Systems and apparatuses include a sniffer circuit, a radio frequency processor, and a beamforming radio frequency integrated circuit. The sniffer circuit is structured to receive spurious signals from a sniffer antenna and self-jamming signals, and to produce an interference signal based on the spurious signals and the self-jamming signals. The radio frequency processor is structured to receive wideband signals from a plurality of radiating elements, receive the interference signals from the sniffer circuit, execute a subtraction from the wideband signals based on the interference signals, and produce desired signals. The beamforming radio frequency integrated circuit is structured to receive the desired signals from the radio frequency processor, execute beamforming operations, and produce an output signal.

A secure wireless transceiver, such as a link 16 transceiver, receives signals using an antenna array having an SOC associated with each antenna element in the array. The SOC's digitize and channelize received data for transmission to a message nulling system that mitigates jamming. The antenna array can be conformal, and can replace an existing Link 16 blade. The disclosed transceiver can be a modified CMN-4 transceiver with digitizing and channelizing moved to the SoC's, and replaced by the nulling system. The transceiver uses applicable TRANSEC information to assign received data to the logical Link 16 channels before nulling, and embodiments apply nulling only to channels of interest, thereby improving the nulling and reducing side lobes. Embodiments distinguish between desired and unwanted signals based on known Link 16 signal features and/or situational awareness, rather than signal amplitudes, thereby enabling nulling of even weak jamming signals.

A wireless device and a wireless local area network (WLAN) signal receiving method, where the wireless device includes a receiver, a jamming circuit, an interference cancelling circuit, a first antenna, and a second antenna. The receiver is coupled to the first antenna and configured to detect a WLAN signal, the jamming circuit is coupled to the second antenna, an input end of the interference cancelling circuit is coupled to the second antenna, and an output end of the interference cancelling circuit is coupled to the first antenna. The jamming circuit is configured to send, using the second antenna, an interference signal on a channel on which the WLAN signal is located, and the interference cancelling circuit is configured to generate, based on the interference signal, a reconstruction signal cancelling the interference signal received by the first antenna, and provide the reconstruction signal at the output end.

A card reader device A1 includes: a housing 11; an openable shutter 311 that allows or disallows passing of a magnetic card C into the housing 11; a magnetic head 511 that reads magnetic data of the magnetic card C received in the housing 11; an interfering magnetic field generator 711 provided on a rear surface side of the shutter 311 to generate an interfering magnetic field in at least a region R between the magnetic head 511 and the shutter 311; an interfering magnetic field control unit 61 that controls generation of the interfering magnetic field; and an interfering magnetic field alleviating unit 81 that alleviates an influence of the interfering magnetic field on the magnetic head 511 so that the interfering magnetic field generated by the interfering magnetic field generator 711 does not interfere the reading of the magnetic data by the magnetic head 511.

The invention relates to a portable electronic signal generator, and in particular a programmable multi-waveform radiofrequency generator for use as battlefield decoy.

Systems and methods of friendly jamming for securing wireless communications at the physical layer are presented. Under the assumption of exact knowledge of the eavesdropping channel, a resource-efficient distributed approach is used to improve the secrecy sum-rate of a multi-link network with one or more eavesdroppers while satisfying an information-rate constraint for all links. A method based on mixed strategic games can offer robust solutions to the distributed secrecy sum-rate maximization. In addition, a block fading broadcast channel with a multi-antenna transmitter, sending two or more independent confidential data streams to two or more respective users in the presence of a passive eavesdropper is considered. Lastly, a per-link strategy is considered and an optimization problem is formulated, which aims at jointly optimizing the power allocation and placement of the friendly jamming devices for a given link under secrecy constraints.

A device (112, 130) is configured to communicate data (108) on a radio channel (101, 105, 106) employing first resource elements. The device (112, 130) is further configured to participate in a radar probing (109) employing second resource elements which are orthogonal to the first resource elements.

An apparatus, configured to communicate with an access terminal in a wireless network and operating in a frequency-division duplexing mode, can be caused to refrain from transmitting during at least one subframe of a frame of a downlink frequency band, and can be caused to monitor for the radar transmission during the at least one subframe of the frame of the downlink frequency band. Optionally, a placement of the at least one subframe within the frame of the downlink frequency band can correspond to a placement of at least one subframe that is designated for an uplink communication within a frame of a wireless network that is operating in accordance with the Long-Term Evolution Time-Division Duplex standard, or can correspond to a placement of at least one subframe that is designated for a transmission in accordance with the Multimedia Broadcast Multicast Service specification.

A locking device for a motor vehicle. A transmitting device, which is designed to send out a request signal into a surroundings of the motor vehicle in dependence on a predetermined triggering event, as well as a receiving device, which is designed to receive, within a predetermined time interval from the sending of the request signal in a predetermined frequency region, a response signal of a radio key from the surroundings, and a control device, which is designed, in event of a response signal received within the time interval, to unlock at least one lock of the locking device. An evaluation module is designed so that the transmitting device sends out an interference radio signal after the sending of the request signal within the time interval at least at one radio frequency lying outside the frequency region.

A securing interface apparatus to be inserted between a GNSS antenna and a first, unsecured, GNSS receiver fed by the antenna, for providing immunity against spoofing or jamming or interrupting of the timing provided by the first unsecured GNSS receiver. The securing interface apparatus comprises (a) a second GNSS receiver, fed by the antenna and including a local oscillator and being immune against spoofing or jamming of timing, for outputting trusted timing and the last GNSS data, the second GNSS receiver including a detection module which is adapted to analyze raw RF signals received from GNSS satellites and verify the signals integrity and authenticity (b) a GNSS Simulator, fed by the trusted timing and GNSS data, the GNSS Simulator is adapted to: as long as the received GNSS data is found authentic, allowing the received GNSS data to reach the input of the first, unsecured, GNSS receiver; upon detecting that the received GNSS data is not authentic, produce, using the output of the local oscillator and at least a portion of the last GNSS data, redundant simulated RF GNSS signals mimicking raw RF signals received from GNSS satellites; and transmit the redundant simulated RF GNSS to the input of the first unsecured GNSS receiver.