A system includes a disabling device with a circuit configured to disrupt communication of a drone.

Jammer location is based on detected powers received by at least one receiver of signals from the satellite navigation system on board a carrier, by estimation, for each satellite, of the power of the noise at the output of each receiver according to the bearing and distance with respect to the carrier, a calculation of the sum of estimated powers, and extraction of the local maxima in terms of bearing and distance by using a synthetic aperture antenna carrying out a coherent integration of received signals in the direction of each bearing angle by using the known movement of the carrier, in which estimation of the power of the noise at the output of each receiver uses a plurality of coherent integrators and non-coherent integrators, with durations matched to the transit time of a source in the beam of the antenna for various distances for the non-coherent integrators.

A deceiving signal detection system includes a first antenna, a second antenna, and a signal processor. The first antenna is configured to receive four or more multiple navigation signals. Each of the multiple navigation signals indicates a transmitting position and a transmitting time of the each navigation signal. The second antenna is configured to receive the multiple navigation signals. The signal processor is configured to determine whether four or more multiple radio wave signals that are received by the first antenna and the second antenna and each signal indicate a transmitting position and a transmitting time of the signal are the multiple navigation signals or deceiving signals.

A system and method for providing time stamps protected from GPS timing signal attacks. A GPS receiver receives a GPS time data, and a local clock provides local time data. A controller initiates the local clock with the GPS time data. It continuously monitors the GPS time data by calculating any difference error between current GPS time data and local time data, and determining whether the error exceeds a threshold value. If the error does not exceed the threshold value, the GPS time data is used to discipline the local clock data and the disciplined output is used for the time stamp. If the error exceeds the threshold value, the local time data is used for the time stamp.

Systems and methods for operating an antenna assembly. The methods comprise: receiving, at the first circularly polarized antenna, a first signal comprising a desired signal emitted from a first signal source located at a first altitude higher than a second altitude of the antenna assembly and an interfering signal emitted from a second signal source located at a third altitude lower than the second altitude; receiving the interfering signal at the second circularly polarized antenna (where the first and second circularly polarized antennas are disposed on opposite sides of an antenna reflector and having opposite circular polarizations); generating a second signal by shifting a phase of the interfering signal which was received at the second circularly polarized antenna by an amount to cause the second signal to be out-of-phase with the first signal; and providing an antenna pattern with a null at or below a horizon by destructively combining the second signal with the first signal.

A signal-of-interest is received by using a first and second planar electrically conductive disc to define an antenna. The antenna produces RF signal outputs at three output ports E.sub.x, E.sub.y and E.sub.z, each having a different associated gain pattern and polarization response. At least one null is automatically asserted in a pattern defined by the antenna in a specified direction by selectively weighting a gain and a phase of the RF signals respectively produced from the three output ports and then combining the RF signals to produce a first receiver signal output.

Disclosed herein are system, apparatus, article of manufacture, method and/or computer program product embodiments for detection of satellite system anomalies. An embodiment operates by receiving satellite signals from a plurality of sources via at least one satellite system receiver and determining the presence of anomalous satellite system activity by comparing an amount of signal strength drop of each of the satellite signals during a time period to a threat detection threshold and by comparing an amount of consistency of the satellite signals during the time period to the threat detection threshold.

A method for authentication of GNSS messages by an authentication transmitter apparatus (20) comprising a reference receiver (22), an authentication server (24) and an authentication transmitter (26). The method comprises: receiving, by the reference receiver, a plurality of navigation messages (50) from a plurality of GNSS satellites (10); hashing, by the authentication server, the navigation messages to create a plurality of hashed messages; creating, by the authentication server, a table comprising the plurality of hashed messages; signing, by the authentication server, the table to create a signed table (70) comprising the hashed messages and a cryptographic signature, and transmitting, by the authentication transmitter, the signed table to an authentication receiver apparatus (40).

An apparatus includes a capsule configured to be launched or carried towards an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The apparatus also includes a directed energy device within or carried by the capsule. The directed energy device includes a first inductor configured to generate an inductive magnetic field that is able to inductively couple into one or more electronics of the UAV in order to disable or destabilize the UAV. The capsule can be configured to be launched towards the UAV and can include a loiter mechanism (such as a rotor, umbrella, or parachute) configured to maintain a position of the capsule or to slow a descent of the capsule after launch. The capsule can also be configured to be carried towards the UAV by a different UAV, and the apparatus can further include a tether coupling the capsule to the different UAV.

RF tags using source addresses to locate stations on a Wi-Fi network are secured. An RF location server receives a pseudo source address of an RF (radio frequency) tag from a station. The station obtains the pseudo source address while being within radio range of the RF tag and the station receiving a beacon frame from the RF tag. A source address for the RF tag is looked-up utilizing the pseudo source address, and a specific location for the RF tag is looked-up utilizing the source address. Some embodiments store the locations in association with the pseudo address. Either way, the specific location of the station is identified based on the source address of the RF tag. An action is determined in response to at least the specific location of the station. Information related to the action is sent to the station for output to a user of the station. For example, a location-based offer or service can be provided in real-time with a consumer's presence to relevant products or services