A system for intercepting accidental emergency calls in a facility, the system including at least one dead air network element configured within the facility, the at least one dead air network element providing a cellular signal stronger than live cellular signals as seen by electronic devices within the facility, wherein electronic devices connecting to the at least one dead air network element cannot reach emergency services.

A vehicle includes: receiver(s), a timer counting time, memory, and processor(s) configured to: receive a timestamped signal from a fob; compare the timestamp to a time window; reject the timestamp if the timestamp is outside the time window; expand the time window with the counted time; compute the time window as a trigonometric function of the counted time and a predetermined angle.

A threat monitoring and vulnerability management system is disclosed. The system includes one or more sensors configured to scan a frequency spectrum of a project 25 (P25) network and to collect data on the P25network. The system further includes a server coupled to the sensors and configured to receive the collected data from the plurality of sensors, compare the collected data with previously stored historical data to determine whether an anomaly exists within data patterns of the collected data, responsive to determining that the anomaly exists, determine at least one of: whether use of a cloned radio that mimics an authorized connection occurs, whether jamming of a radio frequency (RF) communication occurs, or whether jamming of a voice communication occurs within the P25 network by comparing the collected data with preset thresholds, and send a real-time alert to a dispatch and control console unit coupled to the server and the P25 network in response to determining that some of the collected data exceeds at least one of the preset thresholds, such that the dispatch and control console unit provides one or more corrective actions to the P25 network.

Techniques for determining whether data associated with an autonomous operation of a first unmanned vehicle may be trusted. For example, the first unmanned vehicle may receive an indication related to the data and originating from a second unmanned vehicle over a network. For instance, the indication may indicate that similar data for a similar autonomous operation of the second unmanned vehicle may be untrusted. Based on a level of trust accorded to the indication, the first unmanned vehicle may determine that the data may be untrusted and the autonomous navigation may be directed independently of the data.

Disclosed is a method of detecting spoofing of a traffic alert and collision avoidance system, known as a TCAS, the TCAS having a Mode A, a Mode C and a Mode S for communicating with surrounding aircraft. The method includes: querying a suspected spoofing aircraft via Mode S of the TCAS and receiving a response to this query; deducing from the response at least some data, known as Mode S data, relating to the suspected spoofing aircraft; and validating Mode S data by querying the suspected spoofing aircraft via Mode A or Mode C of the TCAS.

Systems and methods for preventing flight of one or more Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in no-fly zones include receiving one or more no-fly zones each defined as geo-fences with associated coordinates; preventing one or more UAVs from entering the one or more no-fly zones by one or more of: transmitting the geo-fences to the one or more UAVs, transmitting avoidance commands to the one or more UAVs from an avoidance device located at a no-fly zone, and disrupting radio communication to the one or more UAVs from the avoidance device.

A control unit for controlling wireless data transmissions in a mobile communications system provided on board an aircraft, a mobile communications system having a control unit of this type, an associated method for controlling wireless data transmissions in a mobile communications system provided on board an aircraft, and a computer program for carrying out the method. The control unit comprises a generating component for generating a band-limited masking signal for masking terrestrial mobile communications signals in a first frequency band and a combining component for combining the band-limited masking signal and a service signal for the wireless transmission of data in a second frequency band different from the first frequency band. The combining component is configured to combine the masking signal and the service signal so that terrestrial mobile communications signals in a third frequency band formed by overlapping of the first and the second frequency band are masked.

Concepts and technologies directed to global positioning system spoofing countermeasures are disclosed. Embodiments can include a system that comprises a processor and a memory that stores computer-executable instructions that configure a processor to perform operations that include identifying a mobile transportation equipment that includes an electronic logging device and a low-power wide area device, where the electronic logging device obtains GPS location data from a GPS receiver unit and the low-power wide area device obtains independent location data via a narrow band path of a low-power wide area network. The operations can include determining that a spatio-temporal misalignment exists between the independent location data and the GPS location data for the mobile transportation equipment, and providing spatio-temporal data alignment. The operations can include determining that a GPS spoofing attack has occurred, and creating a GPS spoofing alert for the mobile transportation equipment.

The system and method of utilizing frequency waterfilling and implicit coordination to mitigate signal jamming in Link 16 systems. The system and method of utilizing frequency waterfilling for Link 16 includes updates to both software and firmware. The frequency waterfilling approach for Link 16 modifies the process by which data bits are allocated to hops based on an assessment of hops affected by jamming, thus avoiding portions of the spectrum occupied by a jammer.

Systems, apparatuses, and methods are described for a privacy blocking device configured to prevent receipt, by a listening device, of video and/or audio data until a trigger occurs. A blocker may be configured to prevent receipt of video and/or audio data by one or more microphones and/or one or more cameras of a listening device. The blocker may use the one or more microphones, the one or more cameras, and/or one or more second microphones and/or one or more second cameras to monitor for a trigger. The blocker may process the data. Upon detecting the trigger, the blocker may transmit data to the listening device. For example, the blocker may transmit all or a part of a spoken phrase to the listening device.