The present subject matter is directed to an apparatus and methodology for monitoring for the occurrence of use of unauthorized telecommunications equipment within a designated area. The present subject matter has particular utility to the corrections environment in that it discloses a methodology for detecting and reporting the unauthorized operation of cellular telephones within a corrections facility. The present technology may be used advantageously in combination with inmate telephone systems to transmit information to appropriate personnel in the form of email messages and/or voice communications by way of telephone local or corrections facility external telephone lines. The present technology also provides for recordation and storage of time, date and location information for detected events.

A phased array anti-jamming device, comprising a plurality (N) of antennas and a plurality of splitters connected to the antennas and adapted to split an RF stream received from the antennas. The phased array anti-jamming device further includes at least one digital signal processor adapted to digitally analyze a digital output of digital processing channels and to split the output into a plurality of digital down converted representations of respective analog outputs of a plurality of analog digital processing channels in a plurality of different frequencies and calculate at least one instructions selected from phase shift, amplification, and attenuation instructions for each one of the plurality of antennas per each one of the plurality of different frequencies. The phased array anti-jamming device further includes a plurality of phase shifter groups a plurality of group combiners and a main combiner adapted to sum outputs of the plurality of group combiners.

A handheld countermeasure device is disclosed herein. The device can include a hand-held form factor body. The device can include disruption components, a directional antenna, and a processor. The disruption components can be configured to generate a disruptive signal. The directional antenna can be configured to emit the disruptive signal. The processor can be configured to determine a position of the handheld countermeasure device based on a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signal. The processor can be configured to load a device profile for the handheld countermeasure device based on the position of the handheld countermeasure device.

A process for an electronically steerable parasitic array (ESPAR) antenna includes operating the ESPAR antenna with a receiver in Normal Mode until an internal flag is generated by the receiver indicating jamming RF noise preventing Normal Mode operation, causing the ESPAR antenna to switch to Anti-jam Mode. Anti-jam Mode includes a Search Mode and a Track Mode. The ESPAR antenna is steered in Search Mode, causing the ESPAR antenna to beam in a circular pattern to locate a spatial direction of the jamming RF noise, identify the spatial direction of the jamming RF noise preventing Normal Mode operation, and place a null in the spatial direction of the jamming RF noise. The ESPAR antenna switches to Track Mode to maintain the null in the spatial direction of the jamming RF noise until the jamming RF noise is not present. The ESPAR antenna then returns to operating in Normal Mode.

Systems and methods for detecting and protecting against phase manipulation during AoA or AoD operations are disclosed. For AoA operations, the network device receiving the constant tone extension (CTE) generates an antenna switching pattern, which may be randomly generated. The network device then receives the CTE using a plurality of antenna elements. In one embodiment, the network device compares the phase of portions of the CTE signal received that utilize the same antenna element. If the phase of these portions differs by more than a threshold, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. In another embodiment, if the AoA algorithm cannot determine the angle of arrival, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. For angle of departure operations, the network device that transmits the CTE signal generates the antenna switching pattern and transmits it to the position engine, which performs the comparisons described above.

The game table reading system comprises reading antennas for each of a plurality of reading areas of a game table, read-restriction antennas for each of the plurality of the reading areas, the read-restriction antennas restricting the RFID tag embedded in a game token placed in the corresponding reading area from being read by the reading antenna corresponding to the other adjacent reading areas, a reading control device that controls the reading antennas, and a read-restriction control device that controls the read-restriction antennas. The read-restriction control device causes the read-restriction antennas corresponding to the reading areas adjacent to the reading areas corresponding to the reading antenna that the reading control device causes to read, in synchronization with the reading control device.

A signal-of-interest is received by using a first and second planar electrically conductive disc to define an antenna. The antenna produces RF signal outputs at three output ports E.sub.x, E.sub.y and E.sub.z, each having a different associated gain pattern and polarization response. At least one null is automatically asserted in a pattern defined by the antenna in a specified direction by selectively weighting a gain and a phase of the RF signals respectively produced from the three output ports and then combining the RF signals to produce a first receiver signal output.

In embodiments of systems and methods for protecting wireless communications a base station and the wireless device, a base station receive from a wireless device channel feedback from a wireless device regarding a communication beam between the base station and the wireless device, generate a barrage signal precoder based on the received channel feedback regarding the communication beam, and transmit a barrage signal using the barrage signal precoder on a second beam that is different from the communication beam.

Systems and methods for detecting and protecting against phase manipulation during AoA or AoD operations are disclosed. For AoA operations, the network device receiving the constant tone extension (CTE) generates an antenna switching pattern, which may be randomly generated. The network device then receives the CTE using a plurality of antenna elements. In one embodiment, the network device compares the phase of portions of the CTE signal received that utilize the same antenna element. If the phase of these portions differs by more than a threshold, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. In another embodiment, if the AoA algorithm cannot determine the angle of arrival, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. For angle of departure operations, the network device that transmits the CTE signal generates the antenna switching pattern and transmits it to the position engine, which performs the comparisons described above.

Systems, methods and apparatus are described for a HERF weapon that may emit high-energy radio waves at a target based on locational information and a frequency associated with the target. The HERF weapon may receive the frequency and locational information from a sensing system. The HERF weapon may emit a high energy pulse toward the target and on the frequency associated with the target to disable or destroy the target without affecting nearby devices. The HERF weapon may allow the user to avoid detection by using a frequency that corresponds to the target's operating frequency.