H04W12/12

BLOCKCHAIN SUPPORTED BANKNOTE

A banknote includes a security element with a processor and a memory. A private cryptographic key of an asymmetric key pair of the banknote is stored in a protected memory area of the memory. The asymmetric key pair is assigned to a banknote-specific blockchain address in a blockchain. A payment method executed with the banknote includes receiving a payment request for a payment with the banknote in the form of a transaction of an amount to be paid from the blockchain address of the banknote to a blockchain address of a payee, signing a transaction approval with the private cryptographic key of the banknote, and sending the signed transaction approval.

SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR DYNAMIC CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR SMALL CELLS

A device within a small cell may establish a first secure communication channel between the device and a network device based on a first type of encryption. The device within the small cell may transmit data between the small cell and a core network via the first secure communication channel. The device within the small cell may receive information associated with a second type of encryption, wherein the second type of encryption is different from the first type of encryption. The device within the small cell may terminate the first secure communication channel. The device within the small cell may establish a second secure communication channel between the device and the network device based on the information associated with the second type of encryption. The device within the small cell may transmit further data between the small cell and the core network via the second secure communication channel.

Misbehavior detection in autonomous driving communications

A first roadway system receives a communication from a second roadway system over a wireless channel, where the communication includes a description of a physical object within a driving environment. Characteristics of the physical object are determined based on sensors of the first roadway system. The communication is determined to contain an anomaly based on a comparison of the description of the physical object with the characteristics determined based on the sensors of the first roadway system. Misbehavior data is generated to describe the anomaly. A remedial action is initiated based on the anomaly.

Using security event correlation to describe an authentication process

Techniques are described herein that are capable of using security event correlation to describe an authentication process. Multiple events may describe a common (i.e., same) attempt to authenticate the user. For instance, a first event may include a first description of the attempt, a second event may include a second description of the attempt, and a third event may include a third description of the attempt. The first, second, and third events may be correlated based at least in part on the first, second, and third descriptions. The first, second, and third events may be aggregated to provide an aggregated event that includes an aggregation of the first, second, and third descriptions. An authentication report may be generated to include the aggregation of the first, second, and third descriptions to describe the authentication process.

Method and system for relay attack prevention incorporating motion
11696136 · 2023-07-04 · ·

A method and system for detecting if a relay is present in a PEPS system for a vehicle is provided by (a) determining whether movement of an authentication device was detected within a predefined time period after the authentication device enters a PEPS entry operational region; and (b) determining if the authentication device was stationary for a predetermined time period during a PEPS entry triggering event.

Method and system for relay attack prevention incorporating motion
11696136 · 2023-07-04 · ·

A method and system for detecting if a relay is present in a PEPS system for a vehicle is provided by (a) determining whether movement of an authentication device was detected within a predefined time period after the authentication device enters a PEPS entry operational region; and (b) determining if the authentication device was stationary for a predetermined time period during a PEPS entry triggering event.

Active base apparatus

In accordance with some embodiments, an apparatus for privacy protection is provided. The apparatus includes a housing arranged to hold a personal communication device and a peripheral interface supported by the housing, where the peripheral interface is connectable to a supplemental functional device. The apparatus further includes a local communication device coupled to the peripheral interface and supported by the housing, where the local communication device includes a personal communication device interface modem operable to provide a communication channel between the peripheral interface and the personal communication device. The apparatus further includes a controller coupled to the peripheral interface and the local communication device, where the controller is operable to manage the communication channel between the supplemental functional device and the personal communication device.

Bluetooth mesh network system and communication method having unprovisioned communication mechanism

The present invention discloses a Bluetooth mesh network system having unprovisioned communication mechanism that includes a delivering node and a receiving node. The delivering node generates a beacon signal having identification information that is not a key and performs broadcast communication. The receiving node receives the beacon signal and performs identification and processing under a network communication protocol to execute a command corresponding to the beacon signal.

DEVICE ADDRESS ROTATION METHOD TO PROTECT AGAINST UNCONSENTED TRACKING

A network infrastructure component determines a risk measurement associated with a wireless client device's use of a device address, and provides an advisory with respect to an address rotation strategy of the wireless client device based on the risk measurement. In some embodiments, the risk measurement is based on one or more of an exposure, by the wireless client device, of information on the wireless network that identifies the wireless client device and/or a characterization of a security of the wireless network environment in which the wireless client device operates.

DEVICE ADDRESS ROTATION METHOD TO PROTECT AGAINST UNCONSENTED TRACKING

A network infrastructure component determines a risk measurement associated with a wireless client device's use of a device address, and provides an advisory with respect to an address rotation strategy of the wireless client device based on the risk measurement. In some embodiments, the risk measurement is based on one or more of an exposure, by the wireless client device, of information on the wireless network that identifies the wireless client device and/or a characterization of a security of the wireless network environment in which the wireless client device operates.