Evasive resiliency countermeasures techniques that include: implementing a cyber asset in a network element of a plurality of network elements, monitoring operations of the network; detecting an adverse event within the network; in response to detecting the adverse event, removing an availability of the cyber asset at the network element; determining when the adverse event has ended; and, in response to determining that the adverse event has ended, restoring the availability of the cyber asset at the network element.

The present disclosure relates to a pre-5.sup.th-Generation (5G) or 5G communication system to be provided for supporting higher data rates Beyond 4.sup.th-Generation (4G) communication system such as Long Term Evolution (LTE). Methods, network entities, and systems for mitigating Denial of Service (DoS) attack in a wireless network (e.g., access network (AN), core network (CN)). Embodiments herein disclose methods and systems for mitigating Denial of Service (DOS) attacks in wireless networks, by performing admission control by verifying a User Equipment's (UE's) registration request via a Closed Access Group (CAG) cell without performing a primary authentication. Embodiments herein disclose methods and system for verifying permissions of the UE to access a CAG cell based on the UE's Subscription identifier, before performing the primary authentication. Methods and systems for mitigating Denial of Service (DoS) attack in a wireless network. A method for mitigating Denial of Service (DOS) attacks in wireless networks includes requesting a public land mobile network (PLMN) for accessing a non-public network (NPN) through a Closed Access Group (CAG) cell, verifying the permissions of a user equipment (UE) to access the requested NPN through the CAG cell, and performing a primary authentication.

An authoritative domain name system (DNS) server receives a DNS query for an address record for a hostname. The DNS server selects an IP address from multiple IP addresses to include in an answer to the DNS query, where each IP address is capable of being selected to be included in the answer regardless of the hostname being queried, where multiple servers of a distributed cloud computing network are capable of receiving traffic at each IP address, and where none of the IP addresses identify a particular server of the distributed cloud computing network. The authoritative DNS server transmits an answer to the DNS query that includes the selected IP address. Sometime after, one of the servers of the distributed cloud computing network receives a request for content that is addressed to the selected IP address and processes the request.

This application provides a data processing method and a device. In embodiments, a data processing method applied to a network device may include: receiving a first data packet, where the first data packet includes a source IP address and a first verification code; obtaining a first key; generating a second verification code based on the source IP address and the first key; and if the second verification code is the same as the first verification code, determining that the first data packet is valid.

Techniques for detecting and mitigating Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in distributed networking environment are disclosed. In certain embodiments, a DoS detection and mitigation system is disclosed that automatically monitors and analyzes network traffic data in a distributed networking environment using a set of pre-defined threshold criteria. The system includes capabilities for automatically invoking various mitigation techniques that take actions on malicious traffic based on the analysis and the pre-defined threshold criteria. The system includes capabilities for automatically detecting and mitigating “outbound” DoS attacks by analyzing network traffic data originating from an entity within the network to a public network (e.g., the Internet) outside the network as well as detect and mitigate “east-west” DoS attacks by analyzing network traffic data originating from a first entity located in a first data center of the network to a second entity located in a second data center of the network.

Using a message bus controller to protect 5G core elements can include accessing, by a computing device that executes a message bus controller, a message in a message bus of a packet core of a cellular network. The message can be generated by a first network function and transmitted to a second network function via the message bus, wherein the second network function can subscribe to messages from the first network function. The computing device can determine if delivery of the message to the second network function should be restricted. If so, the computing device can drop the message, and if not, the computing device can allow a message flow associated with the message to resume.

The disclosed computer-implemented method includes applying transport protocol heuristics to selective acknowledgement (SACK) messages received at a network adapter from a network node. The transport protocol heuristics identify threshold values for operational functions that are performed when processing the SACK messages. The method further includes determining, by applying the transport protocol heuristics to the SACK messages received from the network node, that the threshold values for the transport protocol heuristics have been reached. In response to determining that the threshold values have been reached, the method includes identifying the network node as a security threat and taking remedial actions to mitigate the security threat. Various other methods, systems, and computer-readable media are also disclosed.

A computer method and system for determining patterns in network traffic packets having structured subfields for generating filter candidate regular expressions for DDoS attack mitigation. Stored packets are analyzed to extract a query name for each stored packet. Each query name is segregated into subfields. A Results-table is generated utilizing the segregated subfields of the query names. A Field-length table is generated that contains the length of the Field Values (Field-length) for each Field Name and an associated counter indicating how many instances the Field-length for a Field Name is present in the extracted query names. The Field-length table is analyzed to determine patterns of equal length in the “Results” table. Utilizing the Patterns table, unique combinations of the Field Values are generated as a filter candidate regular expression for DDoS attack mitigation purposes.

An apparatus for mitigating a DDoS attack in a networked computing system includes at least one detector coupled with a corresponding router in the networked computing system. The detector is configured: to obtain network flow information from the router regarding current data traffic to at least one host; to compare the current data traffic to the host with stored traffic patterns associated with at least one prior DDoS attack; and to generate an output indicative of a match between the current data traffic and at least one of the stored traffic patterns. The apparatus further includes at least one mitigation unit coupled with the at least one detector. The mitigation unit is configured: to receive the output indicative of the match between the current data traffic and at least one of the stored traffic patterns; and to initiate a DDoS attack mitigation action in response to the received output.

A Method and a system for securing a SDN controller from denial of service attack are provided. A SDN controller receives, from a networking device, data packets pertaining to a flow in Packet_IN messages, if the flow does not match flow entries in a first flow table of the networking device. A table miss flow entry pertaining to the flow is created in a second flow table of the networking device for sending the Packet_IN. The SDN controller installs a flood prevention flow entry in the second flow table to enable the networking device to drop subsequent data packets pertaining to the flow until the SDN controller installs, in the first flow table, a flow entry matching the flow. The flood prevention flow entry is deleted from the second flow table after the installation of the flow entry matching the flow.