the ENCR routines is callable from a database application to access and process private data and wherein the ENCR system operates in a functional space separate from the database application; and a crypto system having a private key and decryption system, wherein the crypto system decrypts private data in response to receiving a decrypt request and public key from an ENCR routine, and wherein the crypto system operates in a functional space separate from the ENCR system.