A radio frequency (RF) jamming device includes a differential segmented aperture (DSA), a jammer source outputting a jamming signal at one or more frequencies or frequency bands to be jammed, and RF electronics that amplify and feed the jamming signal to the DSA so as to emit a jamming beam. The DSA includes an array of electrically conductive tapered projections, and the RF electronics comprise power splitters configured to split the jamming signal to aperture pixels of the DSA. The aperture pixels comprise pairs of electrically conductive tapered projections of the array of electrically conductive tapered projections. The RF electronics further comprise pixel power amplifiers, each connected to amplify the jamming signal fed to a single corresponding aperture pixel of the DSA. The RF jamming device may include a rifle-shaped housing, with the DSA mounted at a distal end of the barrel of the rifle-shaped housing.

A GNSS hostile environment simulator for accurate real-time processor & hardware in the loop (PHIL) simulations of a multiple antenna GNSSR/AJ system models antenna effects over the entire signal bandwidth allowing direct injection of the RF into the GNSSR. Computational efficiency is achieved by applying the antenna patterns in the frequency domain. To preserve the integrity of the antenna signals, the transmitter signals are generated over an extended period to push any residual ringing outside the update window. Efficiency is further enhanced by using a combination of single-precision and double-precision floating-point units to generate the samples of the transmitter signals with single-precision floating-point. All subsequent calculations are then computed in single-precision.

In one implementation, a method includes receiving versions of a message from a first satellite-based receiver and a second satellite-based receiver that both received a radio frequency (RF) transmission of the message, the message comprising a self-reported position of a transmitter of the message. The method also includes determining a time difference between a first arrival time of the RF transmission of the message at the first satellite-based receiver and a second arrival time of the RF transmission of the message at the second satellite-based receiver. The method further includes determining a measure of the likelihood that the self-reported position of the transmitter is valid based on the time difference between the first and second arrival times. The method still further includes transmitting an indication of the measure of the likelihood that the self-reported position is valid.

A portable countermeasure device is provided comprising one or more directional antennae, one or more disruption components and at least one activator. The portable countermeasure device further comprises a body having a dual-grip configuration, with the directional antennae are affixed to a front portion of the body. The one or more disruption components may be internally mounted within the device body. The dual-grip configuration allows an operator to use his body to steady and support the device while maintaining the antenna on target. The second grip is positioned adjacent the first grip, with the first grip angled toward the rear of the device and the second grip angled toward the front of the device. The portable countermeasure device is aimed at a specific drone, the activator is engaged, and disruptive signals are directed toward the drone, disrupting the control, navigation, and other signals to and from the drone.

Embodiments of the present disclosure relate to a spectrum control system. The system comprises one or more high frequency (HF) antennas, one or more multi-band (MB) antennas, and one or more datalinks. A spectrum management processor is configured to receive signals from the one or more HF and MB antennas and the one or more datalinks, and switch to one or more alternate radio-frequency (RF) channels for communications and/or position, navigation, and timing (PNT) information in response to a failure in a current communication channel and/or a global positioning system (GPS) signal.

A system for disrupting Radio Frequency communication of a plurality of unmanned aircraft. The system comprises: a directional antenna; a transmitter; a drive system connected to the directional antenna and configured to move the directional antenna; and a control system. The control system causes the transmitter to generate a signal waveform configured to disrupt Radio Frequency communication of an unmanned aircraft for emission by the directional antenna, and causes the drive system to move the directional antenna such that each of the plurality of unmanned aircraft is irradiated intermittently by the emitted radiation. Each of the plurality of unmanned aircraft is irradiated for a first period of time and not irradiated for a second period of time, the second period of time is less than or equal to 5 seconds.

A method and a function for checking the integrity of the processing of a radionavigation signal emitted by a satellite, the signal being received by a receiver comprising reception means and processing means, the processing means comprising a linear anti-interference filter, the integrity checking method comprising at least a first phase of detection of a risk of false lock-on comprising the following steps: a step of recovery of a nominal theoretical self-correlation function of the received signal not processed by the linear anti-interference filter; a step of determination of a mean theoretical self-correlation function of the signal received and processed by the linear anti-interference filter over a defined integration period; a step of determination of the number of local maxima of the modulus or of the modulus squared of the mean theoretical self-correlation function, a risk of false lock-on being detected if the number of local maxima is greater than or equal to two.

The system and method of global positioning system (GPS) anti-jam (AJ) AJ antennas utilizing a circular array of patch antennas. In some cases the circular array is conformal. The elements are single patch, dual band (L1/L2) and are linearly polarized. A mode former and progressive phase tapers are used.

Systems, methods, and apparatus for identifying, tracking, and disrupting UAVs are described herein. Sensor data can be received from one or more portable countermeasure devices or sensors. The sensor data can relate to an object detected proximate to a particular airspace. The system can analyze the sensor data relating to the object to determine a location of the object and determine that the object is flying within the particular airspace based at least in part on location data. A portable countermeasure device can be identified that corresponds to the location of the object. The system can transmit information about the object to the identified portable countermeasure device. The portable countermeasure device can transmit additional data relating to the object to the system.

According to some embodiments of the present invention there is provided a method for detecting locations of navigation interfering devices. The method comprises an action of receiving multiple navigation signal parameter datasets, each from one of multiple satellite signal receivers. The method comprises an action of detecting one or more interference event data according to an interference analysis of at least some of the datasets. The method comprises an action of updating a probability value for each of multiple suspected navigation interference device locations, by a location analysis of the interference event data, where each of the probability values is indicative of a likelihood that the interference event data originates from some of the suspected navigation interference device locations. The method comprises an action of selecting a subset of the suspected navigation interference device locations according to the probability values and outputting the subset.