Disclosed is an electronic device for performing code-based encryption supporting integrity verification of a message and an operating method thereof. When a data transmission side encrypts a message through code-based encryption and transmits the encrypted message to a data reception apparatus, the data transmission side is allowed to use a hash value generated based on a part of the message as an error in code-based encryption to support the data reception apparatus to verify an integrity of a received message by using the hash value.

A system and method for encryption of data. The system and method utilizes a cryptographic function that provides asymmetric encryption/decryption and digital signing capabilities that are hardened against cyber attack from quantum computers.

A computer processing system for reducing a processing footprint in cryptosystems utilizing quadratic extension field arithmetic such as pairing-based cryptography, elliptic curve cryptography, code-based cryptography and post-quantum elliptic curve cryptography that includes at least one computer processor having a register file with three processor registers operably configured to implement quadratic extension field arithmetic equations in a finite field of F.sub.p.sup.2 and a multiplexer operably configured to selectively shift from each of the three processor registers in sequential order to generate modular additional results and modular multiplication results from the three processor registers.

Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) can provide security against quantum computers that could feasibly determine private keys from public keys. A server communicating with a device can store and use PKI keys comprising server private key ss, device public key Sd, and device ephemeral public key Ed. The device can store and use the corresponding PKI keys, such as server public key Ss. The key use can support all of (i) mutual authentication, (ii) forward secrecy, and (iii) shared secret key exchange. The server and the device can conduct an ECDHE key exchange with the PKI keys to mutually derive a symmetric ciphering key K1. The device can encrypt a device public key PK.Device with K1 and send to the server as a first ciphertext. The server can encrypt a server public key PK.Network with at least K1 and send to the device as a second ciphertext.

Systems and methods are provided for quantum-resistant secure key distribution between a peer and an EAP authenticator by using an authentication server. The systems and methods include receiving requests for a COMMON-SEED and a quantum-safe public key from a peer and an EAP authenticator. The COMMON-SEED is encrypted using the quantum-safe public key of the peer and the quantum-safe public key of the EAP authenticator, and the encrypted COMMON-SEED is sent to the peer along with a request for a PPK ID from the peer to complete authentication of the peer. The PPK ID is received from the peer, and the encrypted COMMON-SEED and PPK ID is sent to the EAP authenticator. A quantum-resistant secure channel is established between the peer and the EAP authenticator when the peer and the EAP authenticator share the same COMMON-SEED and the same PPK-ID.

Disclosed is a ciphertext calculation method. The ciphertext calculation method comprises the steps of: receiving a comparative calculation command for a plurality of ciphertexts of the same type; performing a calculation by reflecting the plurality of ciphertexts of the same type on a synthesis function corresponding to the comparative calculation command; and outputting the calculated ciphertexts of the same type.

Disclosed in some examples are methods, systems, devices, and machine-readable mediums for authenticating a user using biometric data without distributing unencrypted biometric data or decrypting biometric data during authentication, including selecting, based on a first set of data points representing a biometric characteristic of a user, an encryption parameter of an encryption function, generating first encrypted challenge data by encrypting, by applying the encryption parameter to the encryption function, challenge data to create encrypted authentication data, receiving, from a network based authentication device, during an authentication process, second encrypted challenge data for authenticating the user, and determining whether to authenticate the user using a comparison of the first encrypted challenge data to the second encrypted challenge data.

A method for communicating magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) information wirelessly includes detecting an MRI system emission sequence, and identifying at least one parameter of the sequence. The at least one parameter identified is cross-correlated. A first initial condition for a first chaotic coded sequence and a second initial condition for a second chaotic coded sequence are determined based on the at least one parameter. The method further includes obtaining, from a modulation symbol mapped to MRI information generated at a local coil responsive to the sequence, a real component of the symbol and an imaginary component of the symbol. The real component of the symbol is encrypted based on the first initial condition, and the imaginary component of the symbol is encrypted based on the second initial condition. The encrypted real component and imaginary component of the symbol are wirelessly transmitted.

Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) can provide security against quantum computers that could feasibly determine private keys from public keys. A server communicating with a device can store and use PKI keys comprising server private key ss, device public key Sd, and device ephemeral public key Ed. The device can store and use the corresponding PKI keys, such as server public key Ss. The key use can support all of (i) mutual authentication, (ii) forward secrecy, and (iii) shared secret key exchange. The server and the device can conduct an ECDHE key exchange with the PKI keys to mutually derive a symmetric ciphering key K1. The device can encrypt a device public key PK.Device with K1 and send to the server as a first ciphertext. The server can encrypt a server public key PK.Network with at least K1 and send to the device as a second ciphertext.

Presented herein are methodologies for establishing secure communications in a post-quantum computer context. The methodology includes receiving, from a first communications device, at a second communications device, a secret seed value, or otherwise obtaining the secret seed value; initializing a session key service with the secret seed value; receiving, from the first communications device, at the second communications device, a pre-shared key identifier; querying the session key service for a pre-shared key corresponding the pre-shared key identifier; receiving, from the session key service, the pre-shared key; deriving a session key based, at least in part, on the pre-shared key; receiving from the first communications device, at the second communications device, data encrypted with the session key; and decrypting the data at the second communications device using the session key.