H04K3/28

IDENTIFYING, TRACKING, AND DISRUPTING UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Systems, methods, and apparatus for identifying, tracking, and disrupting UAVs are described herein. Sensor data can be received from one or more portable countermeasure devices or sensors. The sensor data can relate to an object detected proximate to a particular airspace. The system can analyze the sensor data relating to the object to determine a location of the object and determine that the object is flying within the particular airspace based at least in part on location data. A portable countermeasure device can be identified that corresponds to the location of the object. The system can transmit information about the object to the identified portable countermeasure device. The portable countermeasure device can transmit additional data relating to the object to the system.

Spoofing detection and anti-jam mitigation for GPS antennas

There is provided an apparatus comprising an antenna (105) configured to receive a signal from a global navigation satellite system, wherein the antenna includes a first feed and a second feed; a hybrid coupler (110) including a first hybrid input, a second hybrid input, a first hybrid output, a second hybrid output, and wherein the first hybrid output is shifted in phase by 90 degrees relative to the second hybrid output; a variable phase shifter (150) including a shifter input and a shifter output, hybrid output; and a combiner (155) including a first combiner input, a second combiner input, and a combiner output, wherein the first combiner input is coupled to the shifter output, and the second combiner input is coupled to the second hybrid output, and wherein the combiner output is provided to detection circuitry (197).

GNSS RECEIVER INTERFERENCE HANDLING
20200158878 · 2020-05-21 ·

A GNSS receiver comprises an input, at least one front end processor, and an interference mitigation unit. The input is configured to receive from a wireless communication module a control signal comprising timing information, the timing information indicating one or more transmission times during which the wireless communication module wirelessly transmits data. The at least one front end processor is configured to capture a set of data samples from a received GNSS signal and store the data samples in a memory, each sample captured at a corresponding sample time. The interference mitigation unit is configured to configured to identify data samples of the set of data samples that have a sample time that corresponds with one or more transmission times as candidate samples for interference.

RADIO FREQUENCY COMMUNICATION AND JAMMING DEVICE AND METHOD FOR PHYSICALLY SECURED FRIENDLY RADIO FREQUENCY COMMUNICATION AND FOR JAMMING HOSTILE RADIO FREQUENCY COMMUNICATION
20200106545 · 2020-04-02 ·

Disclosed is a radio frequency communication and jamming device configured for physically secured friendly radio frequency communication and for jamming hostile radio frequency communication, the radio frequency communication and jamming device including: an antenna arrangement having a transmission section for transmitting outgoing signals and a receiving section for receiving incoming signals; a receiver device configured for extracting an incoming information signal from the incoming signals received via the receiving section of the antenna arrangement in a receiving frequency band; a jamming generator configured for generating at least one jamming signal for jamming at least one jamming frequency band, wherein the jamming signal is transmitted as one of the outgoing signals via the transmission section, wherein the at least one jamming frequency band includes the receiving frequency band; and a self-interference cancellation device configured for cancelling portions of the at least one jamming signal in the incoming signals received via the receiving section at least in the receiving frequency band.

Method and system of reactive interferer detection

A method and system of reliably detecting a reactive jamming attack and estimating the jammer's listening interval for exploitation by a communication system comprises channelizing one or more signals of interest (SOI), channelizing one or more signals of unknown origin (SUO), identifying frequency support patterns for the SOI and SUO using Bayes thresholds, comparing SOI and SUO detection map histories, and determining a percent match, where a match percentage above a specified minimum indicates a reactive attack. Edge detection can be used to enhance jammer support. Embodiments further detect reactive jammer adaptation to changes in the SOI's frequency support. Embodiments include detectors that are insensitive to jammer modulation and/or signal type. A jammer reaction delay and/or size and periodicity of receive window can be detected. Embodiments determine if a jammer is copying and retransmitting the SOI's waveform(s), and/or if the jammer is anticipatory.

Device privacy protection

Example implementations relate to advertisements of a privacy protected device. For example, advertisements of the privacy protected device are jammed. Additionally dummy device advertisements are broadcasted. The dummy device advertisements include a reduced-information advertisement for the privacy protected device.

Selecting a precoding configuration based on self-jamming metrics

A method for wireless communication by a wireless communication device is described. The wireless communication device determines that an aggressor radio in the wireless communication device is causing (or can potentially cause) self-jamming to a victim radio in the wireless communication device. A precoding configuration is selected based on one or more link throughput metrics and one or more self-jamming metrics. The precoding configuration is applied to transmissions of the aggressor radio.

Method, computer program and device for reducing interference of temporary communication resources used for wireless communication between a transportation vehicle key and a transportation vehicle

A method, a computer program, and a device for reducing interference of temporary communication resources used for a wireless communication between a transportation vehicle key and a transportation vehicle. The method includes determining whether interference of the temporary communication resources is present and switching off the device causing the interference or adjusting the use of the temporary communication resources for the wireless communication between the transportation vehicle key and the transportation vehicle in response to interference being present.

METHODS FOR RADAR COEXISTENCE

A method and apparatus for selecting frequency modulated continuous wave waveform parameters for multiple radar coexistence by a user equipment is described. The user equipment may transmit a radar waveform consisting of a number of chirps, with each chirp having a same duration. The user equipment may vary waveform parameters of the radar waveform for at least a subset of the number of chirp, where the waveform parameters may be chosen from a codebook comprising at least one codeword of parameters. Reflected radar waveforms are received and processed where the processing includes applying a fast time discrete Fourier transform to reflected radar waveforms to produce a one dimension peak in a time delay dimension for each reflected waveform; and applying a slow time discrete Fourier transform to the reflected radar waveforms, where peaks for the reflected waveforms are added.

Hardware component and a method for implementing a camouflage of current traces generated by a digital system
11906581 · 2024-02-20 · ·

Implementing a camouflage of current traces generated by a hardware component having one or more set of digital elements defining a plurality of operational datapaths comprises adjusting (761) one or more working condition(s) of the hardware component, measuring (762) a reaction of the hardware component to the working condition(s) by a logic test circuit through processing data operations along a reference datapath having a minimum duration corresponding to at least the longest of the operational datapaths, and in response to detecting an error (763) along the reference datapath, modifying (764) the working condition(s) so that the error generated by the logic test circuit is cancelled. Applications to countermeasures to side-channel attacks.