A method and system for recording data including content in a recording medium on a computer apparatus. First encrypted data, obtained by encrypting the data using a medium key created for each recording medium, is recorded in a recording medium. Second encrypted data, obtained by encrypting the medium key using a public key, is recorded in the recording medium. A private key corresponding to the public key is not recorded in the recording medium.

Device to device (D2D) communication can be performed with packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) based encapsulation without internet protocol (IP) addressing. The non-IP D2D PDCP-encapsulated communication can further include two forms of secure data transfer. A first non-IP D2D PDCP-encapsulated communication can be a negotiated non-IP D2D PDCP-encapsulated communication. A second non-IP D2D PDCP-encapsulated communication can be a non-negotiated non-IP D2D communication. The non-negotiated non-IP D2D PDCP-encapsulated communication can include a common key management server (KMS) version and a distributed KMS version. The encapsulated communication can be used with various protocols, including a PC5 protocol (such as the PC5 Signaling Protocol) and wireless access in vehicular environments (WAVE) protocols.

Some embodiments include a method of utilizing a proxy device to mitigate latency related to a transport layer security (TLS) handshake protocol. The proxy device can be an untrusted proxy of a server or a client. The proxy device can negotiate cipher suites on behalf of its principal (e.g., the server or the server) without storing private keys of its principal. The use of the proxy device can reduce a typical two round-trips taken between the server and the client into a single round-trip.

Certain embodiments of the invention generally relate to lawful interception of communications for IP Multimedia System-based (IMS-based) voice over IP (VoIP). For example, some embodiments relate to interception of communications including interception for encrypted, transcoded media. A method may include identifying a network node that provides call content interception. The method may also include determining a codec type used at a location of the call content interception at the network node. The method may further include sending a matched codec of the codec type used at the location of the call content interception at the network node to a delivery function in the communications network.

In one embodiment, a secure computing system comprises a key generation sub-system configured to generate cryptographic keys and corresponding key labels for distribution to computer clusters, each computer cluster including a plurality of respective endpoints, a plurality of quantum key distribution (QKD) devices connected via respective optical fiber connections, and configured to securely distribute the generated cryptographic keys among the computer clusters, and a key orchestration sub-system configured to manage caching of the cryptographic keys in advance of receiving key requests from applications running on ones of the endpoints, and provide respective ones of the cryptographic keys to the applications to enable secure communication among the applications.

A method for dynamic encryption and signing, a terminal and a server are provided. The method includes that: at least one key and at least one signature are generated through native data; a first predetermined key index and a first random signature index are selected during session connection; a first key and a first signature are located from the at least one key and the at least one signature according to the first key index and the first signature index; session request data is signed with the first signature, and the session request data is encrypted with the first key and sent to a server; and session response data signed with a second random signature and encrypted with a second random key is received from the server after decryption and signature verification by the server over the session request data succeed.

A method of performing an equality check in a secure system, including: receiving an input v having a known input property; splitting the input v into t secret shares v.sub.i where i is an integer index and t is greater than 1; splitting an input x into k secret shares x.sub.i where i is an integer index and k is greater than 1; splitting the secret shares x.sub.i into a s chunks resulting in s.Math.k chunks y.sub.j where j is an integer index; calculating a mapping chain t times for each secret share v.sub.i, wherein the mapping chain including s.Math.k affine mappings F.sub.j, wherein y.sub.j and F.sub.j−1(y.sub.j−1) are the inputs to F.sub.j and the F.sub.0(y.sub.0)=v.sub.i; and determining if the outputs have a known output property indicating that the input x equals a desired value.

The embodiments provide cryptography that is performed in each of two communicating devices and is based on information known only to the devices. The information is determined in each of the devices at the time of communications. Each of the devices determines the information without communicating key information related to the encryption key with each other. Channel characteristic reciprocity between the two devices allows creation of identical keys in each device. Each of the devices sends a first setup signal to the other device, receives a second setup signal from the other device, where the second setup signal may be a looped back version of the first setup signal, samples the second setup generates sampling results, creates a key based on the sampling results, and utilizes the key to exchange one or more secure data signals with the other device.

The embodiments provide a cryptography key for two communicating devices that is based on information known only to the devices. The information may only be determined by the devices. Each device determines the information without communicating key information related to the encryption key with the other. Channel characteristic reciprocity between the devices allows creation of identical keys in each device. Each device sends a signal to the other device at the same power level based on the distance between the devices. The power level may be set to result in a target receive power level at the other device. Each device samples the received signal, generates sampling results, creates a key based on the sampling results and a threshold power level, and utilizes the key. The threshold power level may be based on the target receive power level, or a median power determined from the sampling results.

The information processing apparatus stores a cryptographic module and a key that the cryptographic module generated. The information processing apparatus determines whether or not the stored key is a key that a cryptographic module for which integrity is not verified generated. If so, the information processing apparatus updates the key determined to be the key that the cryptographic module for which integrity is not verified generated.