An embodiment method comprises receiving a satellite signal in a tracking channel, generating a set of replicas of a pseudo random noise sequence, comprising a punctual replica and a plurality of replicas that are different in time with respect to the punctual replica over a given time spacing, correlating the received signal with each replica to obtain amplitude correlation values, monitoring the tracking channel to detect a spoofed signal by generating a further plurality of replicas of the pseudo random noise sequence having a respective time spacing greater than the given time spacing, correlating the received signal of the tracking channel with each further replica to obtain further amplitude correlation values, calculating a shape anomaly factor based on the further correlation amplitude values, verifying the shape anomaly factor is greater than a given shape anomaly threshold, and signaling detection of a spoofed signal on the tracking channel.

Described herein is a system for drone defense, comprising at least one jammer and at least one radio detector, wherein the jammer is set up to send an interference signal over a frequency range, and the radio detector is set up to detect a radio control signal of a drone, the frequency range of the interference signal comprises a carrier frequency of the radio control signal or a GPS signal, wherein the jammer is configured to temporarily interrupt the interference signal and the radio detector is configured to receive the interference signal, detect the interruptions and detect the radio control signal of the drone within the interruptions of the interference signal.

A system for defeating a threat unmanned aerial vehicle. The system includes a friendly unmanned aerial vehicle, a capturing device configured to be suspended from the friendly unmanned aerial vehicle for arresting a threat unmanned aerial vehicle, and one or more load-limited release mechanisms for removably suspending a releasable portion of the capturing device from the friendly unmanned aerial vehicle. In certain embodiments, the load-limited release mechanisms are configured to release the entirety of the capturing device from the friendly unmanned aerial vehicle upon capture of the threat unmanned aerial vehicle. In other embodiments, the load limited release mechanisms are configured to release only a peripheral portion of the capturing device to reposition a captured unmanned aerial vehicle to a central portion of the capturing device for carrying the captured vehicle to a remote location.

A radio frequency (RF) jamming device includes a differential segmented aperture (DSA), a jammer source outputting a jamming signal at one or more frequencies or frequency bands to be jammed, and RF electronics that amplify and feed the jamming signal to the DSA so as to emit a jamming beam. The DSA includes an array of electrically conductive tapered projections, and the RF electronics comprise power splitters configured to split the jamming signal to aperture pixels of the DSA. The aperture pixels comprise pairs of electrically conductive tapered projections of the array of electrically conductive tapered projections. The RF electronics further comprise pixel power amplifiers, each connected to amplify the jamming signal fed to a single corresponding aperture pixel of the DSA. The RF jamming device may include a rifle-shaped housing, with the DSA mounted at a distal end of the barrel of the rifle-shaped housing.

A deceiving signal detection system includes a first antenna, a second antenna, and a signal processor. The first antenna is configured to receive at least four radio wave signals. The signal processor determines that the radio wave signals are the deceiving signals by determining that a relative positional relation between the first antenna and the second antenna calculated on a basis of the radio wave signals deviates from an actual relative positional relation between the first antenna and the second antenna by more than a predetermined amount, and also determines whether an orientation of the aircraft determined based on positions of the first antenna and the second antenna matches an orientation of the aircraft calculated based on an inertial navigation system.

Disclosed are an anti-drone method using a GPS spoofing signal and a system thereof. According to an embodiment of the inventive concept, an anti-drone method may include injecting a GPS spoofing signal to analyze a drone feature of a target drone and hijacking the target drone by injecting a GPS spoofing signal into the target drone based on a drone hijacking strategy corresponding to the analyzed drone feature among predefined drone hijacking strategies. The analyzing of the drone feature may include injecting the GPS spoofing signal to analyze a safety device mechanism (GPS fail-safe) and a path-following algorithm of the target drone.

An embodiment method comprises receiving a satellite signal in a tracking channel, generating a set of replicas of a pseudo random noise sequence, comprising a punctual replica and a plurality of replicas that are different in time with respect to the punctual replica over a given time spacing, correlating the received signal with each replica to obtain amplitude correlation values, monitoring the tracking channel to detect a spoofed signal by generating a further plurality of replicas of the pseudo random noise sequence having a respective time spacing greater than the given time spacing, correlating the received signal of the tracking channel with each further replica to obtain further amplitude correlation values, calculating a shape anomaly factor based on the further correlation amplitude values, verifying the shape anomaly factor is greater than a given shape anomaly threshold, and signaling detection of a spoofed signal on the tracking channel.

An anti-drone weapon having a housing and at least one antenna positioned within the housing. The at least one antenna capable of operating at a frequency at least between 400 MHz and 6 GHz. In some configurations, a power supply, processor and control circuitry and a control panel, within the housing. In some configurations, the at least one antenna includes three antenna, including, a double helical antenna, a quasi-yagi antenna and a log-periodic antenna.

A phased array anti-jamming device, comprising a plurality (N) of antennas and a plurality of splitters connected to the antennas and adapted to split an RF stream received from the antennas. The phased array anti-jamming device further includes at least one digital signal processor adapted to digitally analyze a digital output of digital processing channels and to split the output into a plurality of digital down converted representations of respective analog outputs of a plurality of analog digital processing channels in a plurality of different frequencies and calculate at least one instructions selected from phase shift, amplification, and attenuation instructions for each one of the plurality of antennas per each one of the plurality of different frequencies. The phased array anti-jamming device further includes a plurality of phase shifter groups a plurality of group combiners and a main combiner adapted to sum outputs of the plurality of group combiners.

A jamming signal detection control method includes: receiving, at a satellite positioning signal receiver, one or more satellite positioning signals; determining, at the satellite positioning signal receiver, one or more quality metric values based on the one or more satellite positioning signals; determining, at the satellite positioning signal receiver, whether the one or more quality metric values are indicative of jamming; and activating, at the satellite positioning signal receiver and in response to the one or more quality metric values being indicative of jamming, a jammer detection technique to determine whether a jamming signal is received by the satellite positioning signal receiver.