Method and system for routing communications traffic between a machine to machine, M2M, device connected to a telecommunications network and having an International Mobile Subscriber Identity, IMSI, and a server, the method comprising assigning an access point name, APN, from a plurality of APNs based on the IMSI of the M2M device. Routing, via the assigned APN, communications traffic between the M2M device and the server, wherein the server is determined based on one or more of: the IMSI, the APN and a characteristic of a communication traffic between the M2M device and the server.

One feature pertains to a method operational at a device. The method includes performing key agreement with a core network device, and generating an authentication session key based in part on a secret key shared with a home subscriber server (HSS), where the authentication session key is known to the core network device. The method further includes generating a mobility session key based in part on the authentication session key, where the mobility session key is known to a mobility management entity (MME) served by the core network device and serving the device. The method also includes cryptographically securing data sent from the device to a wireless communication network using the mobility session key.

Embodiments of the present invention provide systems and techniques for changing cryptographic keys in high-frequency transaction environments to mitigate service disruptions or loss of transactions associated with key maintenance. In various embodiments, a server device can employ a working key encrypted with a first master key to decrypt messages being communicated from a client device, whereby each message is encrypted with a first cryptogram that was generated based on the working key encrypted with the first master key. While the working key encrypted with the first master key is being employed, the server device can generate a notification including a second cryptogram generated based on the working key encrypted with a second master key for transmission to the client device. The transmitted notification can cause the client device to encrypt the messages being communicated with the second cryptogram. The server device can concurrently employ the working key encrypted with one of the first and second master keys to decrypt messages received from the client device, whether encrypted with the first cryptogram or the second cryptogram.

Pursuant to some embodiments, systems, methods, apparatus and computer program code for encrypting and decrypting a message are provided.

Authentication with security in wireless networks may be provided. A first confirm message comprising a first send-confirm element and a first confirm element may be received. Next, an Authenticator Number Used Once (ANonce) may be generated and a second confirm message may be sent comprising the ANonce, a second send-confirm element, and a second confirm element. Then an association request may be received comprising a Supplicant Number Used Once (SNonce) and a Message Integrity Code (MIC). An association response may be sent comprising an encrypted Group Temporal Key (GTK), an encrypted Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK), the ANonce, and the MIC. An acknowledgment may be received comprising the MIC in an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) over LAN (EAPoL) key frame and a controller port may be unblocked in response to receiving the acknowledgment.

Systems and methods of authentication and encrypted communication between a server and client using independently-generated shared encryption keys are disclosed. Clients with arrays of physical-unclonable-function devices respond to server-issued challenges. The clients derive encryption keys from responses to those challenges generated by measuring PUF devices specified by the challenges. The clients send messages encrypted with the encryption keys to the server. The server independently reproduces the client-generated encryption keys using information about the PUF devices. When the keys match, the clients are authenticated. It may be desirable to inject errors into the challenge responses generated by the clients to improve security. When errors are injected, attackers cannot determine correct challenge responses except by brute force. When a sufficiently large number of errors are introduced, the server has sufficient computational power to successfully authenticate the client, but is computationally infeasible for an attacker to reverse engineer the correct responses.

A method is provided for establishing a secure communication session in a communications system. The method includes providing a handshake layer functional block and providing a record layer functional block separate from the handshake layer functional block. A first ephemeral key pair is generated by the record layer functional block of a first communication peer. A public key of the first ephemeral key pair is transmitted to a second communication peer. The handshake layer functional block of the first communication peer generates a second ephemeral key pair. A public key of the second ephemeral key pair is transmitted to the second communication peer. The second communication peer generates a third ephemeral key pair. A handshake key is generated from the public key of the second communication peer and a private key of the handshake layer block of the first communication peer. A session key is generated from the public key of the second communication peer and a private key of the record layer block of the first communication peer

In order for supporting separate ciphering at an MeNB (20) and an SeNB (30), the MeNB (20) derives separate first and second keys (KUPenc-M, KUPenc-S) from a third key (KeNB). The first key (KUPenc-M) is used for confidentially protecting first traffic transmitted over U-Plane between the MeNB (20) and a UE (10). The first key (KUPenc-M) may be the same as current KUPenc or a new key. The second key (KUPenc-S) is used for confidentially protecting second traffic transmitted over the U-Plane between the UE (10) and the SeNB (30). The MeNB (20) sends the second key (KUPenc-S) to the SeNB (30). The UE (10) negotiates with the MeNB (20), and derives the second key (KUPenc-S) based on a result of the negotiation.

Some embodiments provide a method for establishing a secured session with backward security between a first device and a second device. In some embodiments, the method establishes a communication session between the first and second devices using shared keys stored at the first and second devices. The method exchanges encrypted data between the first and second devices as a part of the communication session. The method, upon completion of the communication session, modifies the shared key at the first device in a predictable way. The shared key is modified at the second device in the same predictable way. The method then stores the modified shared key at the first device. The modified shared key cannot be used to decrypt any portion of the encrypted data of the current and previous communication sessions.

Embodiments provide a system and method for stateless session synchronization between inspectors for high availability deployments. Man in the Middle inspectors of a communication session between a client and server exchange a shared key that is used as a common seed value in a mapping function algorithm. Each inspector generates identical key-pairs using the common mapping function algorithm, and the inspectors generate the session keys from the key-pairs. Inspectors use the session keys to decrypt and either actively or passively inspect data transferred in a session between a client and server.