A method of checking the authenticity of the content of a non-volatile memory of an electronic device including a microcontroller and an embedded secure element includes starting the microcontroller with instructions stored in a first non-reprogrammable memory area associated with the microcontroller, starting the secure element, executing, with the secure element, a signature verification on the content of a second reprogrammable non-volatile memory area associated with the microcontroller, and if the signature is verified, using the secure element to send the first key to the microcontroller.

Examples described herein may provide local key managers on computing nodes of distributed computing systems. The local key managers may protect secrets (e.g. cryptographic keys) in the distributed system such that risk of compromise is reduced or eliminated. In some examples, secure processors, such as trusted platform modules (TPMs), may be incorporated in computing nodes of distributed computing systems described herein. The secure processor may aid in securely protect cryptographic keys in the event of disk or node theft, for example.

An example non-transitory computer-readable medium includes instructions that, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to receive a request for data. The instructions also cause the processor to determine a region containing the data based on the metadata. The instructions cause the processor to traverse a tree in the metadata to determine key generation information relating a decryption key for the region to a root key.

According to some embodiments, an overall chain-of-trust may be established for an industrial control system. Secure hardware may be provided, including a hardware security module coupled to or integrated with a processor of the industrial control system to provide a hardware root-of-trust. Similarly, secure firmware associated with a secure boot mechanism such that the processor executes a trusted operating system, wherein the secure boot mechanism includes one or more of a measured boot, a trusted boot, and a protected boot. Objects may be accessed via secure data storage, and data may be exchanged via secure communications in accordance with information stored in the hardware security model.

Generally described, physical computing devices in a virtual network can be configured to host a number of virtual machine instances. The physical computing devices can be operably coupled with offload devices. In accordance with an aspect of the present disclosure, a security component can be incorporated into an offload device. The security component can be a physical device including a microprocessor and storage. The security component can include a set of instructions configured to validate an operational configuration of the offload device or the physical computing device to establish that they are configured in accordance with a secure or trusted configuration. In one example, a first security component on the offload device can validate the operational computing environment on the offload device and a second security component on the physical computing device can validate the operational computing environment on the physical computing device.

A computing platform implements one or more secure enclaves including a first provisioning enclave to interface with a first provisioning service to obtain a first attestation key from the first provisioning service, a second provisioning enclave to interface with a different, second provisioning service to obtain a second attestation key from the second provisioning service, and a provisioning certification enclave to sign first data from the first provisioning enclave and second data from the second provisioning enclave using a hardware-based provisioning attestation key. The signed first data is used by the first provisioning enclave to authenticate to the first provisioning service to obtain the first attestation key and the signed second data is used by the second provisioning enclave to authenticate to the second provisioning service to obtain the second attestation key.

Provided is a method for achieving a security function for a security control device for controlling a device or an installation, including: a basic control device, and a security module and having the following steps of a) providing at least one first partial secret which is stored in the basic control device, b) providing at least one second partial secret which is stored in the security module, c) combining the at least one first partial secret and the at least one second partial secret in order to achieve the security function, wherein the at least one first partial secret is broken down into sections of a predefinable size and the set of sections is gradually combined with the at least second partial secret by means of a calculation rule, which can be processed within a predefinable period during the execution of the calculation rule according to the size and set.

A method for achieving a security function for a security control device for controlling a device or an installation, including: a) providing at least one first partial secret that is stored in a basic control device, b) providing at least one second partial secret that is stored in a security module, c) combining the at least one first and second partial secret to form an overall secret, required to achieve the security function, within the time period in which the basic control device interacts with the security module via the first and second coupling interfaces, and d) disguising the combined overall secret outside the time period.

Examples disclosed herein include are computing device hardware components, computing devices, systems, machine-readable mediums, and interconnect protocols that provide for code object measurement of a peripheral device and a method for accessing the measurements to verify integrity across a computing interconnect (e.g., Peripheral Component Interconnect ExpressPCIe). For example, a cryptographic processor of a PCIe endpoint (such as a peripheral) may take a measurement (e.g., computing a hash value) of a code object on the device prior to executing the code object. This measurement may be placed in a register that is accessible to another component, such as a host operating system across a PCIe bus for interrogation. The host operating system may utilize an interconnect protocol, such as a PCIe protocol to access the measurement. These measurements may be consumed by a Trusted Platform Manager or other components of a host system that may verify the measurements.

Methods, systems, and apparatus for providing secure communication. The device includes a secure element for generating application key pairs. The device includes a trusted environment that is physically or logically isolated from an untrusted environment. The trusted environment includes one or more processors configured to perform operations of an application. The operations include generating an application key pair. The application key pair includes a secure element private key and a secure element public key. The operations include sending an application authentication request including one or more device identifiers and the secure element public key to a server. The operations include obtaining a digital certificate that includes the secure element public key and the one or more device identifiers. The operations include providing the digital certificate to a second device and establishing a secure communication channel between the device and the second device using the digital certificate.