A method including determining, by a first user device, unavailability of a first biometric unit for verification of first biometric information; transmitting, by the first user device to an infrastructure device based on determining unavailability of the first biometric unit, a request for information regarding one or more second user devices available to assist with authenticating the first user device; receiving, by the first user device from the infrastructure device, the information regarding the one or more second user devices based on a determination that the one or more second user devices has a second biometric unit available for verification of second biometric information; and transmitting, by the first user device to the infrastructure device, a selection message for selecting a second user device from among the one or more second user devices to assist with authenticating the first user device is disclosed. Various other aspects are contemplated.

A method for authenticating an origin of a network device. The method includes reading one or more encrypted parameters from a memory of the network device, decoding the one or more encrypted parameters, and determining whether one or more of the decoded parameters match parameters obtained from a trusted platform module (TPM) installed in the network device and/or a read only memory (ROM) of the network device. In response to a mismatch between the decoded parameters and the parameters obtained from the TPM or the ROM, at least one of suspending operation of the device or transmitting a report of an authentication failure across a network on which the device is operating.

A Hardware Security Module (HSM) (900), and method thereof, suitable for use in securely servicing cryptographic requests from multiple tenant applications to preserve end-to-end privacy is provided. A Link Encryption and Key Diversification interoperability (43) between two processors provides cryptographic and logical isolation between multiple tenant applications on the HSM (900) that use and share more than one PCIe Physical Function (30) over more than one Virtual Function (VF) (21) to one or more Crypto Units (CU) (61) for satisfying a request (46) of an HSM cryptographic services. An Output Feedback (OFB) block with CRC support is further provided with encryption and decryption. The HSM as configured is more resistant to side channel attacks.

A distributed ledger and transaction computing network fabric over which large numbers of transactions are processed concurrently in a scalable, reliable, secure and efficient manner. The computing network fabric or core supports a distributed blockchain network that organizes data in a manner that allows communication, processing and storage of blocks of the chain to be performed concurrently, with little synchronization, at very high performance and low latency, even when the transactions themselves originate from distant sources. This data organization relies on segmenting a transaction space within autonomous but cooperating computing nodes that are configured as a processing mesh. The nodes operate on blocks independently from one another while still maintaining a consistent and logically-complete view of the blockchain as a whole. Secure transaction processing is facilitated by storing cryptographic key materials in trusted computing environments associated with the computing nodes to facilitate construction mining proofs during block validation.

Technologies for secure programming of a cryptographic engine include a computing device with a cryptographic engine and one or more I/O controllers. The computing device establishes one or more trusted execution environments (TEEs). A TEE generates a request to program the cryptographic engine with respect to a DMA channel. The computing device may verify a signed manifest that indicates the TEEs permitted to program DMA channels and, if verified, determine whether the TEE is permitted to program the requested DMA channel. The computing device may record the TEE for a request to protect the DMA channel and may determine whether the programming TEE matches the recorded TEE for a request to unprotect a DMA channel. The computing device may allow the request to unprotect the DMA channel if the programming TEE matches the recorded TEE. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

In one embodiment, an apparatus includes a wireless controller, which may include a byte stream parser to receive a stream of data from one or more wireless devices and parse the stream of data to identify a first data packet associated with a first channel identifier associated with a trusted application, and a cryptographic engine coupled to the byte stream parser to encrypt a payload portion of the first data packet in response to the identification of the first data packet associated with the first channel identifier. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Technologies for secure I/O data transfer includes a compute device, which includes a processor to execute a trusted application, an input/output (I/O) device, and an I/O subsystem. The I/O subsystem is configured to establish a secured channel between the I/O subsystem and a trusted application running on the compute device, and receive, in response to an establishment of the secured channel, I/O data from the I/O device via an unsecured channel. The I/O subsystem is further configured to encrypt, in response to a receipt of the I/O data, the I/O data using a security key associated with the trusted application that is to process the I/O data and transmit the encrypted I/O data to the trusted application via the secured channel, wherein the secured channel has a data transfer rate that is higher than a data transfer rate of the unsecured channel between the I/O device and the I/O subsystem.

A computing device is provided including a motherboard including a control module, a first trusted platform module (TPM), and a second TPM. The control module directs security operations to the first TPM, wherein the control module is operable to detect whether or not the first TPM is damaged, and wherein the control module, in response to detecting that the first TPM is damaged, is operable to direct subsequent security operations to be performed by the second TPM. A computer program product is also provided including non-transitory computer readable storage media embodying program instructions executable by a processor to direct security operations to a first TPM coupled to a motherboard of the computing device, detect whether or not the first TPM is damaged, and, responsive to detecting that the first TPM is damaged, direct subsequent security operations to a second TPM coupled to the motherboard of the computing device.

Technologies for secure I/O include a compute device, which further includes a processor, a memory, a trusted execution environment (TEE), one or more input/output (I/O) devices, and an I/O subsystem. The I/O subsystem includes a device memory access table (DMAT) programmed by the TEE to establish bindings between the TEE and one or more I/O devices that the TEE trusts and a memory ownership table (MOT) programmed by the TEE when a memory page is allocated to the TEE.

Systems and methods include establishing a secure communication between an application module and a sensor module. The application module is executing on an information-handling machine, and the sensor module is coupled to the information-handling machine. The establishment of the secure communication is at least partially facilitated by a mutually trusted module.