Patent classifications
H04K2203/18
DFS radar detection
A method for determining presence of a radar includes receiving a plurality of bursts in a dynamic frequency selection (DFS) channel of an access point, storing the plurality of bursts in a queue, in response to the queue comprising a threshold amount of bursts, determining a timespan of a first burst in the queue to a last burst in the queue, partitioning the timespan into at least a first group and a second group, determining a first number of bursts present in the first group and a second number of bursts present in the second group, in response to a difference between the first number of bursts and the second number of bursts equaling more than one, determining the radar is not present, and in response to the difference between the first number of bursts and the second number of bursts equaling one or less, determining radar is present.
System and method for phase manipulation attack protection and detection in AoA and AoD
Systems and methods for detecting and protecting against phase manipulation during AoA or AoD operations are disclosed. For AoA operations, the network device receiving the constant tone extension (CTE) generates an antenna switching pattern, which may be randomly generated. The network device then receives the CTE using a plurality of antenna elements. In one embodiment, the network device compares the phase of portions of the CTE signal received that utilize the same antenna element. If the phase of these portions differs by more than a threshold, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. In another embodiment, if the AoA algorithm cannot determine the angle of arrival, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. For angle of departure operations, the network device that transmits the CTE signal generates the antenna switching pattern and transmits it to the position engine, which performs the comparisons described above.
Methods and tools for assisting in the configuration of a wireless radio network
Tools and methods for optimizing the selection and placement of wireless radio devices in a wireless network within a geographic region using a remote database that includes a geographic mapping of existing wireless devices within the network and/or adjacent networks, device characteristics for the wireless devices within the network and/or adjacent networks, and radio frequency spectral information across times for a plurality of regions (e.g., corresponding to locations of existing wireless devices). A tool may include a local user interface, a remote database, and a processor that communicates with the user interface and remote database. The methods and tools described herein may receive user input indicating a desired location and/or operational characteristics of new wireless radio device and may determine and suggest an optimal type, location and/or operational parameters for the additional device, or may suggest other modifications to the current network to optimize the network including the new device.
Security-enhanced deep learning fingerprint-based indoor localization
An exemplary radio fingerprint-based indoor localization method and system is disclosed that is resistant to spoofing or jamming attacks (e.g., at nearby radios, e.g., access points), among other types of interference. The exemplary method and system may be applied in the configuring of a secured convolutional neural network (S-CNNLOC) or secured deep neural network configured for attack-resistant fingerprint-based indoor localization.
Channel selection for dynamic-frequency-selection channels using puncturing
An access point in a wireless network communicates wirelessly with one or more client devices over a channel that includes a plurality of subchannels. Radar is detected on a first subchannel of the plurality of subchannels. It is determined to puncture the first subchannel, based on the detecting the radar on the first subchannel and based on one or more puncturing factors. The first subchannel is punctured, the puncturing comprising muting one or more subcarriers on the first subchannel.
WIRELESS COMMUNICATION SYSTEM WITH DETECTORS FOR EXTRANEOUS RECEIVED SIGNALS
A wireless communication system having base stations, remotely located terminal units and a base station controller. The base stations and the remotely located terminal units communicate data over operational wireless communication links between them. The base stations include respective in-channel detectors and out-of-channel detectors for detecting radar or other extraneous received signals. The in-channel detectors analyse signals over the operational communication links. The out-of-channel detectors include respective out-of-channel receiver elements that monitor possibly available channels alternative to the respective operational communication link channels. The base station controller registers whether channels are available or not for communication links, and allocates to the base stations respective target channel parameters including frequencies available for operational and alternative communication links. The base stations store the respective target channel parameters for available operational and alternative communication links.
Electronically steerable parasitic array antenna process
A process for an electronically steerable parasitic array (ESPAR) antenna includes operating the ESPAR antenna with a receiver in Normal Mode until an internal flag is generated by the receiver indicating jamming RF noise preventing Normal Mode operation, causing the ESPAR antenna to switch to Anti-jam Mode. Anti-jam Mode includes a Search Mode and a Track Mode. The ESPAR antenna is steered in Search Mode, causing the ESPAR antenna to beam in a circular pattern to locate a spatial direction of the jamming RF noise, identify the spatial direction of the jamming RF noise preventing Normal Mode operation, and place a null in the spatial direction of the jamming RF noise. The ESPAR antenna switches to Track Mode to maintain the null in the spatial direction of the jamming RF noise until the jamming RF noise is not present. The ESPAR antenna then returns to operating in Normal Mode.
System And Method For Phase Manipulation Attack Protection And Detection In AoA and AoD
Systems and methods for detecting and protecting against phase manipulation during AoA or AoD operations are disclosed. For AoA operations, the network device receiving the constant tone extension (CTE) generates an antenna switching pattern, which may be randomly generated. The network device then receives the CTE using a plurality of antenna elements. In one embodiment, the network device compares the phase of portions of the CTE signal received that utilize the same antenna element. If the phase of these portions differs by more than a threshold, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. In another embodiment, if the AoA algorithm cannot determine the angle of arrival, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. For angle of departure operations, the network device that transmits the CTE signal generates the antenna switching pattern and transmits it to the position engine, which performs the comparisons described above.
Protecting transmissions against jamming
This document discloses a solution for performing anti-jamming procedures. According to an aspect, a method for a terminal device comprises: receiving a first reference signal allocation from an access node, wherein the first reference signal is unique to the terminal device in a cell managed by the access node; receiving a second reference signal allocation from the access node, wherein the second reference signal is shared with at least one other terminal device in the cell; causing transmission of payload data together with the first reference signal according to a regular transmission pattern; and breaking the regular transmission pattern by transmitting dummy data together with the second reference signal in a time-frequency resource shared with the at least one other terminal device.
PROTECTING TRANSMISSIONS AGAINST JAMMING
This document discloses a solution for performing anti-jamming procedures. According to an aspect, a method for a terminal device comprises: receiving a first reference signal allocation from an access node, wherein the first reference signal is unique to the terminal device in a cell managed by the access node; receiving a second reference signal allocation from the access node, wherein the second reference signal is shared with at least one other terminal device in the cell; causing transmission of payload data together with the first reference signal according to a regular transmission pattern; and breaking the regular transmission pattern by transmitting dummy data together with the second reference signal in a time-frequency resource shared with the at least one other terminal device.