A card reader tampering detector includes at least one sensor and a detector circuit coupled to the sensor(s). The detector circuit is configured to receive a sensor output from the sensor(s) when the sensor is inserted into a smartcard reader. The detector circuit is further configured to detect, from the sensor output, the presence of an unauthorized device within the smartcard reader, and provide an output signal indicative of the presence of the unauthorized device within the smartcard reader.

Systems, apparatuses and methods provide for detecting the proximate placement of an external NFC reader to a specific location on a display surface. The display surface can be intended for viewing indicia and enabling interaction with an NFC communication device embedded within the display. A circuit can control an NFC security system that can scan for unauthorized tags affixed to the surface of a display. The NFC security system may be activated by an NFC enabled mobile phone placed proximate to the indicated region for receiving an NFC coded message from the display. An NFC security scan can be performed prior to the mobile phone reading the message from the intended NFC tag in the display. Enabling interactive display modes can allow for making selections indicated on the display or detecting motion gestures across the face of the display.

Implementing a camouflage of current traces generated by a hardware component having one or more set of digital elements defining a plurality of operational datapaths comprises adjusting (761) one or more working condition(s) of the hardware component, measuring (762) a reaction of the hardware component to the working condition(s) by a logic test circuit through processing data operations along a reference datapath having a minimum duration corresponding to at least the longest of the operational datapaths, and in response to detecting an error (763) along the reference datapath, modifying (764) the working condition(s) so that the error generated by the logic test circuit is cancelled. Applications to countermeasures to side-channel attacks.

A card reader tampering detector includes a substrate, a detector circuit, and at least one sensor disposed on the substrate and configured for communication with the detector circuit. The substrate is dimensioned to facilitate at least partial insertion of the tampering detector in a smartcard reader. The sensor is positioned on the substrate such that, when the tampering detector is at least partially inserted in the smartcard reader, the sensor aligns with a region of the reader normally occupied by a smartcard when the smartcard is inserted in the reader. The detector circuit is configured to receive a sensor output from the at least one sensor, from the sensor output detect a presence of an unauthorized device within the smartcard reader when the tampering detector is at least partially inserted in the reader, and provide an output signal indicative of the presence of the unauthorized device within the smartcard reader.

A card reader device A1 includes: a housing 11; an openable shutter 311 that allows or disallows passing of a magnetic card C into the housing 11; a magnetic head 511 that reads magnetic data of the magnetic card C received in the housing 11; an interfering magnetic field generator 711 provided on a rear surface side of the shutter 311 to generate an interfering magnetic field in at least a region R between the magnetic head 511 and the shutter 311; an interfering magnetic field control unit 61 that controls generation of the interfering magnetic field; and an interfering magnetic field alleviating unit 81 that alleviates an influence of the interfering magnetic field on the magnetic head 511 so that the interfering magnetic field generated by the interfering magnetic field generator 711 does not interfere the reading of the magnetic data by the magnetic head 511.

An assembly of a standard RFID/NFC element and a scrambling element for outputting wireless noise in response to a wireless request signal from a terminal, such as NFC, RFID or the like. The scrambling element has a noise generating circuit and an antenna for receiving the request signal and outputting a voltage. The scrambling element further comprises a voltage increasing element receiving the voltage from the antenna and feeding a higher voltage to the circuit to have the circuit start operation faster than the circuit of the standard RFID/NFC element.

A system for protecting personal data contained on an RFID-enabled device, suitable for use with an RFID system including an RFID reader configured to extract information from an RFID chip associated with the RFID-enabled device, includes a personal data protection system including a personal data protection device configured to prevent reading of the RFID chip associated with an RFID-enabled personal item.

The disclosed embodiments include methods and systems for detecting ATM skimmers based upon radio frequency (RF) signal. In one aspect, the disclosed embodiments include a system for detecting ATM skimmers including a memory storing instructions and one or more processors that execute the instructions to perform one or more operations for detecting ATM skimmers. The operations may include, for example, receiving radio frequency (RF) signal data corresponding to one or more RF signals detected by an antenna located within communication range of the ATM. The operations may also include determining one or more unidentified RF signals of the detected ATM RF signals that differ from one or more baseline RF signals. The operations may also include determining whether the one or more unidentified RF signals are present for a predetermined period of time, and determining whether a skimmer is present at the ATM based on a determination that the one or more unidentified RF signals are present for the predetermined period of time.

A payment processing device can implement a monitoring system to detect for tamper attempts at a physical interface such as a chip card interface. The monitoring system can establish local tamper criteria including a baseline when no chip card is present in the chip card interface, or in some embodiments, when it is known that an authentic chip card is present in the slot. During subsequent evaluations of the chip card interface by the monitoring system, a response received by the monitoring system that deviates from the local test criteria can indicate that a tamper attempt at the chip card interface may have occurred. The payment processing device may also communicate test results to a server for further testing, or for an update of the local test criteria.

A magnetic jammer for a card reader and structured to generate a magnetic field for jamming illegal reading of magnetic data stored on a card may include a core comprising magnetic material; and a coil wound around the core and structured to generate a jamming magnetic field. The core may include a plurality of separable core segments integrated into a single unit.