H04W12/04

Zero-touch deployment (ZTD) of cellular IoT devices and associated trust model

In one embodiment, a service receives a device registration request sent by an endpoint device, wherein the endpoint device executes an onboarding agent that causes the endpoint device to send the device registration request via a cellular connection to a private access point name (APN) associated with the service. The service verifies that a network address of the endpoint device from which the device registration request was sent is associated with an integrated circuit card identifier (ICCID) or international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) indicated by the device registration request. The service identifies a tenant identifier associated with the ICCID or IMEI. The service sends, based on the tenant identifier, a device registration response to the endpoint device via the private APN.

Zero-touch deployment (ZTD) of cellular IoT devices and associated trust model

In one embodiment, a service receives a device registration request sent by an endpoint device, wherein the endpoint device executes an onboarding agent that causes the endpoint device to send the device registration request via a cellular connection to a private access point name (APN) associated with the service. The service verifies that a network address of the endpoint device from which the device registration request was sent is associated with an integrated circuit card identifier (ICCID) or international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) indicated by the device registration request. The service identifies a tenant identifier associated with the ICCID or IMEI. The service sends, based on the tenant identifier, a device registration response to the endpoint device via the private APN.

SECURE COMMUNICATION METHOD
20230039446 · 2023-02-09 ·

Disclosed is a method for a secure communication method having a secret key generation technique. The novelty of the proposed method stems from enhancing physical layer security (PHY) by using channel-adaptive keys, after manipulating a channel by introducing an artificial component into the channel. An adaptively designed artificial component is cascaded with the legitimate user’s channel. In an orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) system, subcarriers corresponding to a channel gain higher than a threshold value are selected to extract the keys. Since the number of the selected subcarriers is adaptive, the length of the generated key sequences is changing adaptively as well. Thus, the channel reciprocity property in a time division duplexing (TDD) system is utilized.

Integrated secure device manager systems and methods for cyber-physical vehicles

Systems and methods are described for a cyber-physical vehicle management system generated by an Integrated Secure Device Manager (ISDM) Authority configured to manage licensing and approval of Cyber-Physical Vehicle (CPV)s, a public/private key pair and a unique ID for the Authority, create a self-signed Authority token signed by the private key, send the Authority token to a plurality of ISDM Node device configured to verify Module device authenticity and in communication with the Authority, store, by each Node, the Authority token, and mark, by each Node, the Authority token as trusted.

Network watermark
11558422 · 2023-01-17 · ·

A network communications method utilizing a network watermark for providing security in the communications includes creating a verifiable network communications path of nodes through a network for the transfer of information from a first end node to a second end node; verifying the network communications path of nodes, by the first end node, before communicating by the first end node information intended for receipt by the second end node; and once the network communications path of nodes is verified by the first end node, communicating by the first end node, via the verified communications path of nodes, the information intended for receipt by the second end node; wherein the network watermark represents the verifiable network communications path of nodes.

Network watermark
11558422 · 2023-01-17 · ·

A network communications method utilizing a network watermark for providing security in the communications includes creating a verifiable network communications path of nodes through a network for the transfer of information from a first end node to a second end node; verifying the network communications path of nodes, by the first end node, before communicating by the first end node information intended for receipt by the second end node; and once the network communications path of nodes is verified by the first end node, communicating by the first end node, via the verified communications path of nodes, the information intended for receipt by the second end node; wherein the network watermark represents the verifiable network communications path of nodes.

Operator authentication with a vehicle using different pathways

In accordance with one or more embodiments described herein, a method is provided. The method includes receiving a request to assume control of a vehicle generated by a candidate operator via a first communication pathway. The method obtains a key from an onboard controller of the vehicle and communicates the key to the candidate operator via a second communication pathway that is different from the first communication pathway. The method determines the candidate operator to be a confirmed operator based at least in part on obtaining the key from the candidate operator via the first communication pathway.

Operator authentication with a vehicle using different pathways

In accordance with one or more embodiments described herein, a method is provided. The method includes receiving a request to assume control of a vehicle generated by a candidate operator via a first communication pathway. The method obtains a key from an onboard controller of the vehicle and communicates the key to the candidate operator via a second communication pathway that is different from the first communication pathway. The method determines the candidate operator to be a confirmed operator based at least in part on obtaining the key from the candidate operator via the first communication pathway.

Secure communication between a contact lens and an accessory device

Described herein are systems and methods that allow for secure wireless communication between a contact lens system and an accessory device to protect sensitive data and prevent unauthorized access to confidential information. In certain embodiments, tampering attempts by potential attackers are thwarted by using a Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF) circuit that is immune to reverse engineering. In addition, sensors monitor a to-be-protected electronic device to detect tampering attempts and physical attacks to ensure the physical integrity of the communication system.

Secure communication between a contact lens and an accessory device

Described herein are systems and methods that allow for secure wireless communication between a contact lens system and an accessory device to protect sensitive data and prevent unauthorized access to confidential information. In certain embodiments, tampering attempts by potential attackers are thwarted by using a Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF) circuit that is immune to reverse engineering. In addition, sensors monitor a to-be-protected electronic device to detect tampering attempts and physical attacks to ensure the physical integrity of the communication system.