Systems, methods, network devices, and machine-readable media disclosed herein include encoding data for storage or transmission by encoding the data according to a tamper-resistant data encoding scheme that renders the data secure against unbounded polynomial size attacks. The present disclosure further includes subsequently determining whether the data has been tampered with, and notifying a processor when the data has been modified or compromised.

A data processing system includes a host processor that executes an operating system and an accelerator operable to process data under the control of the operating system executing on the host processor. The accelerator can be switched between a normal mode of operation and a protected mode of operation in which the side channel information that can be provided by the accelerator to the host processor is restricted. The data processing system also includes a mechanism for switching the accelerator from its normal mode of operation to the protected mode of operation, and from its protected mode of operation to the normal mode of operation.

A floating core network for secure isolation of a circuit from an external supply interface is described. Isolation of a core is accomplished through a dynamic current limiting network providing an isolated core voltage to the core; and an isolated supply for the corresponding core that is continuously recharged by the dynamic current limiting network. The dynamic current limiting network can include two control loops, one control loop providing a fixed gate voltage to a p-type transistor supplying current to the isolated supply and another control loop providing a fixed gate voltage to an n-type transistor sinking current from the isolated supply.

A method of protecting a Rijndael-type algorithm executed by an electronic circuit against side channel attacks, wherein: each block of data to be encrypted or decrypted is masked with a first mask before applying a non-linear block substitution operation from a first substitution box, and is then unmasked by a second mask after the substitution; the substitution box is recalculated, block by block, before applying the non-linear operation, the processing order of the blocks of the substitution box being submitted to a random permutation; and the recalculation of the substitution box uses the second mask as well as third and fourth masks, the sum of the third and fourth masks being equal to the first mask.

A method of defense against cryptosystem timing attack such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem timing attack, an associated cryptosystem processing circuit and an associated electronic device are provided. The method may include: utilizing a point double calculation circuit to perform a plurality of point double calculation operations related to a predetermined cryptosystem; utilizing a point add calculation circuit to perform a plurality of point add calculation operations related to the predetermined cryptosystem; and in response to there being no need to perform any point add calculation operation related to the predetermined cryptosystem, utilizing a dummy point add calculation circuit to perform a dummy point add calculation operation to emulate a calculation time of performing the any point add calculation operation, without changing a calculation result before performing the dummy point add calculation operation.

There is provided a method of communication between functional blocks in a system-on-chip. The method includes: exchanging a respective public key between a first functional block and a second functional block in the system-on-chip (SoC) for a communication therebetween, the first functional block being a transmitter of the communication and the second function block being a receiver of the communication; generating, at the first functional block, a first code based on the public key of the second functional block; generating, at the second functional block, a second code based on the public key of the first functional block; obfuscating, at the first functional block, an address associated with the communication based on the first code to produce an obfuscated address; transmitting, at the first functional block, the obfuscated address to the second functional block via an interconnect communication infrastructure in the system-on-chip; receiving, at the second functional block, the obfuscated address from the first functional block via the interconnect communication infrastructure; and deobfuscating, at the second functional block, the obfuscated address received based on the second code to produce a deobfuscated address associated with the communication. There is also provided a corresponding system-on-chip.

Embodiments relate to systems, devices, and computer-implemented methods for preventing determination of previous access of sensitive content by receiving, from a user, a request for content at a device in an information centric network, where a cached version of the content is locally stored at the device; initiating a time delay based on a determination that the user has not previously requested the content; and transmitting the cached version of the content to the user after the time delay.

Cryptographic circuitry masks sensitive data values. The masking includes extracting unique combinations of random mask values from one or more sets of random mask values. Each sensitive data value is masked using a respective unique combination. The unique combinations have a combination class greater than or equal to a determined integer corresponding to a protection-level against side-channel attacks, and a number of unique combinations greater than or equal to a number of the sensitive data values. A number of random mask values in the one or more sets of random mask values is based on the number of unique combinations and the class of the plurality of unique combinations.

A communication device is provided, comprising: an ultra-wideband device configured to establish a communication session with an external communication device; a secure element configured to generate a session key for use in said communication session and an authentication key derived from said session key; a processing unit configured to execute an application; wherein the secure element is further configured to transfer the session key and the authentication key to the UWB device; wherein the UWB device is configured to add, upon or after receiving data for use by said application, a cryptographic tag to said data; wherein the processing unit is configured to receive said data and the cryptographic tag, and to forward said data and cryptographic tag to the secure element; wherein the secure element is configured to verify said cryptographic tag and to return, upon or after a positive verification of the cryptographic tag, a signed confirmation.

A method of identifying occurrence of a blinding attack in a quantum cryptography system, and a receiver for a quantum cryptography. The method comprises the steps of providing a light emitter at a receiver of the quantum cryptography system, wherein at least a portion of light emitted from the light emitter is detectable by a single photon detector of the receiver; switching the light emitter off during a normal operation mode of the single photon detector; measuring a first number of detection events registered in the single photon detector in a first time period, T1, with the light emitter switched on; and identifying the occurrence of the blinding attack based on the first number of detection invents.