Systems and methods for detecting and protecting against phase manipulation during AoA or AoD operations are disclosed. For AoA operations, the network device receiving the constant tone extension (CTE) generates an antenna switching pattern, which may be randomly generated. The network device then receives the CTE using a plurality of antenna elements. In one embodiment, the network device compares the phase of portions of the CTE signal received that utilize the same antenna element. If the phase of these portions differs by more than a threshold, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. In another embodiment, if the AoA algorithm cannot determine the angle of arrival, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. For angle of departure operations, the network device that transmits the CTE signal generates the antenna switching pattern and transmits it to the position engine, which performs the comparisons described above.

A system and method of index modulation based joint mode frequency hopping with vortex electromagnetic waves for anti-jamming are provided. The system is additionally provided with a transmit signal carrier selector that provides diversified options, a receive signal carrier selector that is strictly synchronized with the transmit signal carrier selector, and a group of fast Fourier transformation modules to output a binary demodulation signal with jamming eliminated. The method includes: binary information division; index modulation and information modulation; information loading and hopping; information transmission, de-hopping, and jamming filtering; and calculation of the jamming probability and an average bit error rate. The present disclosure combines orbital angular momentum modes and subcarrier frequencies to form OAM mode-subcarrier frequency pair sets so as to diversify information transmission carriers, and performs simultaneously modulation and hopping to increase a spectrum efficiency and enhance the anti-jamming capability.

An embodiment method comprises receiving a satellite signal in a tracking channel, generating a set of replicas of a pseudo random noise sequence, comprising a punctual replica and a plurality of replicas that are different in time with respect to the punctual replica over a given time spacing, correlating the received signal with each replica to obtain amplitude correlation values, monitoring the tracking channel to detect a spoofed signal by generating a further plurality of replicas of the pseudo random noise sequence having a respective time spacing greater than the given time spacing, correlating the received signal of the tracking channel with each further replica to obtain further amplitude correlation values, calculating a shape anomaly factor based on the further correlation amplitude values, verifying the shape anomaly factor is greater than a given shape anomaly threshold, and signaling detection of a spoofed signal on the tracking channel.

There is provided a method for a first network element of a wireless communication network, the method comprising: obtaining blanked subcarrier index data indicating one or more blanked subcarriers in a time-frequency resource grid; initiating reception of a transmission from a second network element of the wireless communication network on said time-frequency resource grid; causing performing an interference measurement on said one or more blanked subcarriers to obtain interference measurement data on said one or more blanked subcarriers; and outputting the interference measurement data for detecting a presence of radio jamming.

Various schemes for mitigating radio frequency (RF) interference are described, wherein an adaptive local oscillator (LO) is utilized. A receiver measures a jamming indicator which indicates a total power within a receiving band of the receiver. If the jamming indicator indicates a presence of substantial in-band interference, the receiver may program the LO to a different frequency and/or adjust a bandwidth of a filter accordingly to reject or reduce the interference. The receiver may adjust the LO and/or the filter repeatedly until the interference is rejected to a point that de-sense to the signal intended to be received is satisfactorily mitigated. The receiver may restore the LO and the filter to a default setting when the jamming indicator indicates that the interference is no longer present.

Systems and methods for detecting and protecting against phase manipulation during AoA or AoD operations are disclosed. For AoA operations, the network device receiving the constant tone extension (CTE) generates an antenna switching pattern, which may be randomly generated. The network device then receives the CTE using a plurality of antenna elements. In one embodiment, the network device compares the phase of portions of the CTE signal received that utilize the same antenna element. If the phase of these portions differs by more than a threshold, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. In another embodiment, if the AoA algorithm cannot determine the angle of arrival, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. For angle of departure operations, the network device that transmits the CTE signal generates the antenna switching pattern and transmits it to the position engine, which performs the comparisons described above.

An embodiment method comprises receiving a satellite signal in a tracking channel, generating a set of replicas of a pseudo random noise sequence, comprising a punctual replica and a plurality of replicas that are different in time with respect to the punctual replica over a given time spacing, correlating the received signal with each replica to obtain amplitude correlation values, monitoring the tracking channel to detect a spoofed signal by generating a further plurality of replicas of the pseudo random noise sequence having a respective time spacing greater than the given time spacing, correlating the received signal of the tracking channel with each further replica to obtain further amplitude correlation values, calculating a shape anomaly factor based on the further correlation amplitude values, verifying the shape anomaly factor is greater than a given shape anomaly threshold, and signaling detection of a spoofed signal on the tracking channel.

Systems and methods for detecting and protecting against phase manipulation during AoA or AoD operations are disclosed. For AoA operations, the network device receiving the constant tone extension (CTE) generates an antenna switching pattern, which may be randomly generated. The network device then receives the CTE using a plurality of antenna elements. In one embodiment, the network device compares the phase of portions of the CTE signal received that utilize the same antenna element. If the phase of these portions differs by more than a threshold, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. In another embodiment, if the AoA algorithm cannot determine the angle of arrival, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. For angle of departure operations, the network device that transmits the CTE signal generates the antenna switching pattern and transmits it to the position engine, which performs the comparisons described above.

This document discloses a solution for performing anti-jamming procedures. According to an aspect, a method for a terminal device comprises: receiving a first reference signal allocation from an access node, wherein the first reference signal is unique to the terminal device in a cell managed by the access node; receiving a second reference signal allocation from the access node, wherein the second reference signal is shared with at least one other terminal device in the cell; causing transmission of payload data together with the first reference signal according to a regular transmission pattern; and breaking the regular transmission pattern by transmitting dummy data together with the second reference signal in a time-frequency resource shared with the at least one other terminal device.

This document discloses a solution for performing anti-jamming procedures. According to an aspect, a method for a terminal device comprises: receiving a first reference signal allocation from an access node, wherein the first reference signal is unique to the terminal device in a cell managed by the access node; receiving a second reference signal allocation from the access node, wherein the second reference signal is shared with at least one other terminal device in the cell; causing transmission of payload data together with the first reference signal according to a regular transmission pattern; and breaking the regular transmission pattern by transmitting dummy data together with the second reference signal in a time-frequency resource shared with the at least one other terminal device.