Systems and methods for securing encrypted data wherein a sending computer encrypts data to be transmitted with an encryption key. The encryption key itself is not sent, but can be derived from a second key and third key. The second key is modified such that an incomplete portion of the second key is sent along with the message to a recipient computer. The third key is sent separately to the recipient computer. The recipient computer obtains the remainder of the second key, reconstructs the complete second key and then uses it with the third key to derive a decryption key to decrypt the message.

The present system and method allow the exchange of messages, such as email, between a sender and a recipient while maintaining the data secure and the integrity of the content of the messages. The method and system do not require a user having an account to open a received message. The method comprises the server creating a new communication key upon reception of a request. The communication key is typically valid for a single request to ensure that each request is encrypted using different communication keys. The method typically comprises a client [A] establishing communication on [HANDSHAKE] with one or more servers [B]. The HANDSHAKE generally aims at initializing the encryption key that will be used to exchange information between A and B.

The processor may collect, from a first peer, a first data set associated with a channel. The channel may include one or more assets associated with a first peer. The channel may link the first peer to a second peer. The processor may analyze the first data set to determine a first status for the one or more assets. The processor may provide the first status of the one or more assets in a viewable channel to the blockchain network.

A method includes sending, to a compute device and via a private channel, a public key for asymmetric encryption. The method also includes concurrently authenticating the compute device and generating a traffic key for symmetric encryption, based at least in part on the public key. The method further includes sending a message to the compute device, the message being encrypted using the traffic key via the symmetric encryption.

Secure communication provides data confidentiality, data integrity, and authentication. In one embodiment, encryption and signatures are used to construct a signcryption, which provides confidentiality and integrity. In one embodiment, an identifier and the output of a cryptographic function applied to a token are used to establish a secure channel. In one embodiment, a secure channel is mutated into a new secure channel using a renew message and a construct containing elements for establishing a secure channel.

Embodiments are provided for establishing secondary secure channels in any network, including networks that enforce a single channel per neighbor policy. In one embodiment, requests to open a new channel are handled only in a listen mode and identifiers are used to authenticate the first and second secure channels. The channels provide secure communication. In one embodiment, a second channel is provisioned using the primary secure channel. In one embodiment, a method of storing data for provisioning secondary secure channels is provided.

Methods, apparatuses and systems for peer-to-peer secure communication are disclosed. In an example, a mobile security apparatus (“MSA”) is connected to a first endpoint device and includes a memory device storing a list of MSAs that are designated as being within a circle of trust (“CoT”) of the MSA. The list includes an Internet Protocol (“IP”) address, a public key, and an identifier of at least one endpoint device for each of the MSAs. The apparatus also includes a processor configured to receive a selection of content from the first endpoint device for transmission to the second endpoint device. After determining the second endpoint device corresponds to a second MSA that is included within the CoT, the processor encrypts a message including the content using the public key associated with the second MSA and transmits the encrypted message using the IP address of the second MSA.

A powered balancing mobility device that can provide the user the ability to safely navigate expected environments of daily living including the ability to maneuver in confined spaces and to climb curbs, stairs, and other obstacles, and to travel safely and comfortably in vehicles. The mobility device can provide elevated, balanced travel.

A method and apparatus for establishing a trust relationship between users is disclosed. The apparatus includes at least two user devices containing the Application, a service provider server (SPS) comprising an application programming interface (API), a network communicably coupling the sender device, the receiver device and the SPS, and an out-of-band (OOB) channel, separate from the network, communicably coupling the sender device and the receiver device. The method includes obtaining a receiver's Public Key provided by an Application Programming Interface (API) on an service provider server, encrypting a verification message with the Receiver's Public key and the Sender's Private Key, sending the encrypted verification message from the Sender's device to the Receiver's device through the out-of-band channel, decrypting the encrypted verification message using Receiver's Private Key and Sender's Public Key, and communicating decrypted verification message via out-of-band channel.

A data transfer process can include multiple verification features usable by a “source” device to ensure that a “destination” device is authorized to receive a requested data object. The source device and destination device can communicate via a first communication channel (which can be on a wide-area network) to exchange public keys, then use the public keys to verify their identities and establish a secure session on a second communication channel (which can be a local channel). The data object can be transferred via the secure session. Prior to sending the data object, the source device can perform secondary verification operations (in addition to the key exchange) to confirm the identity of the second device and/or the locality of the connection on the second communication channel.