In various embodiments supporting directional security, a user equipment (UE) may receive from a network device a noise resource allocation including an indication of a noise direction and a noise parameter, generate a noise signal based at least in part on the noise parameter, and transmit the noise signal in the noise direction while transmitting a communication transmission signal in a different direction from the noise direction. In various embodiments, a network device may determine a geographic zone of interest, select one or more reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs) associated with the geographic zone of interest, selecting one or more noise transmitting UEs, control the one or more noise transmitting UEs to transmit at least one noise signal, and control the one or more RISs to steer the at least one noise signal into the geographic zone of interest.

The invention relates to a portable electronic signal generator, and in particular a programmable multi-waveform radiofrequency generator for use as battlefield decoy.

Frequency management methods and communication networks utilizing such frequency management methods are disclosed. More specifically, multiple frequency sets may be utilized to facilitate frequency hopping and a frequency management method may implement various switching schemes to switch between the different frequency sets. Techniques such as synchronization and spectrum harvesting may also be provided to support utilization of multiple frequency sets, all of which may provide improved operation reliabilities and better handling of jamming signals.

A communication system is provided comprising a transmitter coupled to a switch, which is further coupled to at least two antennas for switching the transmit signal to one of the antennas, with no feedback. The communication system further comprises at least one receiver for receiving the transmitted signal.

The communication system in the present invention is able to help mitigate the effects of multipath. Previous attempts to mitigate the effects of multipath suffer from various problems: increased complexity needed to measure channel parameters and a feedback loop to switch the transmit antenna based on the parameters.

The system is particularly useful when deployed in a MAS system or a jamming system.

Systems and methods of friendly jamming for securing wireless communications at the physical layer are presented. Under the assumption of exact knowledge of the eavesdropping channel, a resource-efficient distributed approach is used to improve the secrecy sum-rate of a multi-link network with one or more eavesdroppers while satisfying an information-rate constraint for all links. A method based on mixed strategic games can offer robust solutions to the distributed secrecy sum-rate maximization. In addition, a block fading broadcast channel with a multi-antenna transmitter, sending two or more independent confidential data streams to two or more respective users in the presence of a passive eavesdropper is considered. Lastly, a per-link strategy is considered and an optimization problem is formulated, which aims at jointly optimizing the power allocation and placement of the friendly jamming devices for a given link under secrecy constraints.

An approach includes a method implemented in a computer infrastructure having computer executable code tangibly embodied in a computer readable storage medium having programming instructions. The approach further includes the programming instructions configured to collect at least one broadcast control channel allocation list from base stations in a surrounding area. The approach further includes the programming instructions configured to generate a list of power signals which correspond to all broadcast control channel carriers based on the at least one broadcast control channel allocation list. The approach further includes the programming instructions configured to transmit information of a highest carrier power in the list to all virtual base stations in a convoy.

There is provided an apparatus comprising an antenna (105) configured to receive a signal from a global navigation satellite system, wherein the antenna includes a first feed and a second feed; a hybrid coupler (110) including a first hybrid input, a second hybrid input, a first hybrid output, a second hybrid output, and wherein the first hybrid output is shifted in phase by 90 degrees relative to the second hybrid output; a variable phase shifter (150) including a shifter input and a shifter output, hybrid output; and a combiner (155) including a first combiner input, a second combiner input, and a combiner output, wherein the first combiner input is coupled to the shifter output, and the second combiner input is coupled to the second hybrid output, and wherein the combiner output is provided to detection circuitry (197).

In various embodiments supporting directional security, a user equipment (UE) may receive from a network device a noise resource allocation including an indication of a noise direction and a noise parameter, generate a noise signal based at least in part on the noise parameter, and transmit the noise signal in the noise direction while transmitting a communication transmission signal in a different direction from the noise direction. In various embodiments, a network device may determine a geographic zone of interest, select one or more reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs) associated with the geographic zone of interest, selecting one or more noise transmitting UEs, control the one or more noise transmitting UEs to transmit at least one noise signal, and control the one or more RISs to steer the at least one noise signal into the geographic zone of interest.

A securing interface apparatus to be inserted between a GNSS antenna and a first, unsecured, GNSS receiver fed by the antenna, for providing immunity against spoofing or jamming or interrupting of the timing provided by the first unsecured GNSS receiver. The securing interface apparatus comprises (a) a second GNSS receiver, fed by the antenna and including a local oscillator and being immune against spoofing or jamming of timing, for outputting trusted timing and the last GNSS data, the second GNSS receiver including a detection module which is adapted to analyze raw RF signals received from GNSS satellites and verify the signals integrity and authenticity (b) a GNSS Simulator, fed by the trusted timing and GNSS data, the GNSS Simulator is adapted to: as long as the received GNSS data is found authentic, allowing the received GNSS data to reach the input of the first, unsecured, GNSS receiver; upon detecting that the received GNSS data is not authentic, produce, using the output of the local oscillator and at least a portion of the last GNSS data, redundant simulated RF GNSS signals mimicking raw RF signals received from GNSS satellites; and transmit the redundant simulated RF GNSS to the input of the first unsecured GNSS receiver.

An electronic device includes first and second antennas, a magnetic stripe transmission (MST) integrated circuit (IC), and a processor. The first antenna is disposed between first and second surfaces of the electronic device and in parallel with the first and second surfaces of the electronic device. The first antenna outputs a signal in a first direction. The second antenna is disposed between the second surface of the electronic device and the first antenna and in parallel with the first and second surfaces of the electronic device. The second antenna outputs a signal in a second direction. The MST IC controls the first and second antennas. When a payment mode is executed, the processor controls the MST IC such that one of the first and second antennas outputs an MST signal and the other of the first and second antenna outputs a jamming signal for interfering with wiretapping of the MST signal.