A radio frequency (RF) jamming device includes a differential segmented aperture (DSA), a jammer source outputting a jamming signal at one or more frequencies or frequency bands to be jammed, and RF electronics that amplify and feed the jamming signal to the DSA so as to emit a jamming beam. The DSA includes an array of electrically conductive tapered projections, and the RF electronics comprise power splitters configured to split the jamming signal to aperture pixels of the DSA. The aperture pixels comprise pairs of electrically conductive tapered projections of the array of electrically conductive tapered projections. The RF electronics further comprise pixel power amplifiers, each connected to amplify the jamming signal fed to a single corresponding aperture pixel of the DSA. The RF jamming device may include a rifle-shaped housing, with the DSA mounted at a distal end of the barrel of the rifle-shaped housing.

A technology is described for mitigating global positioning system (GPS) spoofer signals. A potentially spoofed GPS signal received via an antenna coupled to a GPS receiver can be identified. The potentially spoofed GPS signal can be applied to a spoofer signal nulling loop to generate a set of spoofer nulling weights. The set of spoofer nulling weights can produce a direction vector associated with the potentially spoofed GPS signal. The direction vector can be compared to a beamsteering vector. The potentially spoofed GPS signal can be determined as being a spoofer GPS signal when a misalignment between the direction vector and the beamsteering vector is above a defined threshold. The spoofer GPS signal can be converted to a spoofer mitigation signal that is applied to satellite track channels of the GPS receiver. The spoofer mitigation signal can produce a spatial null in a direction of the spoofer GPS signal.

A process for an electronically steerable parasitic array (ESPAR) antenna includes operating the ESPAR antenna with a receiver in Normal Mode until an internal flag is generated by the receiver indicating jamming RF noise preventing Normal Mode operation, causing the ESPAR antenna to switch to Anti-jam Mode. Anti-jam Mode includes a Search Mode and a Track Mode. The ESPAR antenna is steered in Search Mode, causing the ESPAR antenna to beam in a circular pattern to locate a spatial direction of the jamming RF noise, identify the spatial direction of the jamming RF noise preventing Normal Mode operation, and place a null in the spatial direction of the jamming RF noise. The ESPAR antenna switches to Track Mode to maintain the null in the spatial direction of the jamming RF noise until the jamming RF noise is not present. The ESPAR antenna then returns to operating in Normal Mode.

The present subject matter is directed to an apparatus and methodology for monitoring for the occurrence of use of unauthorized telecommunications equipment within a designated area. The present subject matter has particular utility to the corrections environment in that it discloses a methodology for detecting and reporting the unauthorized operation of cellular telephones within a corrections facility. The present technology may be used advantageously in combination with inmate telephone systems to transmit information to appropriate personnel in the form of email messages and/or voice communications by way of telephone local or corrections facility external telephone lines. The present technology also provides for recordation and storage of time, date and location information for detected events.

Methods, systems, and devices for channelizing and beamforming a wideband waveform are described. Generally, the described techniques provide for transmitting and receiving wideband waveforms that are beamformed on a per-channel basis during generation of the wideband waveforms. A transmitter may separate a first wideband signal into segments, with each segment bandwidth corresponding to a channel of the system bandwidth, and may map the segments to channels. The segments may be replicated to generate multiple copies of each segment. The transmitter may beamform and combine the copies of the segments to generate multiple wideband waveforms, and transmit each wideband waveform using a different antenna. A receiver may receive multiple wideband waveforms using multiple antennas and may separate each wideband waveform into segments, then beamform and de-map the segments. The techniques may be used to transmit and receive beamformed wideband waveforms over tactical data links.

A high-power electromagnetic source for HPEM pulses in a desired radiation direction includes at least three antennas fixed in relation to one another for pulse components, wherein at least two groups of antennas with a respective main direction are present, and a control unit for the activation and phase position of the pulse components for the superimposition for the HPEM pulse, wherein the current radiation direction of said pulse is selectable in an angle range around the main direction. A vehicle with an HPEM source has the antennas mounted in a fixed position or a support for the antennas is pivotably mounted on the vehicle. In a method for emitting the HPEM pulse, all antennas are controlled in order to select the radiation direction in the angle range of less than 360°.

An anti-drone integrated management device includes a drone detection unit that detects at least one drone invading a restricted area, a drone ID identification unit that requests drone unique information to the at least one detected drone, and receives drone unique information from the at least one detected drone, a drone ID identification information storage/management unit that stores and updates the drone unique information received by the drone ID identification unit, an anti-drone integrated controller that determines whether to neutralize the at least one detected drone based on the drone unique information stored in the drone ID identification information storage/management unit, and a drone neutralization unit that neutralizes the at least one detected drone under control of the anti-drone integrated controller.

The game table reading system comprises reading antennas for each of a plurality of reading areas of a game table, read-restriction antennas for each of the plurality of the reading areas, the read-restriction antennas restricting the RFID tag embedded in a game token placed in the corresponding reading area from being read by the reading antenna corresponding to the other adjacent reading areas, a reading control device that controls the reading antennas, and a read-restriction control device that controls the read-restriction antennas. The read-restriction control device causes the read-restriction antennas corresponding to the reading areas adjacent to the reading areas corresponding to the reading antenna that the reading control device causes to read, in synchronization with the reading control device.

A system for providing distributed wireless communication for at least one user equipment with connectivity and/or security against at least one eavesdropper is provided. The system includes wireless communication units and a scheduling unit. In this context, the scheduling unit is configured to schedule a first subset of the wireless communication units for radar sensing in order to gather radar sensing information with respect to the at least one user equipment, the environment of the at least one user equipment, the at least one eavesdropper, the environment of the at least one eavesdropper, or any combination thereof. In addition to this, the scheduling unit is configured to schedule a second subset of the wireless communication units for distributing the wireless communication with respect to the at least one user equipment on the basis of the radar sensing information.

Systems and methods for detecting and protecting against phase manipulation during AoA or AoD operations are disclosed. For AoA operations, the network device receiving the constant tone extension (CTE) generates an antenna switching pattern, which may be randomly generated. The network device then receives the CTE using a plurality of antenna elements. In one embodiment, the network device compares the phase of portions of the CTE signal received that utilize the same antenna element. If the phase of these portions differs by more than a threshold, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. In another embodiment, if the AoA algorithm cannot determine the angle of arrival, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. For angle of departure operations, the network device that transmits the CTE signal generates the antenna switching pattern and transmits it to the position engine, which performs the comparisons described above.