An example operation may include one or more of capturing a current version of sensitive data by a data processor node, hashing, by the data processor node, the current version of the sensitive data, storing, by the data processor node, a hash of the current version of the sensitive data on a first blockchain, encrypting, by the data processor node, the current version of the sensitive data using a secret key, and storing the encrypted current version of the sensitive data on a second blockchain.

A wideband chaotic waveform that is rateless in that it may be modulated at virtually any rate and has a minimum of features introduced into the waveform. Further, the waveform provided may be operated below a signal to noise ratio wall to further enhance the LPD and LPE aspects, thereof. Additionally, the present disclosure may provide a mix of coherent and non-coherent processing techniques applied to signal samples to efficiently achieve coarse synchronization with a waveform that is faster, more efficient and more accurate than using time domain signal correlators alone.

A secret key value that is inaccessible to software is scrambled according to registers consisting of one-time programmable (OTP) bits. A first OTP register is used to change the scrambling of the secret key value whenever a lifecycle event occurs. A second OTP register is used to undo the change in the scrambling of the secret key. A third OTP register is used to affect a permanent change to the scrambling of the secret key. The scrambled values of the secret key (whether changed or unchanged) are used as seeds to produce keys for cryptographic operations by a device.

A telecommunications network includes a serving network and a home network. In some examples the serving network receives, from the home network, identity data associated with a network terminal. The serving network determines a tied key using a tying key derivation function (TKDF) based on the identity data, then prepares an authentication request based on the tied key and sends the request to the terminal. In some examples, the home network receives the identity data from the access network and determines a tied key using a TKDF. The home network then determines a confirmation message based on the first tied key. In some examples, the serving network receives the identity data from the home network, and receives a network-slice selector associated with the network terminal. The serving network determines a tied key using a TKDF based on the identity data and the network-slice selector.

The present disclosure relates to methods and devices for a hearing system. A method, performed by a hearing device of a hearing system comprising a hearing device system and an external device, the hearing device system comprising the hearing device and a user accessory device with a user application installed thereon is disclosed, the method comprising receiving, from the user accessory device, secure hearing system data, the secure hearing system data comprising a data type identifier; determining a data type of the secure hearing system data based on the data type identifier; determining hearing system data by applying a security scheme to the secure hearing system data based on the data type; and operating the hearing device according to the hearing system data.

A method for deriving a partial signature for a subset of a set of messages. The method is implemented by a partial signature derivation entity and includes: receiving the set of messages and a signature of the set of messages, the signature including signature elements of the set of messages; deriving a first verification element calculated from the messages of the set other than those of the subset; deriving a second verification element to prove that the first verification element is formed correctly; and sending to a verification entity a partial signature specific to the subset, the partial signature including a constant number of elements having at least the elements of the signature of the set of messages, the first verification element and the second verification element, the partial signature being verifiable with only messages of the subset.

Disclosed is a method for a secure communication method having a secret key generation technique. The novelty of the proposed method stems from enhancing physical layer security (PHY) by using channel-adaptive keys, after manipulating a channel by introducing an artificial component into the channel. An adaptively designed artificial component is cascaded with the legitimate user’s channel. In an orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) system, subcarriers corresponding to a channel gain higher than a threshold value are selected to extract the keys. Since the number of the selected subcarriers is adaptive, the length of the generated key sequences is changing adaptively as well. Thus, the channel reciprocity property in a time division duplexing (TDD) system is utilized.

A communication apparatus establishes, in a case where a second radio link is established with a partner apparatus in communication in addition to an already established first radio link, the second radio link using information obtained by authentication processing executed at the time of establishing the first radio link.

Disclosed is a method for generating and authenticating a three-dimensional dynamic OTP that does not require input of a password. In the method, a user address received from a user terminal is converted into coordinate values in degrees, minutes, and seconds on latitude and longitude, and set as address coordinates from the coordinates in a unit of seconds and then a two-dimensional reference coordinate system is displayed that is subdivided with the address coordinates as an origin, a two-dimensional function is provided and rotated about an arbitrary axis to form a three-dimensional space by a three-dimensional function, one OTP generation coordinate within the three-dimensional space is provided, and then a one-time password is generated by combining respective coordinate values of x, y, and z axes of the one OTP generation coordinate.

A secure guest of a computing environment requests confidential data. The confidential data is included in metadata of the secure guest, which is stored in a trusted execution environment of the computing environment. Based on the request, the confidential data is obtained from the metadata of the secure guest that is stored in the trusted execution environment.