An electronic device includes first and second antennas, a magnetic stripe transmission (MST) integrated circuit (IC), and a processor. The first antenna is disposed between first and second surfaces of the electronic device and in parallel with the first and second surfaces of the electronic device. The first antenna outputs a signal in a first direction. The second antenna is disposed between the second surface of the electronic device and the first antenna and in parallel with the first and second surfaces of the electronic device. The second antenna outputs a signal in a second direction. The MST IC controls the first and second antennas. When a payment mode is executed, the processor controls the MST IC such that one of the first and second antennas outputs an MST signal and the other of the first and second antenna outputs a jamming signal for interfering with wiretapping of the MST signal.

A passive device shield 2 used to protect a passive chip containing data embedded in a device from remote skimming at a frequency which activates the chip to send the data, the shield 2 being removable to enable authorized reading of the chip data. The shield 2 is adapted to block the frequencies which activate the chip, the shield 2 further having a transmitter 18 which sends a coupling signal at a non-blocked frequency to a receiver 20, at least one of the receiver/and transmitter 18 having means to monitor the distance between the transmitter 18 and receiver 20 and an alert means to indicate when a predetermined distance has been exceeded.

A device is provided that is developed for use in both DIP and Motorized-type card readers installed in the card-operated payment stations usually and used for preventing the theft of the personal data stored in the payment card, to analyze and determine the foreign objects inserted in to the intake slot of the DIP or motorized card readers using a dynamic and adaptive software, to emit jamming signals in order to corrupt the data and prevent copying attempts, to prevent the physical entry of the card by activating a shutter system and to issue audible warnings to warn the users, to notify the central about the events taking place and to maintain the records of the events on the fixed memory card incorporated in the device.

A card reader tampering detector includes a substrate, a detector circuit, and at least one sensor disposed on the substrate and configured for communication with the detector circuit. The substrate is dimensioned to facilitate at least partial insertion of the tampering detector in a smartcard reader. The sensor is positioned on the substrate such that, when the tampering detector is at least partially inserted in the smartcard reader, the sensor aligns with a region of the reader normally occupied by a smartcard when the smartcard is inserted in the reader. The detector circuit is configured to receive a sensor output from the at least one sensor, from the sensor output detect a presence of an unauthorized device within the smartcard reader when the tampering detector is at least partially inserted in the reader, and provide an output signal indicative of the presence of the unauthorized device within the smartcard reader.

Some embodiments include a privacy/security apparatus for a portable communication device that includes a housing assembly configured to at least partially attenuate at least one of sound energy, acoustic energy, and electromagnetic energy including light, optical, and IR energy and RF radiation from passing through the housing assembly. The housing assembly includes a Faraday cage with two or more portions, and at least one protective shell coupled to or forming at least one aperture. The at least one aperture is configured and arranged to at least partially enclose the portable communication device so that at least a portion of the portable communication device is positioned within at least one portion of the Faraday cage, and the at least one seal coupled or integrated with the protective shell. The housing assembly can be an articulating assembly, a sliding assembly, and can include an active acoustic jamming or passive acoustic attenuation element.

Disclosed is a technique for prevention of false tamper positives experienced by an electronic device by use of a custom profile. The technique includes electrically coupling a conductive trace to a tamper monitoring component for use in tamper detection on the trace. Upon occurrence of the threshold voltage on the conductive trace, a tamper event is detected. A second conductive trace is monitored over time to determine behavior of the device. If the device is likely to trigger tamper responses in response to change in environment, the threshold voltage is changed to tamper positives triggered by environment.

The disclosed embodiments include methods and systems for detecting ATM skimmers based upon radio frequency (RF) signal. In one aspect, the disclosed embodiments include a system for detecting ATM skimmers including a memory storing instructions and one or more processors that execute the instructions to perform one or more operations for detecting ATM skimmers. The operations may include, for example, receiving radio frequency (RF) signal data corresponding to one or more RF signals detected by an antenna located within communication range of the ATM. The operations may also include determining one or more unidentified RF signals of the detected ATM RF signals that differ from one or more baseline RF signals. The operations may also include determining whether the one or more unidentified RF signals are present for a predetermined period of time, and determining whether a skimmer is present at the ATM based on a determination that the one or more unidentified RF signals are present for the predetermined period of time.

Devices and methods of disrupting data transfer between an RFID interrogation device (50, 50) and an RFID data storage device (30, 30) to be protected, are provided. An example of an embodiment of an RFID signal disruptor device includes a container (41, 141) and an RFID signal disruptor circuit (151, 161, 161, 171, 171, 271, 271) configured to substantially disrupt the signal provided by the RFID interrogation device (50, 50) when the RFID signal disruptor device is positioned to protect the RFID data storage device (30, 30). The RFID signal disruptor device can also include an interrogation indicator (63, 296) configured to indicate to a user of the RFID data storage device (30, 30) that an unauthorized RFID interrogation device (50, 50) is attempting to interrogate the RFID data storage device (30, 30) when the RFID signal disruptor device is positioned in close proximity to the RFID data storage device (30, 30) to provide protection thereto and when the RFID interrogation device (50, 50) is producing the interrogation signal.

A system for protecting personal data contained on an RFID-enabled device, suitable for use with an RFID system including an RFID reader configured to extract information from an RFID chip associated with the RFID-enabled device, includes a personal data protection system including a personal data protection device configured to prevent reading of the RFID chip associated with an RFID-enabled personal item.

A payment processing device can implement a monitoring system to detect for tamper attempts at a physical interface such as a chip card interface. The monitoring system can establish local tamper criteria including a baseline when no chip card is present in the chip card interface, or in some embodiments, when it is known that an authentic chip card is present in the slot. During subsequent evaluations of the chip card interface by the monitoring system, a response received by the monitoring system that deviates from the local test criteria can indicate that a tamper attempt at the chip card interface may have occurred. The payment processing device may also communicate test results to a server for further testing, or for an update of the local test criteria.