Disclosed embodiments relate to encoded inline capabilities. In one example, a system includes a trusted execution environment (TEE) to partition an address space within a memory into a plurality of compartments each associated with code to execute a function, the TEE further to assign a message object in a heap to each compartment, receive a request from a first compartment to send a message block to a specified destination compartment, respond to the request by authenticating the request, generating a corresponding encoded capability, conveying the encoded capability to the destination compartment, and scheduling the destination compartment to respond to the request, and subsequently, respond to a check capability request from the destination compartment by checking the encoded capability and, when the check passes, providing a memory address to access the message block, and, otherwise, generating a fault, wherein each compartment is isolated from other compartments.

Technologies for secure I/O include a compute device, which further includes a processor, a memory, a trusted execution environment (TEE), one or more input/output (I/O) devices, and an I/O subsystem. The I/O subsystem includes a device memory access table (DMAT) programmed by the TEE to establish bindings between the TEE and one or more I/O devices that the TEE trusts and a memory ownership table (MOT) programmed by the TEE when a memory page is allocated to the TEE.

A method and apparatus for a certificate authority system providing authentication to a plurality of devices associated with an organization are described. The method may include receiving, at the certificate authority system, a request from a device to sign authentication information of the device, wherein the device is associated with the organization. The method may also include sending a challenge to the device to perform an action with a system other than the certificate authority system, and receiving the response to the challenge from the device. Furthermore, the method may include verifying that the response was generated correctly based on the challenge, and signing the authentication information of the device with one or more keys of the certificate authority system as an authentication of an identity of the device.

Disclosed herein are methods, systems, and apparatus, including computer programs encoded on computer storage media, for processing blockchain data under a trusted execution environment (TEE). One of the methods includes receiving, by a blockchain node, a request to execute one or more software instructions in a TEE executing on the blockchain node; determining, by a virtual machine in the TEE, data associated with one or more blockchain accounts to execute the one or more software instructions based on the request; traversing, by the virtual machine, a global state of a blockchain stored in the TEE to locate the data; and executing, by the virtual machine, the one or more software instructions based on the data.

Trusted client security factor-based authorizations. The techniques allow a server to authorize client requested operations to access a protected resource or service based on trusted client security factors that are obtained at client machines and provided to the server.

A method and apparatus prevents hacker code from infecting an application program by requiring decryption of the application program prior to running the application program on a computer. The method includes steps of: providing a storage device that is a separate unit from components necessary to operate the computer; storing a symmetric private key on the storage device; using the symmetric private key to produce an encrypted application program upon first installation; thereafter decrypting that part of the encrypted application program needed implement a command to run the application program; precluding the computer from running any part of the application program that has not been first encrypted with the symmetric private key; and, decrypting, on the fly, only those follow-on parts of the encrypted application program needed to perform functions called for during operation of the application program.

Methods, systems and devices for using charged particle beams (CPBs) to write different die-specific, non-volatile, electronically readable data to different dies on a substrate. CPBs can fully write die-specific data within the chip interconnect structure during the device fabrication process, at high resolution and within a small area, allowing one or multiple usefully-sized values to be securely written to service device functions. CPBs can write die-specific data in areas readable or unreadable through a (or any) communications bus. Die-specific data can be used for, e.g.: encryption keys; communications addresses; manufacturing information (including die identification numbers); random number generator improvements; or single, nested, or compartmentalized security codes. Die-specific data and locations for writing die-specific data can be kept in encrypted form when not being written to the substrate to conditionally or permanently prevent any knowledge of said data and locations.

Environment type validation can provide a tamper-resistant validation of the computing environment within which the environment type validation is being performed. Such information can then be utilized to perform policy management, which can include omitting verifications in order to facilitate the sharing of policy, such as application licenses, from a host computing environment into a container virtual computing environment. The environment type validation can perform multiple checks, including verification of the encryption infrastructure of the computing environment, verification of code integrity mechanisms of that computing environment, checks for the presence of functionality evidencing a hypervisor, checks for the presence or absence of predetermined system drivers, or other like operating system components or functionality, checks for the activation or deactivation of resource management stacks, and checks for the presence or absence of predetermined values in firmware.

A method and apparatus for use in a trusted network environment together or separately employ an implicit attestation that a requesting computing resource is in a trusted state before access to a network resource is granted. The method includes: verifying that a requesting computing resource is in a trusted state; accessing the private key using the released key authorization value; and creating a digital signature for the requesting device from the accessed private key. The apparatus may implement the method.

A chipset for an end device comprises at least a Secure Processor into which a one-time programmable memory storage is integrated, wherein in the chipset at least an end-device serial number of the end device is stored, wherein in the one-time programmable memory information is stored for securing the end-device serial number against tampering.