A method for transmitting a subscription profile from an MNO to a secure element pre-provisioned with a temporary profile comprising a unique identifier, MCC and MNC, includes: —Transmitting from the MNO the unique identifier to a SM-DP; —Creating the subscription profile at the SM-DP; —Provisioning in a D-HSS server having the first MCC/MNC the unique identifier and a temporary IMSI comprising a second MCC, a second MNC; —Provisioning in the MNO the temporary IMSI and an ephemeral key; —At the first attempt of the secure element to connect to the D-HSS server, exchanging data in signaling messages for provisioning the secure element with the temporary IMSI; —At the next attempt of the secure element to connect to the MNO network with the temporary IMSI, open an APN and send from the SM-DP to the secure element the subscription profile.

In one embodiment, a method includes receiving, by a tracking server and from a first computing device, a first tracking signal associated with a tracking device. The first tracking signal is associated with a first location and is received with an identifier for the tracking device. The method includes associating the first location with the tracking device based on the identifier for the tracking device. The method includes receiving second tracking signals from one or more second computing devices, respectively. Each second tracking signal is associated with a respective second location and is received with a respective unresolved hash value. The method includes resolving the identifier for the tracking device based on the unresolved hash value received with each of the one or more second tracking signals. The method includes associating the second locations with the tracking device based on the identifier for the tracking device.

In one embodiment, a method includes receiving, by a tracking server and from a first computing device, a first tracking signal associated with a tracking device. The first tracking signal is associated with a first location and is received with an identifier for the tracking device. The method includes associating the first location with the tracking device based on the identifier for the tracking device. The method includes receiving second tracking signals from one or more second computing devices, respectively. Each second tracking signal is associated with a respective second location and is received with a respective unresolved hash value. The method includes resolving the identifier for the tracking device based on the unresolved hash value received with each of the one or more second tracking signals. The method includes associating the second locations with the tracking device based on the identifier for the tracking device.

A method includes receiving, by an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC), first information from a local profile assistant (LPA), where the first information includes a first certificate issuer (CI) public key identifier, and the first CI public key identifier is a CI public key identifier that the eUICC does not have. The method further includes sending, by the eUICC, second information to an OPS, where the second information includes the first CI public key identifier. The method further includes receiving, by the eUICC, a patch package from the OPS, where the patch package includes at least a first CI public key corresponding to the first CI public key identifier. The method further includes updating, by the eUICC, a CI public key of the eUICC by using the first CI public key.

Systems, apparatuses, and methods for wirelessly updating electronic control unit configuration can include determining operation parameters to be changed of an electronic control unit of an equipment, and generating a write package including the operating parameters to be changed. The systems, apparatuses, and methods include transmitting the write package to the equipment. The write package causes the electronic control unit to change the operation parameters upon verifying that the operation parameters are applicable to the equipment based on values of the parameters. In response to determining that the operation parameters are not applicable to the equipment, the write package can be discarded.

Methods for authenticating a genuine presence of a human involve directing one or more modulated probes towards a body part of the human, receiving a response to the probes from the body part, and analyzing the response to determine whether it contains spectral characteristics that match a class of responses to such probes for the human body part in a human population. Replay attacks are countered by varying the modulation of the probe temporally, spatially, and spectrally each time authentication is performed. The probes may include electromagnetic radiation, acoustic beams, or particle beams that generate a detected reflection, absorption pattern, scintillation, or fluorescence response of the body part. The analysis of the response may be directed to one or more of temporal, spatial, and spectral variations in accordance with the nature of the probes and the modulation.

Methods for authenticating a genuine presence of a human involve directing one or more modulated probes towards a body part of the human, receiving a response to the probes from the body part, and analyzing the response to determine whether it contains spectral characteristics that match a class of responses to such probes for the human body part in a human population. Replay attacks are countered by varying the modulation of the probe temporally, spatially, and spectrally each time authentication is performed. The probes may include electromagnetic radiation, acoustic beams, or particle beams that generate a detected reflection, absorption pattern, scintillation, or fluorescence response of the body part. The analysis of the response may be directed to one or more of temporal, spatial, and spectral variations in accordance with the nature of the probes and the modulation.

A computer system for verifying vehicle software configuration may be provided. The computer system may include a processor and a non-transitory, tangible, computer-readable storage medium having instructions stored thereon that, in response to execution by the processor, cause the processor to: (1) transmit, to a vehicle computing system, an authentication request including a hash algorithm specification; (2) receive, from the vehicle computing system, a current configuration hash value and a vehicle identifier; (3) retrieve a trusted data block from a memory based upon the vehicle identifier, the trusted data block including a stored configuration hash value and a smart contract code segment; (4) execute the smart contract code segment, the smart contract code segment including a failsafe code segment; and/or (5) transmit the authentication response to the vehicle computing system, and cause the vehicle computing system to execute the failsafe code segment.

Various embodiments include methods, components and wireless devices configured to identify illegitimate base station. The processor of the wireless device may determine that a device in communication with the wireless device is a suspect base station. The processor may send a fabricated message to the device, and may receive one or more response messages from the device. The processor may determine whether one or more of the response messages received from the device is an appropriate response or an inappropriate response to the fabricated message. In response to determining that a response message is an inappropriate response, the processor may determine that the device is an illegitimate base station. In response to determining that the device is an illegitimate base station, the wireless device may perform a protective action.

Various embodiments include methods, components and wireless devices configured to identify illegitimate base station. The processor of the wireless device may determine that a device in communication with the wireless device is a suspect base station. The processor may send a fabricated message to the device, and may receive one or more response messages from the device. The processor may determine whether one or more of the response messages received from the device is an appropriate response or an inappropriate response to the fabricated message. In response to determining that a response message is an inappropriate response, the processor may determine that the device is an illegitimate base station. In response to determining that the device is an illegitimate base station, the wireless device may perform a protective action.