H04L2463/081

Secure circuit for encryption key generation

Techniques are disclosed relating to relating to a public key infrastructure (PKI). In one embodiment, an integrated circuit is disclosed that includes at least one processor and a secure circuit isolated from access by the processor except through a mailbox mechanism. In some embodiments, the secure circuit is configured to generate a public key and a private key for an application, and receive, from the application via an API, a request to perform a cryptographic operation using the private key. The secure circuit is further configured to perform the cryptographic operation in response to the request.

Method for operating a system on chip comprising a bootable processor to provide protection of confidential information on the system on chip
10459732 · 2019-10-29 · ·

A method for operating a system on chip (SoC) comprising a bootable processor, wherein the method includes executing a bootloader and measuring electrical power consumed by the processor during booting to derive a unique power characteristic data, verifying the unique power characteristic data, and reconstructing an device key from the unique power characteristic data and helper dater derived during an enrollment of the system on chip, where the measured power trace of the processor constitutes a unique signature of the SoC device executing specified software such that the solution secures the running software by itself.

MTC KEY MANAGEMENT FOR KEY DERIVATION AT BOTH UE AND NETWORK
20190306684 · 2019-10-03 ·

There is provided a new IWF SMC procedure for establishing security association between an MTC UE (10) and an MTC-IWF (20). The MTC-IWF (20) sends to the UE (10) at least an algorithm identifier which instructs the UE (10) to select one of algorithms for deriving a root key (K_iwf). The UE (10) derives the root key (K_iwf) in accordance with the selected algorithm, and derives at least a subkey for checking the integrity of messages transferred between the UE (10) and the MTC-IWF (20) by using the derived root key (K_iwf). The UE (10) protects uplink messages transmitted to the MTC-IWF (20) with the derived subkey. The MTC-IWF (20) protects downlink messages transmitted to the UE (10) with the same subkey derived at a core network.

Method for certification by a control unit of a vehicle
10425398 · 2019-09-24 · ·

A method for performing certification by a control device of a vehicle including generating a first signed certificate, which has at least one public key, and generating an associated private key; single-time introduction of the first signed certificate and of the associated private key into the control device; producing a second certificate; signing a further public key in the control device, using the private key and the second certificate; and making available the signed further public key together with the first signed certificate.

USER VALIDATION SYSTEM UTILIZING SYMBOLIC OR PICTOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATIONS OF VALIDATION CODES

Disclosed herein is a device and method for validating users, such as for entry into a given area. The method includes transmitting a plurality of access control tokens from an access control system to a portable device, and detecting proximity a user portable device associated with one of the plurality of access control tokens to the portable device. A symbolic representation of the access control token associated with the user portable device is generated by and displayed on the portable device. Selection of the displayed symbolic representation is accepted at the portable device. The access control system is notified of selection of the displayed symbolic representation, thereby indicating identification of a user associated with the access control token symbolically represented by the symbolic representation. The venue symbolic representation includes at least one pictograph.

INSTALLATION OF A TERMINAL IN A SECURE SYSTEM
20190268313 · 2019-08-29 ·

A system comprising a terminal and a server, wherein the terminal is installed in the system by the server being configured to: identify the terminal; generate key generation data, comprising at least one data seed; distribute the at least one seed to the terminal; generate key data and meta data based on said at least one seed and a function; store an identifier for the terminal along with the key data and the meta data for the terminal, wherein the terminal is arranged to receive the at least one seed from the server; generate key data and meta data based on said at least one seed and the same function; store the key data and the meta data, wherein the key data and the meta data stored in the terminal are the same as the key data and the meta data stored in the server.

Method and apparatus for simultaneous key generation on device and server for secure communication
11983251 · 2024-05-14 · ·

A secure communication system is disclosed for communication between first and second party devices. An input interface is provided for receiving from an external host a unique host factor in addition to a user input interface for receiving from a user a unique PIN for a user and a selection input for selecting one of the plurality of stored entropy stores as a user selected entropy store A first private key generator is operable for generating a private key using a key generation algorithm requiring the selected entropy store, the host factor and the unique user PIN. The second party device includes a second storage device for storing a plurality of entropy stores. An input interface is provided for receiving the same unique host factor as received by the first party device. A communication interface facilitates communication with the first party device to receive from the first party device a user PIN and an indication of the user selected entropy store. A second private key generator is operable for generating a private key using the predetermined key generation algorithm with the received user PIN, the received host factor, and an extracted entropy store corresponding to user selected entropy store, wherein the private key generated by both the first and second private key generators are identical. The session is initiated to cause the generation of the identical private keys at both of the first and second private key generators and allow secure communication between the first and second devices. The private key at least one of the first and second devices is deleted at the end of the session.

Communication System, Communication Device, And Non-Transitory Computer-Readable Recording Medium Storing Computer-Readable Instructions For Terminal Device
20190253401 · 2019-08-15 ·

A terminal device may execute a communication of authentication information with a communication device, the authentication information being prepared by the terminal device or the communication device without being inputted in the terminal device or the communication device by a user; send the authentication information to a first sever; and send specific information to the first server. The communication device may execute the communication of the authentication information with the terminal device; and send the authentication information to the first server. The first server may register the service information in the memory of the first server in a case where the authentication information is received from both of the terminal device and the communication device, and the specific information is received from the terminal device.

CRYPTOGRAPHY METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR SECURING DATA VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION
20190244198 · 2019-08-08 ·

Provided are QR Codes configured with a Transactional Cryptopgrahy (TC) component and methods for using thereof in a secure manner without the need for specialized hardware. By using software-defined security, QR codes can be used for a wider array of purposes without the additional expense and maintenance of separate hardware platforms for secure information

GENERATION OF KEYS OF VARIABLE LENGTH FROM CRYPTOGRAPHIC TABLES
20190207758 · 2019-07-04 ·

A cryptographic infrastructure, which provides a method for generating private keys of variable length from a cryptographic table and a public key. This infrastructure provides an approximation of the one-time pad scheme. The cryptographic table is shared between a message sender and a message recipient by a secure transfer. After sharing the cryptographic table, no new private keys need to be sentthe private keys are independently generated by each party from the data contained within the shared cryptographic tables, using the public key. After public keys are exchanged, private keys may be generated and used to encrypt and decrypt messages and perform authentication cycles, establishing a secure communication environment between the sender and the recipient.