Patent classifications
H04L9/005
MITIGATING TIMING ATTACKS VIA DYNAMICALLY TRIGGERED TIME DILATION
Techniques for mitigating timing attacks via dynamically triggered time dilation are provided. According to one set of embodiments, a computer system can track a count of application programming interface (API) calls or callbacks made by a program within each of a series of time buckets. The computer system can further determine that the count exceeds a threshold count for a predefined consecutive number of time buckets. Upon making this determination, the computer system can trigger time dilation with respect to the program, where the time dilation causes the program to observe a dilated view of time relative to real time.
JITTER ATTACK PROTECTION CIRCUIT
Method and apparatus for protecting against a jitter attack upon a cryptographic processing device. In some embodiments, the cryptographic processing circuit is configured to perform a cryptographic function on a set of input data to generate a corresponding set of transformed output data. An input line supplies an input signal used by the cryptographic processing IC during execution of the cryptographic function. A monitor circuit monitors the input signal, and temporarily disables the cryptographic processing IC when time-varying changes to the input signal indicate a jitter attack may be taking place. The input signal may be a source voltage, and voltage transitions in the source voltage can be monitored. Alternatively, the input signal may be a clock signal, and frequency variations in the clock signal can be monitored. The monitor circuit may be arranged on a power island to maintain power during power fluctuations.
Apparatus, system, and method for secure remote configuration of network devices
The disclosed apparatus may include an encryption device that signs information exchanged between network devices to ensure the integrity of the information. The disclosed apparatus may also include a network device communicatively coupled to the encryption device, wherein the network device (1) obtains geo-location information that identifies the location of the network device, (2) directs the encryption device to sign the geo-location information to ensure the integrity of the geo-location information, (3) provides the signed geo-location information to a remote management system that manages the configuration of the network device based at least in part on the geo-location information, and (4) receives a configuration profile that modifies the configuration of the network device to account for the current location of the network device from the remote management system. Various other apparatuses, systems, and methods are also disclosed.
ANALYSIS AND REMEDIATION OF FAULT SENSITIVITY FOR DIGITAL CIRCUITS
The present specification is related to analysis of digital circuits for assessing a fault sensitivity of a digital logic circuit. An example method includes: obtaining a set of input vectors that represent possible inputs to the digital logic circuit; for each output gate of the plurality of digital logic gates: (i) for each input vector of the set of input vectors, determining a cumulative output delay for the output gate, and (ii) determining an averaged cumulative output delay for the output gate by averaging the cumulative output delays for the output gate that were determined for multiple input vectors of the set of input vectors; generating a fault sensitivity score for the digital logic circuit based on the averaged cumulative output delays for the output gates of the digital logic circuit; and providing the fault sensitivity score.
KEY ROTATING TREES WITH SPLIT COUNTERS FOR EFFICIENT HARDWARE REPLAY PROTECTION
In one example a computer implemented method comprises encrypting data to be stored in a protected region of a memory using a message authentication code (MAC) having a first value determined using a first key during a first period of time, generating a replay integrity tree structure comprising security metadata for the data stored in the protected region of the memory using the first value of the MAC, and at the end of the first period of time, re-keying the MAC to have a second value determined using a second key at the end of the first period of time, decrypting the data stored in the protected region using the first value for the MAC, re-encrypting the data stored in the protected region using the second value for the MAC, and updating the replay integrity tree using the second value for the MAC. Other examples may be described.
Software protection against differential fault analysis
An encryption module and method for performing an encryption/decryption process executes two cryptographic operations in parallel in multiple stages. The two cryptographic operations are executed such that different rounds of the two cryptographic operations are performed in parallel by the same instruction or the same finite state machine (FSM) state for hardware implementation.
PRIVACY PRESERVING COMPARISON
A method for performing a secure comparison between a first secret data and a second secret data, including: receiving, by a processor of a first party, encrypted bits of the second secret data y from a second party, where
is an integer; computing the Hamming weight h of first secret data x, wherein x has
bits; computing the value of a first comparison bit .sub.A such that .sub.A=0 when h>
/2, .sub.A=1 when h<
/2, and .sub.A is randomly selected when h=
/2; forming a set of
/2 indexes
that includes at least the indexes i where x.sub.i=.sub.A; selecting random invertible scalars r.sub.i for each i in
and computing
c*.sub.i
PROTECTION OF A MODULAR REDUCTION CALCULATION
A modular reduction calculation on a first number and a second number is protected from side-channel attacks, such as timing attacks. A first intermediate modular reduction result is calculated. A value corresponding to four times the first number is added to the first intermediate modular reduction result, generating a second intermediate modular reduction result. A value corresponding to the first number multiplied by a most significant word of the second intermediate modular reduction result plus 1, is subtracted from the second intermediate modular reduction result, generating a third intermediate modular reduction result. A cryptographic operation is performed using a result of the modular reduction calculation.
METHOD FOR DETECTING BLINDING ATTACKS ON PHOTODETECTORS IN A QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY SYSTEM
A method of identifying occurrence of a blinding attack in a quantum cryptography system, and a receiver for a quantum cryptography. The method comprises the steps of providing a light emitter at a receiver of the quantum cryptography system, wherein at least a portion of light emitted from the light emitter is detectable by a single photon detector of the receiver; switching the light emitter off during a normal operation mode of the single photon detector; measuring a first number of detection events registered in the single photon detector in a first time period, T1, with the light emitter switched on; and identifying the occurrence of the blinding attack based on the first number of detection invents.
Method for implementing a communication between control units
A method for implementing a communication between at least two control units, and a control unit interconnection for implementing the method are provided. An electronic hardware security module is provided in each control unit, the communication taking place via an additional communications link.